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THE
HISTORY
OF THE
CAMPAIGN
OF
1797,
IN
ITALY & GERMANY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

VOL. II.

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1800.

THE

HISTORY

CAMBRIDGE



PREFACE.

THE three volumes which are now presented to the Public, form a continuation of the History of the Campaign of 1796, which was published the following year by the same author.

They contain a recital of the short but extraordinary and decisive campaign of 1797—a military and political survey of the two years so critical, and marked by such a succession of events, which elapsed from the treaty of Leoben in April, 1797, till the renewal of the continental war—and the

History of the memorable Campaign carried on in 1799, in Germany, Switzerland and Italy. This last part of his work has most particularly occupied the Author's attention, and it is that which he has treated most in detail. He has had no other object and has no other pretention, than to furnish to the future historian a connected series of authentic materials; and meanwhile to present to the military man a subject of interest and instruction. This double object has imposed upon him the obligation of being strictly impartial. He flatters himself that he has been so in the statements of facts.—It would be vain to expect any greater degree of impartiality from writers contemporary with the French Revolution. Like the law of Solon, it has left no other alternative but that of being its partizan or its enemy. If sentiments adverse to it animate the heart and have guided the pen of the author, every thing induces him to believe that it was only by this means that he could anticipate the judgment of posterity.

rity. The lapse of every succeeding year is making way for this judgment, and announcing more and more what it will be. The French Revolution may be soon, if not already, compared to the decrepid old man, whose moral career, though his physical existence still continues, is at an end; and who, though a principle of life still animates him, can no longer communicate it. He has lost the power of action; there is no longer any good to be hoped, nor any evil to be feared from him; if it is not yet time to pronounce judgment upon him, it is nevertheless time to form it.

During all the wars which have preceded this, even during those nearest to the æra at which we live, the public only knew, and it may be said only desired to know, the principal facts and the grand results, such as the battles and the sieges. The details of the operations, and the motives which had actuated the Generals, were commonly known only many years after from private memoirs—

but as the officers who wrote them not confining themselves to giving an account of what they themselves had seen, were obliged to rely for the rest upon reports often unfaithful, it happened that these different memoirs were frequently contradictory, and proved more embarrassing than useful to the historian, who wished to collect and reduce them into a whole. Hence it is that the Marquis de Feuquieres, and the Chevalier de Folard, the two most enlightened officers of their time, give a very different account of the battle which was fought at Cassano in 1705, between Prince Eugene and the Duke of Vendome. But during this war, in this point similar to those of antiquity, the issue of each campaign being to decide not only the political rights of sovereigns, but the dearest interests of the people, and even every engagement affecting the moral and physical existence of many thousands of individuals, every one has felt an anxious desire to know, and every government the necessity of making known, facts,

facts, to which were attached so many fears, hopes, and common duties. Hence numerous and daily official dispatches have, particularly in the last campaign, informed the whole of Europe of every military event; and enabled every attentive and judicious person to follow and to judge the connection of the operations. These official accounts have in proportion to their degree of value been made the principal basis of this work; but it would have been incomplete, and only a repetition of what the public had already had under their inspection, without the private but authentic documents which the author has procured respecting those things upon which the official accounts are commonly least explicit or least correct, such as the respective forces and losses. Those who have attentively followed the progress of the Campaign of 1797, and of that of 1799, will perceive that he has had respecting several operations which have continued little known, very circumstantial

private informations. Some memoirs already published by French Generals, read with the necessary precaution, have not been found altogether useless. Similar has been the case with a periodical work, intitled: *Le Precis des Evenemens Militaires*, which the author did not, however, receive till after a great part of his work was written. It cannot be denied that the person who has edited this Journal, has in a great number of respects well understood the system of the Campaign of 1799, and that he is an enlightened military writer. But though in conformity with its title this Journal has entered very little into detail in the recital of events, and though it has only appeared once every month, it contains a great number of inaccuracies, and is particularly incorrect in the estimates which it gives of the forces of the armies and of their losses. It is perceivable that its author has in this respect and in some others adopted the false calculations of the gazettes of the day, and it is fair to re-
mark

mark that, obliged to publish each number of his Journal at a fixed period, he may not have had time to draw information from purer sources. Although the author of this history has had in this point the advantage over the author of the Journal, such is the multiplicity and the intricacy of the facts of which he gives an account, that he is far from flattering himself that he has fallen into no errors, but he hopes that they will be found very few in number, and that for such as he has fallen into, he will meet with the indulgence of the reader.

The maps which have been added to this work, and which have been expressly engraved for it, contain the theatre of all the events described in these three volumes. It will be seen from the extent of their scale, from their execution, and from the name of the person who has engraved them, that neither care nor expence have been spared to render them fit for the purpose to which

they were designed. With the exception of a small number of names not to be found in any map, and for the most part belonging to mountains, or to single houses, all the places mentioned in the course of the work are laid down in the maps: a correspondence seldom occurring in such cases, which, among others, the very insufficient maps of the *Precis des Evenemens Militaires* do not present, and which would even be sought for in vain in the maps of Chauchard, so far as relates to the Campaigns of 1796, 1797, and 1799.

It will be seen that the plans of the fortresses annexed to the last volume, by which the author has meant to give it a little value, could not be procured from a common source, and that they could only be drawn by active witnesses of the sieges which they represent.

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
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





Map of the Theatre of War in
ITALY,
1796 and 1799.



Theatre of War,
 IN
ITALY;
in the Years
 1797, 1798 and 1799.





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CAMPAIGN

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CHAPTER I.

*General Bonaparte's projects—Motives which dictated them—Means which he had to execute them—Unfavourable situation of the Austrians in Italy—Position and strength of the two armies—Explanation of their local circumstances.**

FOR nearly a year had victory been chained by Bonaparte to the standards of the Republic; he had waved them over the walls of Mantua, he

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had

* The History of the Campaign of 1796, published three years ago, contains a detail of the military operations, down to the surrender of Mantua, which happened on the 2d of February.—The six weeks forming the interval between that date and the opening of the sixth campaign, presented no event of importance, except

had threatened to plant them on those of the capital, he was lord of one half of Italy, he was enriched by its spoils, and supported by a part of its in-

cept the invasion of the papal territory, and the consequent treaty of peace, which are related in the same volume. The Austrian and French armies were prevented from undertaking any thing of moment, by the weak state of the former, and the absence of a part of the latter; on either side the troops went into cantonments. Several affairs took place among the out posts, however, all of them more or less bloody; but they did not materially affect the position of the two armies. The most remarkable of these happened at Cembra, Lovadino, and Teuchmetz. In the latter, the French lost more than 500 men; indeed they were worsted in almost all these encounters. After having signed a peace with the Pope at Tolentino, on the 19th of February, concluded with no other view, but to enable himself to undertake the invasion of Germany, Bonaparte sent back upon the Po, either in carriages, or by forced marches, all the troops which had advanced into the states of the church, except 5,000 men left in Romagna, under the orders of Generals Victor and Rusca. These officers faithful to the principle adopted by the French Generals ever since the revolution, to make war itself, the very means of carrying on war, and to maintain their troops at the expence of whatever country they happened to occupy, be it hostile, neutral, or friendly, compelled the states of the church in which they lay, to bear the costs of the subsistence of their army, and gave themselves up besides to every kind of extortion and violence. At the same time that they laid waste
this

inhabitants: still however his thirst for military renown, was as little satisfied as the ambition of the French Republic. His army after all its losses, amounted to at least 90,000 fighting men: it had

been

B 2

this beautiful country, they sowed all around them the seeds of anarchy, which were quickly matured by the glowing climate of Italy. These complicated causes, occasioned a number of insurrections to break out in the March of Ancona, the Dutchy of Urbino, Romagna, and the surrounding countries, some of them directed against the French, and some against the Papal government—The latter was too weak, and too much embarrassed to be able either to prevent or punish these seditions. The case was different with the French, who being strong, shewed no mercy: for without troubling themselves with making any distinction between those of the inhabitants who submitted to, and those who resisted their yoke, they abandoned the towns of Macerata, Jesi, Ricanata, Porto di Fermo, and Grotto di Mare, to pillage, and shot a great number of their inhabitants. While the French thus confirmed their empire in the states of the Church, they again took possession of the town of Leghorn, notwithstanding all they had before received from the Grand Duke, to induce them to evacuate it—They had troops also at Genoa, in the territory of Modena, and in Lombardy. The hatred borne against the French in these countries, and the dread of its breaking out into open resistance during their absence, had compelled Bonaparte to take these precautions before he engaged himself in Germany.

been raised to this number, by a detachment of 20,000 sent from the Rhine with General Bernadotte, by some foreign corps, chiefly Polish, formed in Italy, and by the enrolment of Italian volunteers, who were desirous of sharing the victories, and still more, the depredations of the French army.

The possession of Mantua, and of the castle of Milan, the democratic inclinations manifested by a part of the Venetian state, and the offensive treaty just concluded between the King of Sardinia* and the French nation, effectually removed the fears which Bonaparte entertained concerning the views of the government of Venice, and the discontented state of the conquered country; and confiding besides, to the terror inspired by his victories, and still more, by the dreadful examples his vengeance had made, he thought he might advance beyond the Italian territory, and leave that country behind him without fear.

In

* This Prince, like the King of Spain, had turned an ally from an enemy of the French; and the same Piedmontese troops that had fought to prevent them from penetrating into Italy, joined them, to drive the Austrians entirely from it.

In the preceding campaign, he had been unable to penetrate into Germany, and there co-operate with Moreau ; he did not doubt that he should be more successful in 1797 ; and even conceived the hope of being able alone to accomplish those vast projects in which the armies of Germany had been baffled : at least he flattered himself to get before them into the Imperial dominions, the invasion and conquest of which, would thus be prepared, and made much easier.

These projects were rather unexpected than rash, and there was, perhaps, more boldness in conceiving, than difficulty in executing them. The unfavourable chances they presented, could not put a stop to the progress of an army trained to war, taught by so many battles, emboldened by almost as many victories, and confiding as much in the talents of its General, as he himself relied on his good fortune. Besides, every circumstance was propitious to the French. In the country they wished to invade, there was no strong place to be taken, no considerable river to be crossed. They had little to fear, in the first instance, from the Austrian army ; it was too feeble, and too much discouraged, to be able to resist with any hopes of success.

Although the presence of the Archduke Charles, who had come towards the end of January to take the command of that army, had a little restored its vigour, and recalled its confidence; though considerable reinforcements had been sent from the Rhine to join it, and though the extraordinary levies of men then making in all the dominions of the Emperor were to be added to it, yet a vast deal of time must necessarily elapse, before its numbers, coherence, and harmony could be made to counterbalance those of the French army. Bonaparte might reasonably hope to gain some great victory over the Archduke in the mean time, or, if the latter refused battle, at least to force him to abandon a considerable extent of ground.

Besides the facility of invading Germany, resulting from the above military statement, the French were induced to it by several local and political considerations. The countries which they occupied, and which they had now preyed upon for almost a whole year, were very nearly exhausted, and could no longer comply with the requisitions. Every article, which could be of any service to the army, was either consumed already, or secured in the magazines.—Every thing which had tempted the avarice of the Generals was now in their hands; it was

was necessary, therefore, to go and seek other contributions, and other spoils in rich and virgin countries, over which the revolutionary scythe, and a Republican army had never yet passed. The Directory could, moreover, neither consolidate the Cisalpine Republic, nor create new ones, according to their plan, as long as the Austrian army should remain upon the frontier of Italy, threatening the friends of the French, and holding out hopes and encouragement to their enemies. There was a necessity, therefore, for driving the Imperialists to a greater distance, and for carrying the war into Germany; less, indeed, to make new conquests, than to secure such as had already been made.

These were the views of ambition and cupidity, which animated the Directory, and the leaders of the French armies. Bonaparte partook of their sentiments, but in him they were united to private and individual views and motives. The conqueror of Italy burned with a desire to meet, in the field, the saviour of Germany.—Both of them had conquered upon their own theatre: they were both young, and eminently brave: both endowed with the highest talents, the idols of their armies, and passionately

fond of glory, which they had both acquired, but upon very different grounds.—The first had been fighting for usurpators, with whom he was an accomplice, and had laid waste foreign countries.—The second had saved his own, and secured on the head of his brother a legitimate crown.—The one had destroyed—the other had preserved ;—Bonaparte was to be looked upon by posterity as an Attila—The Archduke as a Camillus.—The conscience of the former could not fail to tell him, that the glory of his rival was purer, more warranted by reason, and far less repugnant to humanity.—He could not help seeing, at once, in young Prince Charles, the protector of Germany, the hope of Europe, and the defender of social order.—This was more than sufficient to stimulate the proud and fiery Bonaparte, and to inflame him with the desire of contending with the Archduke, and erecting his trophies upon the ruins of those of that Prince. Fortune furnished him with the opportunity, and every possible advantage favoured his design. Indeed, the wrecks of the five Austrian armies, successively formed and dissipated in the plains of Italy, and in the mountains of the Tyrol, during the preceding campaign, were the only troops, except some battalions

come

come from the upper Rhine, which could then be opposed to the French. These feeble remains of the numerous bodies of men, which had almost exhausted the population of the hereditary states, were scarcely to be called an army. They had neither the requisite strength, consistence, spirit, or system. Not one of the regiments was complete: some, indeed, had no more than a few companies.—The flower of the cavalry had been lost in Mantua. The battalions reckoned more recruits than able soldiers.—Those had never seen service—these had always been beaten.—The courage of the former, was not animated by the hope of victory,—that of the latter was totally depressed by continual misfortunes; and what was still more distressing, the Generals, and the officers, partook of the soldier's despondency, and added to it complaints and criticisms, the too common consequences of bad fortune.

In this state of affairs the Austrians could not think of an offensive war, from which, the loss of Mantua, and other circumstances, had taken away all ground of hope. The only plan they now could adopt was, to shut the entrance into Germany against the French army, by maintaining themselves in the position they already occupied. They
were

were cantoned in the Trentino, in the Tyrol, the country of Feltre, and the Trevisano ; having their right supported by the mountains of the county of Bormio, and of the country of the Grisons ; their centre occupying the space inclosed between the Adige and the Piave ; and guarding with their left, the left bank of that river, from Feltre to where it flows into the sea. Their line passed by Cles, Salurn, Cavalese, Predazzo, Primiere, Feltre, and from thence followed the course of the Piave.—In the beginning of February, the Archduke caused the main body of the army, to retire behind the Tagliamento, and sent it to take cantonments in the Friuly and in Carinthia, leaving three corps of troops to guard the line above mentioned.—The first commanded by General Lyptay, and about 11,000 men strong, defended all the space comprehended between the frontier of the country of the Grisons and Salurn, and covered, as has been seen, the valley of the Adige.—The second, near 7,000 men strong, and commanded by General Lusignan guarded the line from Salurn to Feltre, and was posted part in the mountains and part in the plain.—5,000 men commanded by General Hohenzollern lined the left bank of the Piave, from its mouth

mouth to Feltre.—Thus these three corps which communicated by a chain of posts, amounted to about 23,000 men. The total of the troops which were behind this line, might amount to near 15,000 men. All the forces then which were at the disposal of the Archduke, did not amount to more than 38,000: he expected in the spring from 30 to 35,000, which were to come to him from the Rhine, and some thousands had already arrived in the bishopric of Salzburg. The head quarters of this prince were at Udina.

The line of the French army was a short distance from, and in front of that of their enemies. It also began from the mountains of the county of Bormio, and extended as far as the sea, at the mouth of the Piave, passing by Wezzano, Lavis, Trent, Pergine, Borgo, Primolano, Bassano, and Treviso. It was also divided into three principal corps: the first commanded by General Joubert, was more than 20,000 men strong, and formed the left—That of the centre, was under the orders of Massena—The third was under the immediate direction of the commander in chief, Bonaparte, the two latter corps were 60,000 men strong.

Such

Such was the position of the two hostile armies at the end of February, it corresponded to the three principal *debouches* by which they could attack each other. The nature of the ground was not equally favourable on these three points for the invasion meditated by Bonaparte ; and yet to effect it with safety, he must be equally successful on every one of them. The superiority of the forces which he commanded in person, upon the lower Piave, promised him success on that point of attack, which besides offered no other obstacles, but the little difficult passage of the rivers Piave and Tagliamento, and some posts so hastily fortified, that they were not capable of a long defence.—The second point of attack presented greater impediments and dangers. To drive the Austrians from the upper Piave, and reach the valley of Cadore, it was necessary to entangle the troops among the mountains, and to expose their two flanks to the corps of the enemy which were in Tyrol and Friuly. The attack of the former country, nature had rendered by far the most difficult. The French could not expel the Austrians from it, without attacking them front to front in the narrow valley of the Adige. The mountains which formed it

were

were almost inaccessible on both sides, and all their approaches were defended by numerous entrenchments, and by corps of armed Tyrolians, who to their natural aptitude for a war of posts, added the advantage of fighting upon their own ground.

By examining on the maps, the three openings by which Bonaparte could penetrate into Germany, it will be seen how indispensably necessary it was for him to secure all the three: for if he contented himself with advancing across the lower Piave and the Tagliamento, the Austrian corps which were on the upper Piave, and in the district of Cadore, might come upon his rear, and enclose him between them and the Archduke. Even if he attacked upon the upper and lower Piave at once, without also attacking upon the side of the Tyrol, the Austrians who defended the latter country, who were masters of all the mouths of the defiles, and occupied the highest of the mountains, might advance against the French with advantage; and if they should meet with success, might retake the Trentino, descend into the plains of the Veronese, arm the inhabitants, cut off Bonaparte's communications with Italy, seize his depots

depots and magazines, and finally occasion the entire destruction of the French army.

These considerations influenced the French General in the execution of his plan of invasion: he resolved to act offensively upon each of the points, but first upon the centre, to ward off those dangers which have been just explained, and to secure the operations of the right wing of his army. There was another reason which determined him to strike the first blow upon the upper Piave; he wished to place himself between the Archduke's army, and the Austrian corps posted in the Tyrol, and thus to interrupt their communication, a manœuvre which he found to succeed so well in the beginning of the preceding campaign, when he separated the Austrians from the Piedmontese, and which he hoped to repeat with no less effect.

However, he might rely upon his talents, his fortune, and his strength, he was of opinion that the happy issue of the expedition he was preparing, depended in great measure upon the promptitude with which it should be carried into execution.—He thought that his designs might miscarry, if he gave time to the troops coming
2 from

from the Rhine, from Hungaria, and Croatia, to join the Archduke, and if he allowed that Prince to organize and strengthen all the new elements of his army. Seeing then of what importance it was for him to get the start of his enemies, and to attack them before they should be capable of defending themselves, he hastened his arrangements, and prepared to bring his army into the field as soon as the season might permit.

CHAP. II.

*The French begin the Campaign—Success of Massena in the country of Feltre and of Belluna—Passage and action of the Tagliamento—The Austrians retire from the Isonzo—That river passed, and Gradiska taken by the French—Opening of the Campaign in the Tyrol—Engagements of Lavis, of Tramen, and of Clauzen—Plan of the Archduke to prevent Bonaparte from penetrating into the Hereditary States—Cause of its Failure—Battle of Tarvis and its consequences.**

ON the 10th of March, the centre and part of the right wing of the French army began to move, and,

* The same day on which Bonaparte opened the campaign, he addressed a Proclamation to his army. As in it he recapitulated his military romances, took occasion to number his triumphs with much emphasis, boasted of actions with which history will reproach him, and declared, openly, his wish to revolutionize the states of the

and, according to the plan formed by Bonaparte, the principal object of which was to separate the armies of

the Emperor. It may not be thought useless to insert the whole of it in this place.

BONAPARTE, *General in Chief, to the Soldiers of the Army of Italy, from Head Quarters, at Bassano, 10th March.*

" The surrender of Mantua has just terminated a campaign, which entitles you to the everlasting gratitude of your country.

" You have been victorious in fourteen pitched battles, and in seventy engagements.—You have taken 100,000 prisoners, above 500 field pieces, 2,000 heavy cannon, and 4 sets of pontoons.

" The contributions, exacted from the countries which you have conquered, have fed, cloathed, and paid the army, during the whole campaign, and you have, besides, sent 30,000,000 of livres to the Minister of Finance, to assist the public treasury.

" You have enriched the Museum at Paris with above 300 master pieces of art, the produce of ancient and modern Italy, during the space of thirty centuries.

" You have conquered for the Republic, the finest countries in Europe : the Lombard and Cispadan Republics, owe to you their liberty. The flag of France now flies for the first time, on the shores of the Adriatic; and within twenty-four hours sail of Ancient Macedonia.—The Kings of Sardinia, and of Naples, the Pope, and

of the Tyrol and Friuly, that General directed his first efforts against the body of the enemy, which defended

“ the Duke of Parma, are detached from the coalition of
 “ our enemies, and have solicited your friendship.—You
 “ have driven the English from Leghorn, from Genoa,
 “ and from Corsica: but you have not yet done all.—A
 “ great destiny is reserved for you: it is in you that your
 “ country places its dearest hopes: you will continue to
 “ deserve its confidence.

“ Of so many enemies who leagued to stifle the Re-
 “ public in its birth, the Emperor alone remains. De-
 “ grading himself from the rank of a great Potentate,
 “ this Prince has accepted the wages of the merchants of
 “ London,—He has no longer any political existence,
 “ and no will but that of those perfidious islanders, who,
 “ strangers to the horrors of war, smile, with pleasure,
 “ at the miseries of the continent.

“ *The Executive Directory have spared no pains to*
 “ *give peace to Europe. The moderation of their pro-*
 “ *posals had no relation to the force of their armies.—*
 “ They did not consult our courage, but humanity, and
 “ their desire to restore you to your families. They
 “ have not been listened to at Vienna. There is then
 “ no hope of peace but by going to seek it in the heart of
 “ the Hereditary states of the House of Austria.—You
 “ will find there a brave people, ruined by the war they
 “ have had with the Turks, and by that in which they
 “ are now engaged. The inhabitants of Vienna and
 “ of Austria groan under the arbitrary blindness of their
 “ government. There is not one of them who does not
 “ believe

defended the countries of Feltre and of Belluna. On that day, General Massena advanced towards the first of these towns: at his approach, the advanced posts of the enemy fell back from the Cordevola to Belluna. At the same time, General Serurier took post with his division at Asolo, and assisted by that of General Gyeux, passed on the 11th, without much difficulty, the Piave at Vidor, and at Hospidaleto. The enemy, who had not been in sufficient force to make any effectual resistance, at the passage of the Piave, were equally unable to impede their progress, and on the same day, they pushed on as far as Conegliano. On the 13th, they

C 2

continued

" believe that the gold of England has corrupted the
 " ministers of the Emperor.—You will respect their
 " religion and their manners—You will protect their
 " properties.—It is *Liberty* which you will bestow on
 " the brave Hungarian nation.—The House of Austria,
 " which for three ages past, loses by every war a part of
 " its power, which estranges the hearts of its subjects,
 " by depriving them of their privileges, will be reduced,
 " at the end of this sixth campaign, (since it forces
 " us to make it) to accept the peace which we will
 " grant, and will descend, in reality, to that secondary
 " rank among the powers of Europe, in which it has
 " already placed itself, by accepting the wages and putting
 " itself at the disposal of England.

" BONAPARTE."

continued to advance, and one of their divisions dislodged the Austrians from Sacile. At the same time, General Massena marched to Belluna, which had been evacuated by the Austrians. General Lusignan, who commanded them, had posted himself behind that town, wishing to cover the valley of Cadore. He was soon attacked by above 10,000 men; but though he had not 2,000, knowing it to be of much importance, that he should preserve his position as long as possible, he therefore, resolved to risk every thing in its defence. He resisted the whole force of Massena's army for thirteen hours, and, during the whole day, maintained his post. At last, however, he was obliged to yield to superior numbers, and the French, having got possession of all the heights and avenues which surrounded him, General Lusignan, after having lost the greatest part of his troops, expended his ammunition, and unsuccessfully attempted to force his way through the enemy at the point of the bayonet, was obliged to surrender himself prisoner with his remaining forces.*

These

* "Bonaparte wrote to the Directory, that General
"Lusignan, having conducted himself with inhumanity
"towards

These different successes having rendered Bonaparte master of Belluna, and of all the country between the Lavis and the Piave, he had no longer any thing to dread from that quarter, and he was enabled, with confidence, to advance his right wing, in which, as has been said before, was the principal part of his forces. In passing the Piave, it had already overcome a part of the obstacles which opposed its progress; and the country between that river and the Tagliamento, behind which the Austrians had retired, presented nothing very difficult to overcome. On the 16th, three divisions of his army set out from Pardenone, Sacile, and Pasiano, and marched towards Valvasone and the Tagliamento.

C 3

The

" towards 2,000 French prisoners, whom he had taken
 " at Brescia, he had sent him to Paris, that he might
 " not be exchanged. Upon his arrival there, he was
 " treated in the same manner as Sir Sidney Smith, and
 " was put into the same prison with that officer. He immediately demanded that a commission should be
 " named to examine into the accusations brought against
 " him, and he was not only acquitted unanimously by it,
 " but also by another which was formed in Italy for the
 " same purpose. As soon as he recovered his liberty,
 " he returned to that country, and went to Bonaparte,
 " who engaged to publish, himself, his justification,
 " but who forgot that promise, as he had done so many
 " others."

The Austrians had hastily thrown up some entrenchments on the left bank of that river, but as it was almost every where fordable, and as the French could effect the passage out of the reach of the enemy's batteries, they became almost useless; in fact, the French marched to the right and left of them, and, under the protection of a numerous artillery, and a crowd of sharp shooters, they passed the river, though not without opposition, and without loss. The Austrian cavalry immediately charged the infantry, with much effect, but, having soon to defend itself against the French cavalry, in spite of all the personal efforts of the Archduke, it was obliged to retreat, a measure rendered indispensable by the great disproportion of numbers, those of the French being threefold superior. This action, in which the infantry of the Austrians took almost no part, cost them, according to the report of their enemies, 6 pieces of cannon, and 4 or 500 prisoners, among whom was General Schulz.

The Archduke, who had caused himself to be joined by all the troops cantoned in Friuly, retired from the Tagliamento towards the Isonzo.—His head-quarters were on the 16th at Ontagnan, and on the 17th at Visco, behind the Venetian fortress of

of Palma Nuova. This Prince was too wise to wait for the French in the open country, and to hazard a battle which he could not hope to gain.— However painful it was to him to fall back before his enemies, he knew how to sacrifice this personal feeling to what his situation required. He thoroughly comprehended the extent of the dangers which surrounded him, and of the resources which he still possessed; he saw that to run the risk of a battle with a weak and dispirited army, against a superior and elated enemy, would be to play a losing game, and to give them an opportunity of destroying in one day all the forces he had left. If by avoiding an engagement, the Archduke sacrificed some territory, he was in part recompensed by his approaching so much nearer to the reinforcements which he expected. Every retrograde movement which he made augmented his strength, while it diminished that of the French, who were obliged to leave detachments behind them to protect their convoys, their hospitals and their communications.—In proportion as they advanced, their subsistence became more difficult and precarious. The army of the Archduke, on the contrary, was more easily provided from

the great magazines, which had been formed in Carinthia and in Carniola.

The position which it occupied was not sufficiently strong to make the defence of it adviseable, and the enemy having again advanced on all sides, on the 18th, the fortress of Palma Nuova, a place of great extent, and of which the fortifications were in bad order, was evacuated.—On the same day, the French entered it, and all their army pushed on as far as the Torre, their left stretching to the foot of the mountains which border the plain of Friuly.—On the 19th they marched to the Isonzo; and the town of Gradiska, situated on the right bank of that river, and which was rather a *tête de pont*, than a regular fortification, was surrounded by the divisions of the Generals Serrurier and Bernadotte.—After having made some attempts, which cost him dear, to take it by storm, Bernadotte summoned the town to capitulate,* and the Austrian officer, who

* The summons which he sent to the Commandant is a curious model of the style, the modesty, and the humanity of the Republicans.

“ Sir, you have defended yourself like a brave man
 “ and by doing so have acquired the esteem of military
 “ men, but a longer resistance on your part, would be a
 “ crime.”

who commanded in it, did not wait either for another attack, or another summons.

The garrison, to the number of 3,000 men, according to Bonaparte, but in truth, little more than half that number were made prisoners of war.—At the same time the right of the French army forded the Isonzo, near Cossegliano, while Massena, on the left having forced the passage of the Chiusa, advanced into the valley of that name, and pushed on to Ponteba, on the frontiers of Carinthia.—The French force, which had passed the Isonzo, below Gradiska, threatening to turn the position of Goritia, where, on the 18th, the Archduke Charles had placed his head quarters, that Prince was obliged to remove them farther back, and transferred them on the 20th, to Vippach. While the army, led by Bonaparte himself, finished the conquest of Friuly, and forced back the Imperialists into the Hereditary states,

“ *crime, which I would revenge principally on you, and*
 “ *to justify myself in the eyes of posterity, I must sum-*
 “ *mon you to surrender in ten minutes; if you refuse, I*
 “ *shall put your garrison to the sword. Spare the blood*
 “ *which will not be spilt but by your faults. The prin-*
 “ *ciples of philanthropy, which ought to animate every*
 “ *Commander, lays the obligation upon you. The scal-*
 “ *ing ladders are ready, the grenadiers and chasseurs are*
 “ *impatient for the assault.—Answer.”*

states, the three divisions which he had left in the country of Trent, and in the Tyrol, under the orders of General Joubert, began to assist in the execution of his plan of invasion. In the preceding chapter, the reasons have been stated which had induced the French commander in chief to begin his attacks by his centre and right wing. The success he had, had diminished the dangers and difficulties of the operations which were to be entrusted to his left. It was time, that in his turn, the left should act in support of the right, and should secure its progress by dislodging the Austrians from the commanding positions which they yet held in the Tyrol. On that depended not only the future success of Bonaparte, but also the preservation of what he had already gained, and it may be said, the safety of his army.

On the 20th of March, the three divisions, to the amount of 25,000 men, and which, as has been said, occupied the banks of the Adige, as far as Lavis, and extended along the left side of that river, put themselves in motion and marched against the enemy, who were on all sides at a little distance from them.

Their

Their force being greatly superior, and their attack well combined, they had complete success, and the line of posts of the Austrians, commanded by Generals Kerpen and Loudon, having been broken in several places, they were entirely driven from Lavis with great loss, principally in prisoners. Bonaparte estimated it at 4,000 men, and of these 2,000 in killed and wounded. He would have been nearer the truth if he had stated their total loss, on this occasion, at near 3,000 men, and if he had acknowledged that that of his troops amounted to more than half that number.—On the following day, the French pushed forward, and on the 22d, again advanced against the enemy, who had mostly retired to the right bank of the Adige. The Republicans, having occupied Salurn and Neumarkt, passed the river there, and attacked, near Tramen, the troops commanded by General Loudon, which were retiring along the right bank. This officer disputed the ground very bravely, and probably would have retained it, had not the French received, during the combat, reinforcements which gave them the advantage. They made 2 or 300 prisoners, and intercepted the road to Botzen, so as to prevent General Loudon from joining General Kerpen

and the main body of the army. This last General, unable to contend with General Joubert, who, he perceived, was gaining his flanks, by different passages in the mountains, on the 22d evacuated Botzen, which was the next day taken possession of by the French. On the 24th, after leaving a corps to watch General Loudon, who had retired towards Meran, they marched to Clauzen, where General Kerpen had posted himself. They attacked him there, and after a long and obstinate engagement, in which he made every effort to maintain his situation, and in which he lost some hundred men, he was forced to retreat beyond Brixen; and from thence, in order to cover Inspruck, he went to take a position near Sterzingen, in the chain of mountains, called Brenner, which is not only the last but the strongest in the Tyrol, on the side of Italy. In his account of this affair, General Bonaparte, who is as good a story teller, as a soldier, assured the Directory, that General Dumas, *after having killed, with his own hand, several of the enemy's horsemen, like another Cocles, had alone stopped, for several minutes, upon a bridge, a squadron of cavalry, and had gave time to his troops to come to his assistance.*

On

On the 26th, General Joubert wished to follow up his success, by forcing the position taken by the Austrians in the defile, through which the road from Brixen to Inspruck passes ; but notwithstanding the briskness of his attack, he could not succeed in dislodging them entirely, and was obliged to return to his former position, after an action in which both sides suffered considerable loss.

By the progress made by the left of the French army, the General in Chief Bonaparte was relieved from any serious disquiet, and felt himself at liberty to pursue his schemes. In ten days he had obtained the most signal advantages on every side ; he had separated the army of the Archduke from that of General Kerpen ; he had obliged the former to evacuate all the Friuly, and the latter to yield up three fourths of the Tyrol. Fortune had favoured him every where, and so numerous were his forces, that he could indulge the hope of fixing her to his standard. He therefore did not lose a moment in advancing into the Hereditary states which he had just entered, and in penetrating into Germany by a road which had not been trod by the French since the time of Charlemagne.

As has been said before, the Austrians having evacuated Gorizia after the French had passed the Isonzo, Bonaparte marched to that town, while his right proceeded towards Trieste; and on his left Generals Guyeux and Massena advanced, the one from Cividale to Chiavoretto, where he gained a slight advantage over the rear guard of the Austrians, and the other to Austrian Ponteba, otherwise called Pontaffel. Massena had received orders to make every effort to possess himself as soon as possible of the two passages which lead from Friuly into Carinthia, across the chain of Alps which separate these two countries. His object was to turn the right flank of the Archduke, to prevent this Prince from receiving all the reinforcements which had been sent to him from the Rhine, and even to arrive before the main body of the Imperial army, upon the road which leads from Clagenfurt to Vienna.

While the French were busy in the execution of these designs, the Archduke foreseeing, thought of preventing them, and at the time when they were preparing to turn his right flank, he formed the bold plan of putting a sudden stop to their career by turning their left and attacking them in flank. Accordingly, after having drawn nearer to each

each other, his left and his centre which were retreating into Carniola, and which united on the 21st at Prewald and Villach; he set off post the same day for Tarvis and Villach, towards which place he had ordered a column of his centre to hasten by forced marches, and where several battalions and squadrons coming from the Rhine were to join him—The junction of these troops would have formed a body superior in number to that commanded by Massena, and the Archduke might reasonably have hoped to defeat him, and force him to retire. But that Prince received on his way, the distressing news that General Ocskay, to whom was entrusted the defence of the defile of Pontaffel had abandoned it, and that the enemy was already arrived near Tarvis, which from its being situated upon one of the highest points of the Noric Alps, commanded the road by which the Archduke expected the arrival of two columns, under the command of Generals Gontreuil and Bayalich, as also of his artillery of reserve and baggage.

In circumstances so critical, when the Archduke had little to hope, and every thing to fear, he formed a resolution the more worthy of his courage, and the best suited to his situation: it was to repulse

pulse the enemy from Tarvis, and thus to re-open this important communication. He sent orders to Generals Gontreuil and Bayalich, to march with all possible expedition to Tarvis, and there to attack the enemy. The first of these officers executed the order with such courage and promptitude, that he drove the French from the village of Safnitz, and by that means, gave time for the artillery of reserve to arrive at Tarvis. On the next day, the 23d in the morning, Massena who had arrived to the assistance of his vanguard, attacked with more than 10,000 men, General Gontreuil, who had not 3,000. Not being however discouraged by this inferiority of numbers, he resolved to defend to the last extremity, a post of so much importance. The presence and the example of the Archduke, who having arrived during the combat, mounted upon the horse of a common dragoon, and exposed himself as much as the lowest officer, animated the courage of the soldiers, who fought desperately, and kept possession of the ground till after mid day; but about four o'clock the French having received new reinforcements, and those expected by the Austrians under Generals Bayalich and Ocskay not making their appearance, this
brave

brave little troop, attacked upon its flanks, and already much reduced, was obliged to abandon the village of Safnitz, and the field of battle, which it had defended with a devotion to which the French themselves did justice. General Gontreuil was wounded, as also the Count Wratislaw, Aid-de-camp to the Archduke, who himself had been exposed to the greatest dangers.*

This check was not the only, or the worst consequence which resulted from General Ocskay's having abandoned the defile of Pontaffel; for the Austrian column which was on its march to join General Gontreuil, got entangled in the mountains between the division of Massena, and that of Guyeux, who had already succeeded in forcing the

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post

* We have personally cause to regret the loss of General Gontreuil, a man of rank and fortune in the low countries, who had had a very quick advancement in the Imperial service—Obliged by his wounds to retire to Vienna, and not having been able to conceal the truth with regard to the conduct of many persons who had been far from discharging their duty so well as he himself had done, he drew upon himself so many enemies, that he sunk under the distress occasioned by them, and turned against his own breast, that sword which he had used so well against the enemies of his sovereign.

post of the Austrian Chiusa, (or of Pletz), which however had been better defended than that of Pontaffel—This column abandoned to itself, and fatigued with a long and painful march, was not in a condition to force its way through the division of Massena, and was mostly made prisoners. The French estimated the loss of their enemies on these two occasions at 5,000 men, 30 pieces of cannon, and 400 baggage waggons. This was exaggerated, but yet the loss was really very considerable.—It is impossible not to remark, that the Austrians acted wrong in entangling their artillery of reserve and their baggage in the mountains of Carynthia, and that they would have exposed them less if they had sent them through Carniola. But this want of prudence, a defect extremely rare among the Austrians, was fatal to them only on account of the weakness, not to use any more harsh term, with which the defiles of the Alps had been defended, a weakness which the commander in chief could not have expected.

C H A P. III.

Situation of the Archduke—Plan adopted by that Prince—Zeal shewn by the Emperor's subjects in arming for his defence—Dispositions made for a retreat by the Archduke—The French advance into Istria, Carniola, and Carinthia—Situation of Bonaparte—He resolves to open negotiations for a peace, and writes to the Archduke—Proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Carinthia—The French continue to gain ground—The Austrians avoid engaging the enemy—A suspension of arms takes place.

PRINCE Charles having lost the opportunity of executing the only project, which (had it proved successful) might have prevented the French from penetrating into the hereditary states, now thought only of making them repent their invasion. The difficult and extraordinary situation in which he was placed, left him but one course to pursue. Under the weight of a responsibility, such as modern times

have seldom seen equalled, driven to decide in less than a month, upon the overthrow or the preservation of an ancient and powerful monarchy with his own brother at its head, having before his eyes the awful idea, that all the power and glory, which for nearly four centuries had marked the illustrious house from which he sprung, might be annihilated by one single fault, or even by a misfortune, he was not at liberty to act as in ordinary circumstances, and upon common occasions. He had no longer a right to seek for victory in chance, or to rely upon probabilities, such as are admitted by the art of war; it was his duty to render success almost infallible, which could not be done until every advantage, especially those of numbers and position were obtained over the enemy. The Cabinet of Vienna had omitted nothing to bring matters to that state; and if not always skilful in its measures, at least commonly prudent, had not waited till the danger became imminent to provide the means of averting it. Of the troops that could with safety be detached from the armies of the Rhine, some had already joined the Archduke, others in greater numbers had been judiciously posted in the Archbishopric of Saltzburg, from whence they could

could, as occasion might demand, either reinforce General Kerpen's corps in the Tyrol, or advance upon Bonaparte's left. At the call of the Emperor, and of their endangered country, the warlike inhabitants of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, had flown to arms; equally docile and brave, submissive and zealous, they were organized and formed into regiments in a few days, by officers sent by government, and were willing to perish in the cause of their sovereign and religion.* All the inhabitants of Vienna able to bear arms, offered their services

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to

* How striking the contrast between this general rising, and the forced conscriptions of the French! between a people at once simple, religious, and warlike, arming cheerfully at the call and example of their civil rulers, breaking the ties of all their former habits of life, those of order and obedience excepted, and receiving arms and colours at the foot of their altars—what a contrast between such a people, and a people to whom arms were held out by tyrants, covered with blood and crimes, to whom no other choice was left, but to die either by the hand of the executioner, or by the sword of the enemy, who were driven like cattle or slaves into the camps, were prepared for war and battles by all the excesses of impiety, licentiousness, and debauchery, yet from whom courage and patriotism were expected, after they had been accustomed to terror and subjection.

to defend that town, the fortifications of which were repairing. Troops were employed in entrenching the mountains which separate Austria from Styria ; and a camp was forming some leagues in front of the capital at Neustadt, which commands a defile through which passes the road to Vienna : this camp was to be occupied by a reserve of 50,000 men, principally drawn out of Hungary. All the troops yet to be disposed of, the garrison battalions, and the regiments of the frontiers, (composed of the military conscriptions from Croatia and Bosnia), were on their march to join the army of the Archduke. In a word, the house of Austria evinced the same calm and firm character that it has almost always shewn in times of alarm and adversity ; and that monarchy after a six years war, supported almost entirely at the expence of its own population, unfolded both moral and physical resources, such as its enemies little suspected it of possessing.

This state of affairs was calculated to reassure the Archduke as to the final issue of the enterprise of the French. Armies were forming behind him, but yet some time would be necessary to organize and provision them. A happy enthusiasm had possessed

essed the minds of the people, which one defeat might extinguish or render useless. Nothing therefore was to be trusted to chance, no general engagement was to be fought, and though the ground was not absolutely to be sacrificed, yet was it only to be defended by dexterous manœuvres, and by the choice of positions: Science, rather than courage was requisite; the Archduke in short was to act like Fabius, until he should be able to act like Camillus.

That Prince combined his plan of defence and of retreat in the following manner; he divided his army, into three principal corps, one of which under the orders of General Seckendorf, occupied the road to Laybach, and defended Carniola, and the valley of the Save; the centre commanded by General Mercantin, protected the valley of the Drave and Klagenfurth; and the third corps formed of the divisions of the Prince de Reuss and General Kaim united, was to defend Styria, and to stop the progress of the French left wing, upon the road to St. Veit, and in the valley of the Muehr. It will be seen that this disposition was the best which the ground admitted of, as it opposed the enemy

on the three principal openings through which they could penetrate, and covered the approach of the Imperial States with a sufficiently extended front.

Bonaparte, whose head quarters had succeeded those of the Archduke at Gorizia, remained in that town till the 25th. At that period all his army was in Carniola and Carylthia. A part of his right wing had pushed on to Trieste, and had seized upon that place; but it did not there find so much booty as had been expected, any more than at the mines of Idria, where Bonaparte wrote however that he had found ore prepared to the value of two millions, (£80,000.) His centre was already upon the Save, and his left wing upon the Drave. His left which in forcing the defile of Pontaffel, and penetrating to Tarvis, had surmounted the greatest local obstacles, met with but little opposition during the following days, and arrived on the 28th at Villach, upon the banks of the Drave, where Massena was joined by the two divisions of Gueux and Serurier. On the morrow, this corps about 30,000 strong, advanced from Villach against Clagenfurth, into which its vanguard entered on the 30th, after
having

having obtained a slight advantage over the Austrian rear guard. At the same time General Bernadotte occupied Laybach, which General Seckendorf had evacuated on the 28th.

Bonaparte now master of Clagenfurth, was arrived at the point to which it had been at once easy and little dangerous for him to advance. Till this period it had been possible for him to draw the greatest part of the stores necessary for his army, out of the depots and magazines he had formed in the state of Venice: his communications had not yet required strong detachments: his army had not been essentially diminished by the engagements it had fought, and the troops opposed to him were not yet capable of making an effective resistance: But in a few marches more, his situation would become very different—his advancing would render the communication with Italy precarious, and the arrival of provisions would become more and more slow and uncertain.—To secure this service, and that of the hospitals, he must leave a certain number of men behind him.—It would be hardly possible to form magazines in a country by no means fertile, the productions of which had been
already

already consumed and carried off by the Austrian army.—That of the French would be entangled in the midst of a difficult and mountainous country, inhabited by an hardy race, not less accustomed to loyalty towards its sovereign, than to the profession of arms.—At every step the relative proportion of strength, and of resources, would change in a two fold ratio in favour of the Austrians—Already did a corps of nearly 15,000 men, advantageously posted in the Archbishopric of Salzburg, threaten the left flank of the French. The inhabitants of the Tyrol were rising in mass, and might enable Generals Kerpen and Loudon to repulse the three French divisions, (which had been baffled in attempting to penetrate beyond Brixen), as far back as into the plains of the Mantuan and the Veronese.—If these divisions met with any considerable check, the remoteness of the French army might encourage the people, if not the government of the Venetian territory, to rise against the republicans, and to make common cause with the Tyrolians. It was therefore in the order of possibilities, that while the French army advanced in Carnythia and Styria, its communication with

Mantua

Mantua might be cut off on a sudden, and all the passes by which it had penetrated into Germany, be shut up behind it.

These considerations had not escaped Bonaparte when he undertook the execution of his grand enterprise, and they had not since then acquired any additional force, as his successes had equalled and perhaps even surpassed his expectation. In planning the invasion of the Hereditary States, that General and the Directory had been actuated rather by a wish to strike terror into the cabinet of Vienna, and to compel it to accept of such conditions of peace as they might dictate, than by any desire of conquering and revolutionizing them. They had flattered themselves, that by entering upon the campaign so early, and by advancing rapidly towards the capital, they might furnish new pretexts and additional support to the powerful cabal which had long continued to demand peace, and to lead to that, had found means to clog the measures of the Cabinet of Vienna by its intrigues, and by insensibly neutralizing the courageous dispositions of the Emperor, the Archduke Charles, and a part of the ministry. Although this cabal, in which the women acted a distinguished part, had no immediate

and voluntary correspondence with the Directory, although its views and principles by no means accorded with those of that body; yet it admirably served the directorial interest; and though, unconscious of it, was even subjected to Gallic influence, by the intermediate agents of a third power. The cabinet of the Luxemburg had already made several attempts to take advantage of the secret practices of this faction, formed by cowardice, baseness, ignorance, paltry ambition, and perhaps even by a revolutionary spirit. It hoped to bring about a peace by the action of these elements, heterogeneous, it is true, but all of them tending the same way, and exerted for the same end. A Republican General, named Clarke, had been sent from Paris into Italy, some time before, to instruct Bonaparte in the views of the Directory, to examine also, thoroughly, those of the conqueror of Italy, and afterwards to carry propositions of Peace to Vienna, if the party of the friends of peace could procure him a reception. The firmness of the Emperor, however, and of some of the members of his council, had prevailed over the views of the courtiers; and General Clarke was obliged to remain in Italy, to confine his mission to

keeping

keeping a strict watch upon Bonaparte, and to carrying on various intrigues. Having not been able, by diplomatic seduction, to bring about a peace, which was only desired that it might again be in a state to devise and execute new projects of revolutionizing and pillage, the Directory wished to bring about, suddenly, that peace, by force of arms; and this it was which had induced that power to adjourn the ruin of the Pope, and to hasten the opening of the campaign. That, indeed, had been as prosperous as the Directory could have wished; but the successes must quickly produce the effect expected from them, or the heaviest disasters might be the consequence. When arrived at Clagenfurth, Bonaparte saw that the moment was fast approaching which would appear equally perilous to himself, and to his enemy; and in which he who had least boldness, would be disposed to yield. Aware of all the danger that he might himself incur, but not doubting that the court of Vienna was still more appalled by that which threatened it; he judged the time favourable for making propositions of peace; and, being convinced of this by some secret intercourse, he wrote the following letter to Prince Charles on the 31st of March:

“ Sir,

“ Sir, and Commander in Chief,

“ Brave soldiers, make war and desire peace.
 “ Has not this contest, in which we are now engaged, lasted for six years?—Have we not slain
 “ a sufficient number of fellow-creatures, and caused
 “ enough of misery to afflicted humanity? She
 “ implores on all sides—Europe has laid down the
 “ arms she had taken up against the French Republic—Your nation stands alone; and yet blood
 “ is about to be more profusely shed than ever!—
 “ Fatal presages preside over this sixth campaign—
 “ Whatever may be its issue, we shall yet destroy
 “ several thousands of men on both sides, and,
 “ sooner or later, this struggle must end in a mutual agreement, since every thing has its turn,
 “ even the passion of hatred. The desire which
 “ the Executive Directory entertains of putting an
 “ end to a war that afflicts the two nations, was
 “ made known to his Imperial Majesty: the intervention of the court of London opposed it. Is
 “ there then no hope of a good understanding between us? and must we continue to butcher one
 “ another for the interests and the passions of a nation
 “ tion

“ tion which knows not the evils of war?—You,
 “ commander in chief, whom birth has placed so near
 “ the throne; who are superior to the little passions
 “ which often influence ministers and governments:
 “ have you resolved to deserve the title of bene-
 “ factor of humanity, and true saviour of Ger-
 “ many?—Do not suppose, sir, and commander in
 “ chief, that I mean to imply that it is impossible
 “ for you to save your country by the force of arms;
 “ but even granting that the chance of war should
 “ be favorable to you, Germany will, nevertheless,
 “ be laid waste. As for me, General, if the over-
 “ ture which I have the honor to make to you, can
 “ save the life of a single man, I shall pride myself
 “ more upon the civic crown, than my conscience
 “ will tell me I thus shall have deserved, than
 “ upon the melancholy glory which arises from
 “ military success. I entreat you, sir, and com-
 “ mander in chief, to believe in the sentiments of
 “ esteem, and high consideration with which

“ I am, &c.

BONAPARTE.

The

The day after the Archduke answered this letter as follows :

“ GENERAL,

“ While I make war, and obey the calls of
“ honour and of duty, I certainly desire a peace as
“ you do, for the sake of humanity, and for the
“ happiness of nations.—But, nevertheless, as in
“ the post entrusted to my charge, it does not be-
“ long to me to scrutinize, or terminate the quar-
“ rel between the Belligerent Powers, and as I
“ have even no full power from his Majesty, the
“ Emperor, I trust, you will find it natural, Gene-
“ ral, that I should not enter into any negotiation
“ upon that head, with you, and that I should await
“ superior orders, upon a subject of such high
“ importance, and which does not properly come
“ within my province.—Whatever may be the fu-
“ ture chances of war, or the hopes of peace, I
“ beg you will be assured General, of my esteem
“ and high consideration.

“ CHARLES, F. M.”

It is unnecessary to remark the noble and proper
style of this letter, or to mention that the Archduke
im-

immediately informed the cabinet of Vienna of the pacific overture which had been made to him.

The day after Bonaparte had written this letter to Prince Charles, a letter in which knavery concealed itself behind the mask of humanity, and which might flow from the pen, but could not from the heart of the destroyer of Lugo, Arquata, Binasco, &c. &c.—Bonaparte, equally accustomed to deceive and to conquer, addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Carynthia, replete with the same hypocrisy.—As it tended to the same end, with the letter written to the Archduke, and was destined to add new strength to the party, already mentioned, by means of which it was hoped that the Emperor might be forced to make peace, it will not be useless here to transcribe that piece, in which there is more address, than in the ordinary declamations of the French Generals.

Bonaparte, Commander in Chief of the army of Italy, to the People of Carynthia.—At the headquarters of Clagenfurth, April 1.

“ The French army does not come into your country to conquer it, nor to make any change in your religion, manners, or customs.—It is

“ the friend of all nations, and particularly of the
 “ brave people of Germany.—The Executive Di-
 “ rectory, of the French nation, has neglected
 “ nothing to put a stop to the calamities which
 “ afflict the continent.—It resolved to make the
 “ first overture, and to send General Clarke to
 “ Vienna, as Plenipotentiary, to commence nego-
 “ ciations for peace.—But the Court of Vienna re-
 “ fused to listen to him; it even declared at Vicenza,
 “ through the organ of Mr. de St. Vincent, that it
 “ did not acknowledge the French Republic.—
 “ General Clarke demanded a passport to go him-
 “ self and speak to the Emperor; but the Ministers
 “ of the Court of Vienna, feared, with reason,
 “ that the moderation of the proposals he was com-
 “ missioned to make, would determine the Emper-
 “ or in favour of peace.—These Ministers, cor-
 “ rupted by English gold, betray Germany and
 “ their Prince; and have no other will but that
 “ of those perfidious islanders, the detestation of
 “ all Europe.

“ Inhabitants of Carynthia, I know it well, you
 “ abhor as much as we do, the English, who alone
 “ are gainers by the present war, and your Minis-

“ ter

“ter who is bought by them.—That we have
 “been at war for six years, is contrary to the
 “wish of the brave among the English, of the
 “enlightened citizens of Vienna, and of the sim-
 “ple and good inhabitants of Carynthia.

“Come then! In spite of England and the mi-
 “nister of the court of Vienna, let us be friends—
 “The French Republic has the right of conquest
 “over you; may that right disappear before a
 “contract that may reciprocally bind us! You will
 “not interfere in a war which has not your consent—
 “You will supply us with the provisions we may
 “be in need of—On my side, I shall protect your
 “religion, your manners, and your properties—
 “I shall levy no contribution upon you:—Is not
 “war sufficiently horrid in itself? Do you not al-
 “ready suffer too much; you innocent victims of
 “the folly of others? All the taxes you were in
 “the habit of paying to the Emperor, shall serve
 “to indemnify you for the waste inseparable, from
 “the march of an army, and to pay for the sus-
 “tenance with which you shall have supplied
 “us.”—

By this proclamation, which accorded but ill with that which he had addressed to his army three weeks before, and in which he had said, “ It is *liberty* you shall carry to the brave Hungarian nation,” the French General hoped to cool the zeal that the warlike people of Austria and of Hungary, had shewn in arming for the defence of their Sovereign, and to persuade them that peace would be the immediate result of his successes, and that they were in some degree necessary to bring it about.

If, as has been shewn, it was the interest as well as the intention of the Archduke to avoid a decisive battle, and to preserve his army entire, until it should be sufficiently strengthened to enable him to resume the offensive, it was equally desirable for Bonaparte to come to action as soon and as conclusively as possible. The superiority of number which was yet on his side promised him success: the courage and confidence of his army was yet unabated—But the distance to which it was removed from the place of its outset, the difficulties opposed by the ground, the want of provisions, and the idea of the dangers that awaited it near the capital, should the enemy have time to unite all the strength of monarchy for its defence, these considerations might operate a
change

change upon the sentiments of this army, sentiments which it was not only necessary to keep up, but even to augment. A victory alone could have this effect; and it would, at the same time, disconcert the temporising plan adopted by the Austrians, and prevent their being able to complete their defensive measures. These reasons, added to a desire of hindering the junction between the Archduke, and a body of troops which was coming out of Suabia, determined Bonaparte to bring on a great battle as soon as possible, and, by pressing hard upon the Imperialists to occasion it.

In pursuance of this resolution, he marched, on the 1st of April, from Clagenfurth to St. Veit. The Archduke, after having concentrated his right and centre near him, had abandoned that town on the 30th, and had removed his head quarters to Freisach. The approach of the French, who marched with rapidity, induced him to quit this latter place; his rear guard disputed the possession of it a long time, however, and on the 2d (the day after) defended the defile which leads from Freisach to Newmarkt, with equal bravery, and with more success; for, having been supported by the main body of the army posted upon the heights, it obstinately resisted

all the efforts of Massena, and, after a very bloody engagement, remained master of its position.

The Archduke waited so near to, and fought with the enemy, during these two days, merely that General Spork, who was coming from Salzburg, with some reinforcements, might be enabled to join him. This General, being arrived upon the Muehr, and, in spite of the dispositions made by Bonaparte, having secured his communication with the Archduke, that Prince retired in the night to Hundsmarkt. He was followed by the French, who still hoped to be able to force him to a battle. They could but just come up with his rear guard, however, in the end of the day; they attacked briskly, but it received them as valiantly as before; and sold the ground it yielded at a dear rate.—In the report he made of these three actions of his van-guard, Bonaparte represented the loss of the enemy in killed and wounded as very great, and stated that he had taken near 1,200 prisoners. The fact is, that this loss was exaggerated in all the three respects, and did not exceed that of the French. What proves this, is, that the Imperialists did not lose a single cannon. That they fell back, was not because they were worsted, but merely in observance of the defensive system,

system, adopted by the Archduke. Faithful to this system, that Prince, who had no longer such urgent motives, or even so many local advantages for defending the ground inch by inch, as on the preceding days, continued his retreat from Hundsmarkt to Judembourg, Knittelfeld, and Vorderernberg. Bonaparte occupying, successively, the places abandoned by the Imperialists, saw himself master of all Carylthia, and entered into Styria, while his right wing advanced through Carniola, upon the two banks of the Save, covered by a small detachment, which kept pace with it in Istria.

Arrived at Judembourg, that General there reaped the fruits of his military boldness, and of his political manœuvres. Generals Bellegarde and Meerfeldt came to him with full powers to treat concerning a suspension of arms, or even for a peace. After having had a conference with the French General, in which they agreed with him as to the first object of their negociation, the demand was made to him, officially, and in the following manner.

Judembourg, 7th April, 1797.

“ His Majesty, the Emperor and King, has
 “ nothing more at heart, than to contribute to the

“ repose of Europe, and to put an end to a war
“ which afflicts the two nations.

“ In consequence of the overture made by you
“ to His Royal Highness in your letter from Cla-
“ genfurth, His Majesty the Emperor has sent us
“ to you to treat upon an object of such high im-
“ portance.

“ After the conversation we have just had with
“ you, being persuaded of the good will, as well of
“ the sincere intention of the two powers to con-
“ clude this disastrous war as soon as may be, His
“ Royal Highness desires a suspension of arms, for
“ ten days, to the end that the wished for aim may
“ be attained with more celerity, and that all the
“ delays and obstacles, which the continuation of
“ hostilities would throw in the way of the ne-
“ gociations may be prevented, and that every thing
“ may concur towards the restoration of peace, be-
“ tween the two great nations.”

Bonaparte answered this note by that which fol-
lows, dated at the head quarters of Judembourg, on
the 7th of April.

“ GENTLEMEN,

“ In the military position now held by the two
“ armies, a suspension of arms is *quite adverse* to
“ the

“ the interests of the French army. But if it is
“ to be a step towards a peace, so much desired, and
“ so useful to the two nations, I readily assent to
“ your wishes.

“ The French Republic has often manifested to
“ His Majesty a desire of putting an end to this
“ cruel struggle: it still persists in the same senti-
“ ments, and I doubt not, after the conference I
“ have had the honor of holding with you, that, in
“ a few days, peace will be at length restored be-
“ tween the French Republic and His Majesty.
“ I entreat you to believe in the sentiments of
“ esteem and high consideration, with which
“ I am, Gentlemen, &c. &c.”

These two notes, in form, were immediately
followed by a suspension of arms, the conditions of
which were these:

*His Royal Highness the ARCHDUKE CHARLES, Com-
mander in Chief of the Imperial Army,
And General BONAPARTE, Commander in Chief of
the French Army of Italy,*

“ Wishing to facilitate the negotiations for peace,
“ which are about to be opened, agree;

First

“ *First Article.* There shall be a suspension of
 “ arms between the Imperial and French Armies,
 “ commencing on this night the 7th of April, and
 “ continuing until the night of the 13th Inst.

“ *Article Second.* The French army shall pre-
 “ serve the following line: the outposts of the right
 “ wing of that army shall remain in the positions
 “ they now occupy between Fiume and Trieste.
 “ The line shall extend through Treffen, Lithay,
 “ Windish-Feistriz, Marchburg, Ehrenhausen,
 “ the right bank of the Muehr, Gratz, Bruck,
 “ Leoben, Traffejach, Mautern, the road from
 “ Mautern as far as Rottenmann, Rottenmann, Ir-
 “ ding, the valley of the Drave and Lientz.

“ *Article Third.* A suspension of arms shall also
 “ take place in the Tyrol. The Generals, com-
 “ manding the French and Imperial troops in that
 “ quarter, shall agree together upon the posts to be
 “ occupied by them.

“ Hostilities shall not recommence in the Tyrol,
 “ until twenty-four hours after the Generals in
 “ Chief shall have so arranged it, and, at all events,
 “ twenty-four hours after the Generals, command-
 “ ing the French and Imperial troops, in the
 “ Tyrol,

" Tyrol, shall have reciprocally warned each other
" of it.

" Done at Judembourg, on the 7th of April,
" 1797.

" BELLEGARDE, Lieutenant-General.

" MEERFELDT, Major-General.

" BONAPARTE, Commander in Chief

" of the Army of the French Re-

" public."

This armistice was, in some respects, advantageous to the Austrian army, but was a great deal more so to the French army*, as the cessation continuing but for six days, it was put in possession of a line without striking a blow which it might not have gained in that lapse of time, and which gave it a considerable advantage in case of the recommence-
ment

* We have seen that Bonaparte wrote to Generals Bellegarde and Meerfeldt, " In the military position now held by the two armies, a suspension of arms is quite adverse to the interests of the French army." He wrote to the Directory, " It was my intention to give the army two or three days of rest, therefore this suspension will scarcely derange the military operations."

ment of hostilities. By looking on the map it will be seen that the position, occupied by the French army, in consequence of the suspension of arms, was singular, forming a kind of circle, or rather an ellipsis; the centre, the most advanced point of any, being at Bruck, the extremity of the right wing, between Fiume and Trieste, and that of the left wing at Lientz, at the mouth of the valley of the Drave,

C H A P. IV.

Situation of the Austrians and French in the Tyrol—

The inhabitants of that country arm in mass—Generals Loudon and Kerpen advance—The former makes himself master of Botzen, and the latter of Brixen—Retreat of the French through the valleys of Puster and the Adige—Part of the state of Venice is revolutionized—Views of the French—Conduct of the Venetians—Prolongation of the armistice—Signing of the preliminaries of peace at Leoben on the 18th of April—What is published of their import—They are but partially ratified by the Directory—The negotiations change their nature, and are prolonged.

IT has just been seen, that the truce had been made common to the French and Imperial corps opposed to each other in the Tyrol. An account has not yet been given of their last operations, to avoid interrupting the relation of those made by Bonaparte, but though they have not been described together, they

they were not the less intimately connected one with another, and when the French General consented to the armistice, he had no doubt turned his eyes upon the Tyrol, as well as upon Styria.

It has been seen in the second chapter that Generals Loudon and Kerpen had retired, the one upon Meran, and the other upon Sterzingen, the last defensive post in the Tyrol, the Alps between that place and Inspruck, lowering both on the German and Italian side. On the preservation of this post depended that of all which the Austrians yet possessed in the Tyrol, as also the possibility of regaining what they had lost. But if it was of the last importance that Generals Kerpen and Loudon should maintain themselves in their positions, it was far from being easy for them to do so. The advantage of ground which was still in their favour, by no means compensated for the inferiority of their force, and they had no reason to expect early and sufficient reinforcements. The courage and fidelity of the Tyrolians came to their assistance, and these mountaineers, like those of Switzerland in their warlike character and their attachment to their native soil, armed spontaneously on all sides for its defence. Their zeal was guided by Count

Lehrbach who commanded in that province, an able and courageous man, who in the course of the revolution, has shewn in council, in negotiations, and at the head of the Tyrolians, firmness, ability, and a warm attachment to the honor and interests of his sovereign.* Conducted by a man worthy of them, the inhabitants of the Tyrol, who had already furnished several volunteer companies of Chasseurs, rose in mass, organized and ranged themselves, some under the standards of General Kerpen, and some under those of General Loudon. This rising which began on the 26th of March, reinforced them with nearly 20,000 men, and would in a short time have produced double that number; for the enthusiasm was such, that children, old men, and even women demanded arms, and were willing to die in the defence of their habitations.

These

* It was he, (as it is well known), who endured the impertinencies of Treilhard, at the congress of Rastadt, with so little patience; and who adopted the republican manners very opportunely, by turning that negociator out of a room in which they happened to find themselves together.

These sentiments, and these means, again allowed the two Austrian Generals to think of resuming the offensive. After the engagement of the 26th, the French who had united their forces between Brixen and Botzen, made no serious attempt to penetrate farther, and no action took place until the end of March, except a few skirmishes among the out posts. The position occupied by General Joubert, was the best he could possibly take as matters then stood, and it was of consequence to him not to quit it; for being master of the vallies of the Adige and of Puster, he could according to circumstances, either retire by the one, or advance by the other. Prudence moreover required that he should maintain the power of communicating with Bonaparte, or even of joining him with promptitude and ease. By remaining at Brixen, he could do this by Prunecken and Lientz. If on the contrary, he had advanced as far as Inspruck, he must not only have lost this advantage by his removal, but would also have placed a thick chain of mountains between himself and the valley of the Drave, would have exposed himself to the attacks of the Austrians stationed in the Archbishopric of Salzburg, and would have run the risk besides
of

of seeing his retreat completely cut off by General Loudon's corps, and the Tyrolian volunteers.

Whilst these considerations detained the French at Brixen, and upon the Adige, Generals Kerpen and Loudon were forming the project of driving them from thence. On the 2d, the latter at the head of 15,000 men, (of whom more than one half were armed peasants), marched against the enemy and attacked them between Meran and Botzen. Having gained some ground from the out posts, he again pressed upon them the day after, with so much vigour, that they were compelled to evacuate Botzen during the night, into which place that General entered on the morrow. Encouraged by this first success, and by the confidence with which it inspired the Tyrolians, he wished immediately to profit by it, to re-establish his communication with General Kerpen, and to cut off that of the German Tyrol with the Italian Tyrol, from the French. Accordingly he advanced a part of his troops on the 5th, as far as Deutenhoffen and Branzol, brought the other upon the rear of the enemy, who was retiring by Clausen and Steben, and drove him successively from these two places. During this time General Kerpen, who had also put him-

self in motion from Sterzingen, overthrew the French advanced posts, and repulsed them as far back as Brixen, where they did not make a stand. He entered that place on the 6th.

The French driven from Botzen and Brixen, where they left some considerable magazines behind them, and from all the posts which they occupied between those two places, retired, part by the valley of the Adige towards Trente, part (and by far the largest), by the valley of Puster, towards Prunecken, from whence it proceeded rapidly to Lientz, where it arrived on the 8th. It was there joined by a corps of cavalry sent by Bonaparte to guard the valley of the Drave, and to establish an immediate communication through it, between the two armies of the Tyrol and Carynthia. General Kerpen fixed his head quarters at Prunecken on the 8th, pushed his advanced posts as far as Silian on the 9th, and on the 10th as far as Lientz. Joubert joined the main body by Prunecken, Toblach, Lientz, Traaburg, Greifemburg, Saxenburg, Spital, Paternion, and Villach.

While the French were thus driven from the valley of Puster, and from the whole of the German Tyrol, with the loss of some hundreds of men
killed

killed or taken prisoners, they did not defend their ground better in the Italian Tyrol.—General Loudon, after having compelled them to evacuate Botzen, and after concerting matters with General Kerpen, followed them along the Adige.—He overtook them near Lavis, attacked briskly, put them to the rout, and forced them to accelerate their retrograde march.—He drove them successively from Trente, Roveredo, Torbola, and Riva, upon the lake of Garda; and on the 12th, the Austrians were already in possession of these several places, after having taken some considerable magazines from the enemy, 12 pieces of cannon, and more than 500 prisoners, and having obliged them to seek for safety in the citadel of Verona.

It was not only from General Loudon's army, that the French were under the necessity of sheltering themselves, they had not less to fear from the inhabitants of the Veronese, than from those of the Tyrol: but in order to form a correct judgment of what was then passing, it will be necessary to relate what had passed a short time before.

The numerous triumphs obtained, in the space of ten months, by the French army, in Italy, had put the Directory in such a state, as to be able, there

to unfold its true political character, and it had treated that country in the manner it desired, and hoped one day to treat all Europe—Conquer to revolutionize, revolutionize to despoil, such was the abridgement of its public code, and such its invariable aim.—The Milanese, the Modenese, and the Dutchies of Ferrara and Bologna had already been regenerated, and had received the laconic charter which the French Republic destines for every nation—"Give me all you have, and I will give you what you have not, and that is French liberty."—Piedmont was now but an appendage to the Republic, and if the King of Sardinia yet preserved the title and apparent exercise of sovereignty, it was only till interest or caprice should induce the French to strip him of them.—The Republic of Genoa and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, payed with exactness the price, at which the preservation of their political existence, had been condescendingly rated.—By sparing the territorial ransom of the Duke of Parma, they attached Spain more closely to the cause of the Republic, and the efforts expected from her were negatively paid.—Though the Holy Father had been stripped but of one half of his dominions, this revolutionary sacrifice, made
to

to the desire of penetrating into Germany, was well repurchased by the conditions of the treaty of peace concluded a short time before. The 30 millions, which the Directory had gained by a dash of the pen, and which it could scarcely have realized by taking possession of the whole ecclesiastical state, could not be procured by his Holiness without exhausting the states of the church, and occasioning discontents among the inhabitants, a double advantage which facilitated their being at a future time, completely revolutionized. This, indeed, the Directory had good hopes of being able to effect, as soon as it should have concluded a peace with the Emperor, such as it desired, and the same fate was reserved for the dominions of the King of Naples.—With this Prince a peace had been made at a time when he could hurt, though he could not himself be injured; but a proof of Republican gratitude and good faith, was destined for him; and while the intrigues of a part of his court were made use of, to force Austria to a peace, machinations of a very different nature were carrying on at the same time. The Nobles were urged to conspire, and the people to rebel; the prejudices of the aristocracy were flattered, and the reveries of philosophy were caressed. Discordant

elements were employed to hasten a political dissolution ; different means were used, but the end was the same.

There remained a state which was Republican, but not Democratic, which had observed the strictest neutrality, but which, instead of being paid, had paid for it ; a state which, if it had joined its force to that of the Austrians a few months before, might have stopped the French in their career, but was incapable of resisting them by itself ; a state, ruled by a government ancient, wise, and sanctioned by experience, and whose inhabitants were happy, rich, and faithful. So much was not required to draw down the rapacious and destructive hands of the French, and the annihilation of the Venetian Republic had been determined upon. In vain did it attempt to avert the storm, by shunning every appearance of partiality towards the Austrians, by enduring patiently the reiterated infringements of its neutrality by the French, by observing punctually all the injunctions made by the envoy of the Directory, by submitting to the robberies committed by the French army, by advancing, without a hope of ever being reimbursed, to the amount of nearly 30,000,000 of livres, in subsistence, provisions, and equipment of all kinds, and by lavishing money to purchase the good graces of Bonaparte,

parte, of the Commissary Salicetti, and of the greater part of the Generals.* In this conduct, which in other times, and towards other men, might have been reputed wise, the French only saw the weakness of the Venetian government; and that government, so long renowned for its foresight, seemed not to have been sensible soon enough, that strength, and not prudence, was the guard against a victorious and revolutionary army. It is well known, however, that at the æra in question, there were some enlightened members of the government of Venice, who were perfectly aware of the complicated dangers of their situation, and it must also be allowed that at that period it was no longer possible to avert them, The Directory was quite determined to overturn that aristocracy, and it had several motives for doing so. It saw, in the state of Venice, a country which

F 4

might

* In the war of the succession, at the beginning of the present century, the case was very different. The French had orders to pay every thing, even to their straw, in the state of Venice, whilst the Imperial troops payed nothing. Respect for the neutrality of that Republic, was pushed so far, that the French would not advance upon its territory. Prince Eugene, therefore, entered it without opposition, and made his brilliant campaign, which drove the French from Italy.

might not only be constituted into a democracy, or be united to the Cisalpine Republic, but also a country which, in its hands, might become an easy means of concluding a peace conformable to its views. It likewise had good reason to believe, that the acquisition of the states of Venice, upon which the House of Austria had always cast a covetous eye, would sufficiently console it for the loss of the low countries, and of the Milanese; but it knew, at the same time, that the Cabinet of Vienna would feel some repugnance at the idea of committing an usurpation, for which there was no pretext, and which could only be effected by open force. One political crime more could be no impediment to the French government, especially as it went to confirm it in the possession of the fruits of those it had already committed. That government, therefore, willingly undertook to bear the odium of the usurpation, happy if it could occasion some favourable result for a power which had seemed to fight for six years in the cause of legitimate governments. The conduct of that of Venice, towards the French, had nevertheless been too irreproachable; and however little it was prepared for a war, it might yet, as affairs then stood, have occasioned too much danger and
 embar-

embarrassment for them to judge it prudent to alledge any other reason against it but their own will, and to employ no other means but those of the bayonet. They had recourse, therefore, to a method which was more familiar to them, and which gave them least to fear, and that method was perfidy. Seeing well that the prudence of the Venetian government would not willingly supply them with any ground of reproach, they wished to compel it into an appearance of having committed wrongs against them, and for that purpose they began by very essentially injuring it themselves. As they occupied almost all the states upon Terra Firma, they disseminated the principles of democracy amongst the people, through the organ of the Cisalpine patriots, exciting them to a contempt of authority, and skreening all those who ought to have been repressed or punished. It was easy for them thus to form in every class, a numerous party of mal-contents, and of revolutionizing traitors; and they awaited the moment which should be most advantageous to them to make use of it. When they were advancing to invade Germany, and when it was of consequence to divide and engage at home, a state which they were about to leave behind them, then they thought proper to blow up
the

the mine which had been prepared. The first explosion took place on the 13th of March, in the town of Bergamo; the patriots assumed the tri-coloured cockade, obliged the rest of the inhabitants to do the same, disarmed the troops and dismissed them; deposed all the magistracy, substituted a municipality of their own choice in its room, and put themselves under the protection of France. This example the other inhabitants of the Bergamese were compelled to follow, as well as those of the Brescian, and of a part of the Veronese; and the Republic of Venice saw itself in an instant, and with an ease which evinced that the French were the rulers and conductors of this revolution, stripped of its most valuable possessions on Terra Firma. This was not the only blow intended against it by the French; for no sooner had that been struck, than some indigent members of the privileged families of the Republic, and a small number of citizens, gained over to the French party, allowed a design to appear of annihilating the aristocracy, and changing the constitution of the state. The senate, and those who had more particularly the direction of affairs, were unable to take any vigorous and effective measures in this complication of danger and of evil.

They

They protested, however, against the independence of the provinces of the Veronese, Bergamese, and Brescian, and devoted all their care and attention to maintain the peace of the capital, and to preserve the established government. The motion made in the senate, to change it for a mixed government of aristocracy and democracy, was rejected by a majority of 391 against 5, an unequivocal proof of the attachment of the Patrician families to the ancient form of their Republic.

The greater number of the subjects of Terra Firma, also, preferred it to the new order of things, which they had only been induced to adopt at first, by the fear of the French, who evidently had presided, and did still preside, over this revolution, though the contrary was pretended in their public acts. The fidelity to their government, of a part of the inhabitants of the towns, and of almost all those of the country of the Brescian and Veronese, was not slow in manifesting itself, and there were some bloody scenes towards the end of March, in several places, and particularly at Brescia, between the patriots and the faithful inhabitants, supported by the Venetian troops.

Things

Things were in this state when General Loudon beat the French in the beginning of April, and drove them back into the Venetian territory, on both sides of the lake of Garda. The Italians, little thinking that peace was so near, were persuaded that that General would yet make farther progress, and would come upon the rear of Bonaparte's army, which they reckoned lost. The enthusiasm of the Tyrolians, communicated itself to the inhabitants of the state of Venice: they took up arms on all sides, murdered the patriots, and some French also fell under their hands at Verona. Such were the facts which were made use of as pretexts, a short time after for the conquest of Venice, and for the annihilation of that Republic. The importance of this event rendered it necessary to enter into a detail of what preceded it. Styria must now again become the object of attention.

The six days truce that had been agreed upon on the 7th of April were employed in negotiating with all the activity which the short duration of the armistice required. The town of Leoben had been chosen as the place of conference, and had, consequently, been declared mutual. The negotiations were

were carried on, on one side, by Generals Bonaparte and Clarke; on the other at first by the Archduke, but afterwards by General Meerveld, and the Neapolitan Marquis de Gallo, who some time before had been engaged in a correspondance with the French Generals, and had debated with him the principal conditions of an accommodation. It was, therefore, not difficult for them to agree, and to lay down, together, the first basis of a pacification. The time necessary to make the Emperor acquainted with these proceedings, and to obtain his answer, required a prolongation of the armistice. It was not of long duration, and the cabinet of Vienna, having quickly resolved to accept the conditions proposed; the preliminaries of peace were signed on the 18th, by the respective negociators. They dispatched couriers, on the instant, to convey the news, some to Vienna, and others to Paris, and to the armies of Generals Hoche and Moreau. This great event filled both France and Germany with an almost universal joy. *The people* saw in it a cessation of the horrors of war—*Higher classes* a continuation of their pleasures, or rather of their idleness—the *numberless herd of common politicians*—the *ne plus ultra*

of

of the influence of the French Revolution upon Europe—the *small number of enlightened men* who judge of the present by the past, suspended their judgment, and adjourned their hopes until the time when they should be made acquainted with the conditions of that peace, and should see them faithfully executed.

These conditions being only preparatory to a treaty, and being even liable to alteration before the ratification by the two powers, they were not officially made public. The court of Vienna left the public to arrange them according to its fancy, and to persuade itself that the very first article was the integrity of the German Empire. The directory contented itself with announcing to the Legislative Body, that the ground work of these preliminaries, was:


- 1st. The cession of Belgium by the Emperor.
- 2d. The acknowledgement of the French boundary, such as it had been decreed by the laws of the Republic.
- 3d. The establishment and independence of a Republic in Lombardy.—The Directory did not hesitate to make these three articles known because they were favourable to France, and conformable to its own desires ; but the strictest silence was pre-


preserved upon those which concerned the Emperor ; because the three Directors Rewbell, Barras, and Lareveillere judged them too advantageous to that Prince, and thought, that in granting them, Bonaparte had gone beyond his powers, or at least had abused them.


They did not long remain a secret, however, to the well-informed at Paris. Carnot has confirmed this himself, and what followed the negotiations of Leoben proved his veracity upon this head. The restitution of Mantua to the Emperor, was one of the articles stipulated, and it was the most important and the most advantageous to that Prince ; but the Directory obstinately refused to ratify it. This refusal, upon the leading point, and upon several others of less moment, prevented the preliminaries of Leoben from being converted into a definitive peace, and occasioned new and long negotiations between the cabinets of Vienna and of Paris, that were only terminated at the end of five months by a treaty which it is not yet time to discuss. It shall not be considered (conformably to the plan adopted) until a successive account of the events which preceded, has been given, according to the order of dates. The military operations commenced upon
the

the Rhine, at the very moment when the treaty of Leoben was signing, and which that treaty brought to a sudden conclusion, shall now be described. The knowledge of these events is necessary to enable to form a general judgment on the short though extraordinary campaign which has just been described.


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


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




PART of the THEATRE of WAR in GERMANY,



GERMANY, in the Campaigns of 1796 & 1797.



CAMPAIGN

OF

1797,

IN

GERMANY.

CHAP. IV.

Inaction of the Imperial and French armies, during the winter.—Both weakened by reinforcements sent into Italy—Strength and situation of the armies on the 1st of April 1797—Disadvantages on the side of the Austrians—Offensive plans of the French Government.

THE Campaign of 1796 had terminated in Germany, by the capture of the Forts of Kehl and of Huningen, which had been given up, the former on the 9th of January, and the latter on the 2d of February 1797.—The French being completely driven from the right bank of the Rhine, by the surrender of these two forts, that river again separated the armies of Archduke Charles and of Moreau.—This

common barrier, joined to the rigour of the season, enabled them at length to enjoy a repose which they were both in need of ; and they both remained on the defensive.—This was likewise the case with the Austrians and the French on the lower Rhine, and they continued to observe the tacit armistice concluded by their chiefs, in the preceding month of December,

Between Basle and Dusseldorf, no act of hostility took place from the 2d of February, till the 17th of April.—During the short continuance of their winter quarters, the hostile armies were occupied in completing their regiments, in fortifying their positions, and in making preparations for a new Campaign.

It was not upon this point, however, that the Belligerent Powers intended to make their greatest efforts ; and the armies in Germany, which till 1796, had acted the principal part in this war, were to be henceforward but secondary instruments.—It was towards Italy that the Cabinets of Vienna and of Paris turned their attention.—It was on that side that the former had most to fear, and the latter most to hope. Circumstances were such, that the fate of Germany was in great measure to be decided by the

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armies

armies in Italy, which were, moreover, enabled by the climate to begin the campaign earlier.—It was in the latter country, that the two powers meant to assemble the greatest force, and each of them hastened to carry into it a part of the troops they had upon the banks of the Rhine.—In the month of February, the Directory drew about 20,000 men from the armies of Beurnonville and Moreau, and sent them under the orders of General Bernadotte to reinforce Bonaparte.

The void occasioned in the armies of Germany by their departure, was partly filled up by troops drawn out of Holland, the low countries, and the interior of France.—The Imperial armies were still more weakened; in the course of the winter, upwards of 40,000 men were successively detached into Italy.*—25,000 left Bohemia and upper Austria, to go and replace them, but they were no less inferior in

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quality

* 6,000 from the Dutchy of Wurtemberg, marched thither at the end of October, 1796, with Colonel St. Julien.—9,000 were sent from the banks of the Lahn, in the month of January following, 10,000 in the month of February, and a short time after 15,000 more were taken from the armies of the Rhine, to defend the Archbishopric of Saltzburg.

quality than in number, consisting almost entirely of recruits, or very young soldiers, who had never seen service before. Notwithstanding all its losses during the preceding campaign, either from the enemy's sword, or the diseases occasioned by the siege of Kehl, where the flower of the Austrian infantry perished; in spite of all the sacrifices it had made to the army of Italy, that of the Rhine was on the 15th of April about 100,000 strong, including 10,000 troops of the Empire, and the corps of the Prince of Condé.—This army bordered the Rhine from Basle to the Sieg.—55,000 men were stationed along that line from the frontier of Switzerland to the Mein—near 30,000 occupied the space between the Mein and the Sieg.—The remaining 25,000 formed the garrisons of Philipsburg, Mannheim, Mentz, and Ehrenbreitstein, as also of the fort of the Rhine, before Mannheim, and occupied some posts on the Seltz and Nahe in front of the fortress of Mentz.

Lieutenant General de Latour, commanded on the upper Rhine, and Lieutenant General Werneck on the lower. Lieutenant General Mack, was quarter-master-general, and it was supposed he would have the chief command. The Court of Vienna flattered itself, that the ability of that officer would compensate

compensate for every thing that was deficient in his army, and indeed the talents of its leader were the only ground on which any hopes of success, could be rested, as it had the disadvantage, in every other respect. It was inferior in number and intrinsic value, having a much larger proportion of recruits than that of the French. Its position was equally bad for either offensive or defensive operations. It had no strong place from Basle to Mannheim; while the French, besides the barrier of the Rhine, had a line of fortresses from Huningen to Landau—Its centre was defended, it is true, by the four strong holds of Philipsburg, Mannheim, Mentz, and Ehrenbreitstein, but its two flanks were laid open, whilst those of the enemy were well supported. The latter presented only two vulnerable sides; first, that part of upper Alsace contiguous to Switzerland, the weak point in the line of defence on the east of France—but to attack it with effect, the Rhine must have been passed, Huningen besieged, and the siege covered by a strong army of observation—The Austrians were not sufficiently numerous to accomplish this object without leaving other points entirely defenceless; and, besides, the state of affairs in Italy would not allow them to engage in such an enter-

prize. Moreover that such an attack might lead to any solid and important success, it ought to have belonged to a plan of invading France through *Franche Comté*, a plan equally vast and bold, and which had been several times rejected by the cabinet of Vienna, when yet possessed of the means of executing it. In the next place an attack might have been made on the side of the Hundsruok, the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, or the Moselle; but it has been sufficiently shewn in the History of the Campaign of 1796, how great were the obstacles and inconveniences arising out of this offensive plan; and it may be remembered how quickly the Archduke Charles was compelled to abandon it.—In 1797 there was still much less chance to succeed in the attempt; first, as the Austrians no longer possessed so great an extent of territory in the above mentioned countries, then because the French had acquired the *tete de pont* of Neuweid, and lastly because the former were much weaker than the year before.

The Austrian army was not therefore in a condition to attack; nor was it in a much better state to defend itself, obliged as it was to maintain a line quite out of proportion with its means, and which with forces more considerable it had not been able to preserve

preserve the year before. General Mack found himself as in 1794, (though however with much fewer resources) obliged to defend a line of which the centre only was secure, while the two flanks were uncovered, and could easily be turned—Thus situated all the good he could do, was to prevent evil as much as possible, so that it was but *negatively* (if it may be so said) that he could be of use to his Sovereign, and add something to his own reputation. If, as was thought by some people, he attended more to the latter consideration, than to the former, when he abandoned the command of the Imperial Army in 1794, he acted differently, when he consented to resume it in 1797, and there could be no longer a doubt remaining about his patriotism *.

The French Generals Moreau and Hoche who commanded, the first on the upper, and the second on the lower Rhine, where he had replaced Beurnon-

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ville,

* This Officer acted as Quarter Master General to the armies of the Rhine but a short time; just enough to inspect them, and to order some arrangements to be made, which were very ill conducted in his absence. In the end of March he was recalled to Vienna, to be entrusted with the defence of the town, and to take the command of the corps de reserve and the volunteers destined to cover that capital.

ville, had collectively, under their orders, about 150,000 men—These troops lined the banks of the Rhine, and guarded the fortresses from Huningen to Landau; garrisoned the strong holds of the Sarre and Moselle; occupied a part of the Palatinate, the whole of the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, and almost all the Hundsruck; had posts upon the Nahe; and from the mouth of that river, edged the left bank of the Rhine, as far as Cologne, and the right bank from that town to Dusseldorf—It may be seen from what has been said above, how much this position was preferable to that of the Austrians, either for attack, or defence.—The French had every advantage with respect to numbers and position; their superiority was the same in the relative quality of the soldiers, because the losses suffered by the armies of Hoche and of Moreau in the preceding campaign had not been repaired by recruits, but by corps of troops organized since the very beginning of the war, and which had most of them served in Flanders, Spain, or La Vendée.

It was very far from the intention of the Directory to leave such powerful instruments unemployed in their hands—They had witnessed the expulsion of their armies out of Germany with too much regret,

not to long ardently for a time when they might again behold them re-entering that country in triumph—Besides the general state of political and military circumstances rendered its invasion much easier than it had been in 1796;—and the ambitious views of the Directory had enlarged in due proportion with the means it had acquired of realizing them—It aimed at nothing less than conquering all the hereditary dominions, stripping the Emperor entirely, or in part of his possessions and dignity, transplanting the revolution into Germany, or making the petty princes dearly purchase their political existence; they even perhaps meant to give the King of Prussia a few such marks of gratitude, as they had already bestowed upon the Republics of Holland, Genoa, and Venice—However great might have been the ambition of the Directory, its rapacity was still greater, and if it wished to conquer Germany, it was rather for the sake of plunder, than of power. To conquer first, then to despoil—such were the designs of the Directory against Germany. It wished that its armies should spread themselves into that vast and rich country to extort from it the pay, clothing, and subsistence, which could not be afforded them at home—and so to seize again, and
carry

carry off all that had escaped a few months before from the rapacious hands of their Generals and Commissaries. In short, it flattered itself that they would organize the pillage of Germany as completely as Buonaparte had done the plunder of Italy, and that like the latter they would replenish the coffers of the Republic with the wealth of the rich, and the spoils of the poor.

To execute these designs, to realize the hopes which hurried the Directory into an offensive campaign, it was necessary to hasten its commencement. Buonaparte had opened the breach, either he must be assisted to widen it, or France must run the risk of seeing him buried beneath its ruins. He continued to advance into Germany, but his danger increased with his progress; he stood alike in need of help either to maintain himself, or to retire; therefore Generals Hoche and Moreau received orders to quit their cantonments, and to pass the Rhine as soon as possible.

That operation was not equally difficult for the two Generals. Moreau had no bridge across the river, and could not pass it but by main force, and in the face of the enemy. Hoche on the contrary, besides the town, and the entrenched camp of Dusseldorf,

dorf, which gave him a secure footing on the left bank, had a *tete de pont* at Neuwied, which at the cessation of the armistice returned untouched into his hands. Besides his army having been perfectly at rest during five months, had had more time than that of Moreau to repair its losses, and to put itself in a condition to begin the campaign; it was proper therefore that it should commence hostilities, and endeavour, by some success, to assist the operations of the army on the upper Rhine.

C H A P. V.

General Hoche's army passes the Rhine at Neuwied; it attacks and carries the entrenched position of the Austrians—They retreat upon the Lahn, abandon it, and then retire upon the Nidda—The French pass these rivers and arrive before Franckfort—Suspension of Hostilities.

ON the 18th of April, at three o'clock in the morning, General Hoche's vanguard passed the Rhine at Neuwied, and advanced into the plain: the main body of his army followed quickly after, and drew up in order of battle, in front and within the reach of the Austrian cannon. The Imperialists were posted between Hettersdorf and Bendorf, their right being supported by the former, and their left by the latter village. This position, which they had held since the end of the preceding year, for the purpose of masking the *tete de pont* of Neuwied, and to prevent the French from extending themselves beyond it, was strongly entrenched, and defended,

fended, by good redoubts, which they had had time, during the winter, to compleat ; but still they were not so formidable, and the whole of the position was very far from being so favourable to the Austrians, as was pretended by the French in their accounts of the matter. In another point of view the former had an immense disadvantage: they were to be attacked by 35,000 men, when they did not amount to 10,000 themselves ; and, indeed, there were no more than 6,000 posted in such a manner as to offer any immediate resistance, General Werneck being in the mountains between Altenkirchen and Hachenburg, with the main body of the army. The brave General Kray, who commanded before Neuwied, consulting his courage, rather than his force, not only resolved to await the enemy, but even began the combat by a brisk cannonade*. The
flying

* Before this attack took place, General Kray, who was informed of the armistice which had been concluded at Judenburg, on the 7th of April, proposed to General Hoche to suspend hostilities, in like manner, thus to prevent an effusion of blood, which the probable and nearly approaching signature of peace would render as useless as it would be deplorable. General Hoche, really ignorant,

flying artillery of the French answered with no less vigour: but they were too numerous to confine themselves to an action of this nature. Therefore as soon as they had all passed the river, they formed into columns, and marched to the attack of Hetttersdorf and Bendorf. It was made with resolution, and they firmly withstood the fire of the entrenchments, which were very soon assaulted on all sides. The Austrians defended themselves desperately, but this obstinacy was more honorable than useful, and served only to encrease the effusion of blood; the superiority of numbers prevailed, the two villages were forced, and the French cavalry completed the victory. General Hoche lost no time to take advantage of it, by gaining ground, and pursuing the Austrians, who were in full retreat, some towards Montabauer, and some towards Dierdorf. Meanwhile, having obtained reinforcements, they made a stand in these two places, and chiefly in the latter,

ignorant, or pretending to be so, of what was passing in Styria, refused to accede to this proposal, unless the Austrians should consent to put the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, and the course of the Lahn in his power. General Kray could not grant this extravagant demand, and the parley ceased.

latter, where they, for a long time, stopped the light troops of the enemy; but the main body of the French coming up after a long march, the Austrians were again driven from this post, as well as from Montabauer, where 15,000 of the enemy had followed them.

While the right and centre of Hoche's army obtained these advantages, his left, consisting of more than 25,000 men, and commanded by General Championnet, was not less successful. It had advanced from Dusseldorf to the Sieg, marching in two divisions, part upon Uckerath, and part upon Altenkirchen. It may be remembered how often these two strong positions were taken and retaken during the preceding campaign; and how much blood they cost. The two small Austrian corps, which occupied them, were too weak, effectually to resist Championnet's attack: however, they warmly disputed the possession of the ground, but were forced, after considerable loss, to abandon it to the French.

In the account, given by General Hoche, to the Directory, of these battles, he did not mention the number of Austrians killed and wounded, but said he had taken 7,000 men, and 27 pieces of cannon from them, besides a great number of caissons, waggons,

waggons, and horses. This statement was certainly exaggerated; but there is reason to think that the Imperialists lost, in these several engagements of the 18th, near 4,000 men, killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. The battle of Neuwied, alone, cost them more than 2,000 men, and 20 cannons. The Republicans lost, at least, half that number of men*.

Such

* One cannot mistrust too much the computations made by the French Generals, of the number of men killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. They are truly fabulous.—One instance, amongst others, will shew how little their exactness, in this respect, is to be relied on. In a letter, full of rodomontade, written by the French General De Belle to one of his friends, and published at Paris, he had the impudence to say, that at the battle of Neuwied, alone, they had taken 9,000 men, 25 pieces of cannon, and 2,000 horses.—Nobody will suppose that General Hoche, whose boasting is sufficiently known, had any wish to attenuate his own victory, and diminish its splendor; and yet he estimated the number of prisoners at 4,000, thinking it prudent not to carry exaggeration any farther. Hoche added, "*we are yet employed in pursuing the enemy,*" which implies, that they fled, and, of course, that all were not taken. De Belle, on the contrary, boldly asserts, "*the retreat is cut off, and every thing remains in our power.*" It is not known whether this De Belle who commanded

Such important successes obtained by the French in one day, their rapidity in taking advantage of them, their vast superiority of number which promised fresh victories, in short, every thing seemed to preclude all hopes that General Werneck could keep his position in front of the Lahn, or even prevent the enemy from passing it. A part of his left wing was, the day after, on the 19th, obliged to retire beyond that river, while the centre and right wing endeavoured to stop the progress of the enemy between the Sieg and the upper Lahn.

The French advanced on all points with such rapidity, and principally upon the lower Lahn, where they found fewer obstacles, that on the night of the 19th, their light troops passed the river at Limburg, and pushed their advanced posts much beyond that town. On the 20th they invested the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein. The right wing, and part of the centre of their army crossed the Lahn at Weilburg and Nassau on the same day, the troops opposed

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manded the French artillery is skilful in that line, but he certainly is so in another, for he found the means to take 9,000 men, where there were only 6,000.—This man was dismissed in 1799, for exactions committed by him in the conquered countries.

to them retiring towards Mentz, Kœnigstein, and Franckfort. General Werneck had taken a strong position at Kleinnister on the 19th, and had there reunited the greatest part of his force, but he was compelled to abandon it the very day after, and to retire upon Westlaer, and Giessen, finding himself too weak to hazard a battle with the main body of the French army which was opposed to him, and his left flank being already threatened by that corps of the enemy which had passed the Lahn at Weilburg.—His rear was a good deal harrassed in his retreat, and had to sustain several combats, in which it was a sufferer. The right wing of the French army was marching with such rapidity from the Lahn to the Mein, that General Werneck had reason to fear that it might push on as far as Franckfort, and possess itself of that place, before he could himself arrive upon the Mein. This was probably the consideration that induced him to abandon Westlaer on the 21st, as also Giessen, into which the French entered the same day. The two armies marching very near each other, several rear guard affairs took place, which were attended with some loss on both sides.

On

On the 22^d the Austrians again retreated and repassed the Nidda, which their enemies cleared at the same time. The French cavalry pursued so warmly two squadrons of Austrian hussars, flying to take refuge within the walls of Franckfort, that they were very near entering the town with them. This indeed would have happened, had not an officer of Austrian infantry, who was upon the rampart with 50 men, made them fire so opportunely upon the French cavalry, that it was for a moment disconcerted and broken, which gave time to raise the drawbridge, and eventually saved Franckfort—For no sooner did the French vanguard appear before the walls of the town, than General Lefebvre who commanded it, was informed by the General of the Austrians, that the preliminaries of peace had been signed, and that a courier was just arrived, sent by Bonaparte to apprise General Hoche of it. This intelligence suddenly interrupted all hostilities, and put a stop to the motions of the two armies. The Austrians rejoiced at this event much more than the French, whose Generals saw with regret, the prospects of conquest, of glory, and of fortune vanish, which presented

themselves to their view. It was not even without difficulty, that they could be convinced of the truth of the information, and could be persuaded to sheath their swords. Generals Werneck and Hoche immediately set about marking out a line of demarcation, behind which their respective armies were to wait the ultimate issue of the negotiation. This arrangement was not effected without much altercation and difficulty. General Hoche pretended that the town of Franckfort should be put into his hands, upon the plea that his troops being already before the town when the news of the peace arrived, they could not have failed to make themselves masters of it in a very short time. This reasoning was far from appearing conclusive to the Austrian Generals, but it was easier to prove its fallacy to General Hoche than to prevail upon him to renounce it, which in the end, however, he did—Thus did the town of Franckfort escape almost miraculously from the dominion of the French, and save some millions, which their residence in it must infallibly have cost.

While peace put a stop to the triumphant march of the French, on the lower Rhine, the sacrifices

it obliged them to make on the upper Rhine were not less material; but before what passed in that quarter is related, a retrospective view must be taken of what has just been detailed. The French army has been seen advancing in five days from the bridge of Neuwied, to that of Franckfort, a space of about 25 leagues (75 miles), which an army proceeding without impediment in full peace, could scarcely have traversed in the same space of time— It has been seen that its march was only interrupted to fight and to conquer, and to carry in a few hours a camp, the intrenching of which had taken up several months. They have been seen daily gaining some important advantage, driving the enemy from the strongest posts, and compelling them to imitate in their flight, the velocity of its march. To what cause must these rapid and complete successes be attributed?—May it not reasonably be looked for in the position of the Austrian army, which was unsupported on the right, inferior in number, (scarcely amounting to 30,000), and opposed to at least the double of its force? may its defeat not be imputed to the discouragement with which the great reverses experienced in Italy, had naturally inspired

its Generals and officers, as well as to the confidence which the same events gave to the French ? There is no doubt but these reasons abundantly account for the result, and admitting the first to be true, the other must apparently follow ; yet it must be believed that the issue of this short campaign, was owing to less obvious causes, and partly to the faults committed by the Austrian Generals. In fact, Generals Clairfayt in 1795, and Wartensleben in 1796, had found themselves, (especially the latter), in the very same situation, with disadvantages nearly similar, and as great an inferiority of force as General Werneck ; and yet they employed twice the time in making the same retreat, and had effected it too with more order, and comparatively little loss. But they had shewed more foresight, prudence, and activity, their defensive operations were better combined, and they had not left between 5 and 6,000 men to their fate, exposed every moment to be attacked and surrounded in their entrenchments by 30,000 troops. The works which had been constructed during the winter, for the purpose of uniting the end of the line of demarcation with the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein

breitstein, and with the entrenched camp at Neuweid, compensated the *tête de pont* which the French possessed at the latter place, and gave Mr. de Werneck an advantage for the defence of the Lahn, which Generals Clairfayt and Wartensleben had not.

If General Werneck may be accused of having but ill defended the position he had taken, he may with still more reason be blamed for having taken it at all. Nothing could be more imprudent, than to endeavour with 30,000 men at most, to keep the useless plain of Neuwied, and the whole course of the Lahn, which could scarcely have been defended by an army of 50,000. Every reflecting man of the profession will agree, that he ought in the month of March, to have taken upon the Lahn, a position as concentrated as possible, from which he would at the first check, have retreated to Friedberg, and entrenched himself upon the Nidda, by doing which he would have secured the means of safely afterwards passing the Mein, and without being obliged to engage an enemy too superior in number. It is therefore reasonable to attribute the unavailing resistance, and the misfortunes of

the Austrian army, to faults of one kind or another, committed by the Generals who commanded it. This opinion is justified by the accusation laid against General Werneck by General Kray, which was sufficiently serious to be made the subject of a military trial. General Kray was put under arrest for a short time, but the Council of War ultimately allowed him to have been right, and General Werneck was deprived for ever of his command, and compelled to retire with the usual pension.

CAMPAIGN

OF

1797,

IN

GERMANY.

CHAP. VI.

After having made the necessary preparations, Moreau forces the passage of the Rhine, on the 20th of April—On that day and the following, the Austrians made several fruitless attempts to oblige him to repass that river—The whole French army having got to the other side, attack the Austrians, who are beaten, and put to flight—The French take possession of Kehl—The intelligence of the conclusion of peace puts a stop to further hostilities.

WHILE Hoche, in five days, acquired so many advantages, his colleague Moreau, in still less time, obtained successes equally important, of greater difficulty, and more dearly bought.

On the 19th of April all his army quitted its cantonments, which extended from Huningen to Landau,

dau, and marched towards the Rhine, which he intended to pass on the following night.—As has been already remarked, Moreau had no bridge over that river, and according to his own account, he possessed but one set of pontoons.—A bridge could not be established with promptitude and safety, unless he had a footing on the opposite bank, and it was necessary that he should obtain it either by surprise or by force. He flattered himself that he should succeed by combining these two means. In order to embarrass the Austrians by harrassing them on several points at the same time, and to prevent them from directing their force to that which was actually in danger, he prepared several false attacks, calculated to conceal the real one, which was to take place a little below Strasburg, and opposite to Kilstett. This point had been fixed upon as the most favourable, either from the very nature of the spot, or because it stood more conveniently for procuring the means which the execution of the enterprize required, or from its affording greater facility for sending reinforcements, and thus, immediately, improving any success that might be obtained.

Moreau had intended to effect the passage of the river before break of day, but the difficulty of

assembling a sufficient number of boats having retarded the embarkation of his troops, it did not take place till six o'clock, and for more than two hours before, a heavy fire of cannon and small arms had taken place, all the way from Brisach to Fort Louis, either from the opposite banks of the river, or from the little islands possessed by the hostile parties. The advanced posts of the Austrians, along the river, being put on their guard by these attacks, Moreau could no longer hope to surprise them; nothing, therefore, remained for him but to postpone the passage, or to attempt it by open force, which latter he determined to do.

The attack was to be made by nearly 15,000 men, divided into three bodies, and commanded by the Generals Jordis, d'Avoust, and Duhem,—It was the latter, who, with five battalions first set out from where the little river Ill joins the Rhine, and advanced towards the opposite bank. The Austrians, perceiving their approach, fired briskly upon the boats, both with cannon and small arms, but the French, being partly covered by the islands, did not suffer much, and made good their landing on the island which lies nearest the right bank.—Having driven out the Austrian posts, which occupied it, they forded a narrow branch of the river, and with-

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out much difficulty established themselves on the German side. It was only defended by the ordinary advanced piquets, who seeing so superior a force coming against them, fell back to their reserve. Before several corps could be got together in sufficient numbers to attack the French, their boats had time to return to the left bank, and to bring over fresh troops. The Republicans, as soon as they were sufficiently in force, foreseeing that they would soon be attacked, and feeling the necessity of possessing themselves of some post, where they might be sheltered from the fire of artillery, and from the attacks of the Austrian cavalry, until they could oppose them with a similar force, attacked the village of Diersheim, from which they were at first repulsed with loss, but of which they at last made themselves masters. They defended it better than the Austrians had done, who several times attempted in vain to retake it. During these first combats, the Austrians flocked in from all sides, and collected the forces they had in the neighbourhood.—On the other hand, the French received continual reinforcements, either by means of their boats, or by a flying bridge which they had established: it was by means of this that some pieces of cannon, and some hundred horse, came to join them from Strasburg. They were then able

able to make a more orderly arrangement of their force, by forming into a semicircle, their centre at Diersheim, and their right and left on the Rhine, so that they could not be forced on their flanks, and could protect and keep open their communication with the left bank. The Austrians saw that every hour increased the number and strength of the enemy, and proportionally diminished the possibility of forcing them to repass the river; therefore, after having received some reinforcements, and silenced the fire of the French, they attacked the village of Diersheim, with such intrepidity, that they penetrated into it, and almost entirely expelled them from it. Knowing, however, that all hope of victory or of retreat depended upon their keeping possession of the village, the enemy brought up all their force, and an engagement of infantry ensued, the most obstinate and most bloody, perhaps, of any during this war. Both parties were sensible, that on the issue of this combat, depended, in a great measure, the fate of Germany. The hope of conquest on the one side, and the shame of defeat on the other, animated the courage of the troops, and made them redouble their efforts. Though one side did not yield to the other in obstinate valour, yet the Austrians gained ground, and,

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in all probability, would have been victorious, if the numbers had remained equal: but the reinforcements sent to the French by means of the boats, followed each other so rapidly, that they became, in a short time, greatly superior to their enemies, who were obliged to yield to numbers, and to give up the attack of the village: they lost, also, that of Honau, where the French lodged themselves. Another attack was made by the Austrians on the left, which was at first attended with some success, but was soon frustrated by superior force. Night stopped the effusion of blood. The French took advantage of it to get a surer footing on the right bank. They established a bridge of boats over the river, and made so good a use of it in bringing over ammunition, artillery, and fresh troops, that on the following morning they were sufficiently strong to defy all the efforts of their antagonists.

The Austrians had prepared themselves, during the night, for fresh and greater exertions, having been joined by the troops stationed in the vallies of Kintzing, of Renchen, of Acheren, and of Murg, to the number of about 18,000 men. The commander in chief, de Latour not being yet arrived, General Stzarray headed them, who, perceiving that every moment augmented the force of the French,

so that that day being past, it would become, so to speak, impossible to prevent them from spreading themselves over Germany, was sensible that there remained to him only one moment, and no means of saving it but that of making an immediate and desperate effort : accordingly, soon after the break of day, the Austrians commenced so terrible a cannonade upon the villages of Diersheim and Honau, that the French batteries were dismounted. This cannonade was soon followed by an attack so vigorous, that its commencement was attended with success. The right of the enemy gave way, and they would probably have been driven from their position, if, at the most critical moment, two half brigades had not come to their relief, and given them a decisive superiority. The same thing happened in the centre, and on the left, where a column of Austrian infantry, in vain, performed prodigies of valour. It was on the point of getting possession of the village of Diersheim, when Moreau sent two battalions to attack it in flank : these battalions advancing into the plain, were immediately charged by the Austrian cavalry, to oppose which, and to disengage their own infantry, the French cavalry soon came into the field. These reciprocal and
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precipitated attacks produced one of the most furious and confused combats of cavalry that was ever seen—The continual reinforcements which arrived over the bridge of boats, however, terminated the affair in favour of the French, and the Austrians were obliged to return to their position without being able to impair that of the enemy. The time was now come when defence instead of attack was the object of their attention, for the French had made all their army and artillery pass the Rhine, and every opportunity to drive them back was irrecoverably lost.

Moreau did not lose a moment in beginning in his turn offensive operations. He divided his army into three columns—the centre one was the strongest, and marched towards the villages of Linz and Hobin, whilst the right advanced towards the Kintzing, and the left to the Renchen. The Austrians fatigued, weakened, and discouraged by two days of bloody and fruitless fighting, could not resist fresh and numerous troops. The French easily got possession of the causeway which leads from Kehl to Stollhoffen, and overran the plain, where their cavalry completed the defeat of the Austrians. and put them entirely to the rout. A great part of their artillery
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and baggage became a prey to the conquerors, who likewise took 4,000 prisoners with a General. According to Moreau's account, the killed and wounded amounted to the same number. As is usual with the French Generals he took no notice of his own loss: it must undoubtedly have exceeded that of the Austrians, both in killed and wounded, as the latter for two days had the advantage of position and a superiority of fire, and as the French owed their ultimate success to the perseverance with which they sustained it. There men were sacrificed to gain possession of the country, and the acknowledged wounds of six of their principal Generals, are a sufficient proof that they paid dearly for it.

The prisoners which they easily took from an enemy flying in every direction, were not the only fruit of their victory. On the same day they pushed on their left to Freystadt, their centre to Renchen and Oberkirch, and their right to Offenbourg and Gengembach; and in the evening, without firing a shot, they took possession of that fort of Kehl, which a few months before they had given up after so gallant a defence. The fortifications had been very imperfectly repaired and the commanding officer dreading the consequence

of the assault with which he was threatened, delivered up the place, and his garrison to the French.

They next day they advanced in all directions, and without meeting with much resistance, occupied Stollhofen, Freydenstadt, Haslach, and Ettenheim. It was while they were in these positions, that intelligence of the peace signed at Leoben, reached them, and a suspension of hostilities having been agreed upon by General Latour and Moreau, it was announced to both armies.

Thus was terminated in Germany, almost as soon as it was opened, a campaign remarkable for the bloody combats which marked its short duration, and in which the bravery of the Austrian soldiers, it must be acknowledged, was much more conspicuous than the ability of their Generals.—Their conduct on both the lower and higher Rhine, was far from being unexceptionable : But upon the whole, the passage of that river, was much more difficult and honourable to Moreau than to Hoche ; the latter was in possession of a bridge already established and even fortified ; whereas the former, who had nothing of the kind, was not even provided with a sufficient number of boats. This passage, which he executed in spite of every obstacle, was a very

very bold action, and one of those which contributed most to the military reputation he has acquired.—The short duration of this campaign, makes it unnecessary to enter into further details, nor shall at present any surmise upon its probable consequences be hazarded, as they depended so much upon the military operations then carrying on in Italy, and in the south of Germany, that they cannot be judged of separately. The hostile armies on the frontiers of Germany and Italy, shall therefore be returned to, and some observations shall be offered upon the whole of the campaign, and upon its probable consequences, had it been continued.

C H A P. VII.

Examination of the plan of invasion followed by Bonaparte—Enquiry whether it agreed with the principles of ordinary offensive war, and with those of a war of conquest?—Whether it was executed with prudence?—What would have been its result, had it not been prevented by the armistice, and the preliminaries of peace which followed?

THE first striking circumstance which the campaign made by Bonaparte presents, is the object which the French General proposed to himself. To traverse the Friuly, Carylthia, Carniola, Styria, and Austria, to drive the Emperor from his capital, or to dictate to him under the walls of Vienna, the terms of a humiliating peace; this is not only what had never been done, but what not one of the Kings of France, who in the course of the three last centuries, had found themselves temporary masters of Italy, had ever dared to undertake, or had even dreamt of effecting. Louis the fourteenth
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had indeed in the beginning of this century formed the plan of making his troops penetrate into Germany by Italy ; but the route of the Tyrol was that which they were to take ; and this project, the execution of which was scarcely attempted, had no other view, than to unite on the banks of the Danube, a part of the army of Italy, to that of the Elector of Bavaria.—Bonaparte wished that one of the most brilliant campaigns that had ever been made, should be succeeded by one, that should be without its equal, as it would be without its model ; and in two months to strike against the House of Austria, at the head of a republican army, blows more sensible, than had ever been struck in the course of five wars, by any of the great Generals of the most powerful monarch that had ever reigned in France. One may easily believe that this last motive did not contribute less than the interests of the French Republic, to recommend this enterprize to the ardent mind, and the haughty soul of this young Corsican.

It cannot be denied, but that the object of this campaign was quite in the spirit of that species of war which the French were waging, namely, of a revolutionary one : but was it equally so in the

true spirit of common offensive war, and of a war of conquest?—The first of these undoubtedly consist in doing all possible harm to your enemy, and in pushing your advantages as far as they can be carried: it ought not however to be undertaken but with limited views, and on data, if not certain, at least little subject to variation; and should be continued only to the point, at which there is no ground to apprehend its degenerating into a defensive war, difficult to support.—You ought not to engage in a war of conquest, without being assured of being able to maintain yourself, as long as there may be occasion, in the conquered countries, either through the favorable disposition of the inhabitants, by effecting, or accomodating to their wishes, a revolution in the government; or by getting possession of a great number of strong places, which may at once afford security against insurrections, against surprize, and against a want of subsistence, in a word it ought not to be entered upon, if it cannot be waged without exposing yourself to great dangers, and without placing yourself in a situation where success must at last engender reverses.—Let us examine, whether the plan and the conduct of the French General agreed with these fundamental rules

rules of these two species of war, from the violation of which so many Generals have derived disgrace, and so many armies their ruin.

In the month of March 1797, the situation of Bonaparte was in all respects superior to that of his adversaries; his forces more than doubled theirs; he had behind him Mantua and Peschiera, while they were unsupported by any fortress; he had just finished a splendid campaign of victories and conquests; the sentiment of his troops was that of confidence; that of the army opposed to him was discouragement. These circumstances prescribed to him the attack : but at what period and on what points ought he to make it? That is the question.

The Directory had determined to resume in 1797, the plan which had failed in the preceding year, and to make the two armies of the Rhine and of Italy penetrate into the very heart of the Hereditary States. The decisive advantages obtained by the latter in the preceding campaign, and the probability of their having disposed the cabinet of Vienna to peace, rendered the execution of this project at once less difficult and more seasonable than in 1796. If Buonaparte had consulted the interests

of the cause which he served rather than his own vanity and ambition; if he had listened to reason instead of trusting to his star; if he could have borne to consent to partake with any other, the glory of carrying terror to the very gates of Vienna; instead of entering upon the campaign six weeks sooner than it was possible for Generals Hoche and Moreau to do it, he would have deferred putting himself in motion, if not till they had arrived, the one on the banks of the Mein, and the other on those of the Danube, at least till both had forced the passage of the Rhine, and that he could reckon on their co-operation. Instead of advancing into the middle of a difficult country, full of defiles, and unfruitful, having both his flanks perfectly uncovered, and leaving Italy behind him, which had so much vengeance to exercise; instead of seeking to occupy a line of near 300 miles, with less than 80,000 men, which must at once be employed in securing his communications, to present a front on both his flanks, to be incessantly forcing an army to retreat, which was strengthening every day, and to pierce into the centre of the territories of a Prince, who had 20,000,000 of faithful subjects; instead of undertaking so senseless an expedition, had he taken

taken advantage of the superior force which he then possessed, to drive the Austrians entirely out of the Friuli, to force them beyond the Alps from the Gulph of Venice to the frontiers of the Grisons, to back his army with the German Alps; then, being master of the defiles which lead into Carniola, Carynthia, and Bavaria, and of the vallies of the Save, the Drave, the Inn, and the Lech, he would have been enabled, either to wait in this unattackable position till General Moreau had traversed the mountains of Suabia, or to favour the success of this General, by placing his left in the rear of the Austrian army of the upper Rhine. Had he adopted either the one or the other of these measures, such was at that time the superiority of the three Republican armies, over those opposed to them, that the latter must inevitably have been forced to fall back; and that probably, before the end of the month of June, 200,000 French might have had a footing in Styria, in Austria, or in Bohemia. It is not to be concluded that the Austrian Monarchy would have fallen; but since the Directory had proclaimed its desire to destroy, or at least to shake it, since it cherished the vain hope of accomplishing so gigantic a project, at least

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it ought to have employed the forces which were destined for its execution, in a way at once the most safe and the most efficacious.

It may perhaps be objected, that Bonaparte had no other motive for opening the campaign so early, but to take advantage of the moment when the Austrian army was nearly in that state of weakness and discouragement, in which the terrible reverses which it had experienced a few weeks before had left it; and that had he waited a month, the Archduke would have found himself in a condition to resist him, and to shut against him the entrance into Germany. To these presumptions, the fact itself gives an answer. On the 7th of April, the day on which the armistice was agreed on, that is to say, near a month after the opening of the campaign, the Archduke was still inferior in force to Bonaparte; and yet this Prince, in retreating, had spared more than half the journey to the reinforcements which he expected from Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary. It must besides be observed, that the first troops which came to the assistance of Prince Charles were those which were sent him from the Rhine, and a large part of which remained in the Archbishopric of Salzburg. Now it is probable, that if the
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French army of Italy had put itself in motion at the same time, only with that of the Rhine, these latter Austrian troops would have made a retrograde movement towards Suabia, and that even some regiments would have been sent thither, which upon the urgency of the moment, marched from the Hereditary States to join the Archduke. One must, besides, suppose, that three large armies, attacking at the same time, and in concert, would have thrown Austria into much greater embarrassment, and would have given her more serious alarm, than one single insulated army, against which she might suddenly unite with advantage all her forces. These different considerations appear sufficiently to justify the opinion, that Bonaparte's plan violated the restrictive rules of the two species of offensive war, which shall be still more clearly proved in the course of this chapter; that this plan was rather the combined production of thirst for glory and of rashness, than of courage and science; that it was better suited to the head of Charles the Twelfth, than to that of the great Condé.

If this plan of invasion is censured, notwithstanding the success with which it was crowned, which happened only, because Bonaparte, found in his politics, a powerful auxiliary to his
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arms; in spite of the same reason it will be found, that this project, conceived with little wisdom, was executed with little discretion. What the French General did personally, from the moment of his departure from Udina, to that of his arrival at Judenburg, shall not be criticized. It will be admitted that his march was rapid, his movements brilliant, and his attacks well combined: but the Generals whom he had left on the Adige, whether they followed his orders, or whether they acted independently of him, did not, it would appear, do all that circumstances required of them. The centre and the right of the army were destined to advance to Vienna, while the left should remain in the Tyrol; this should have taken a position, which might at the same time have given security to itself, and have contributed to that of the rest of the army, which was moving to a distance from it. General Joubert should then, instead of leaving (as he did) Generals Kerpen and Loudon masters of the strongest position which the Tyrol offers, have driven them entirely from the upper part of this province, have pushed them beyond the Alps, and have shut their entrance against them. That done, he ought to have dispatched a small corps to occupy the beginning of
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the valley of the Drave. By acting thus, General Joubert would have prevented, in a great degree, the rising in mass of the Tyrol, would have been secure, if not from attack, at least from suddenly being forced from his position, would, while maintaining it, have given time to General Kilmaine, who commanded some troops that remained in the Tyrol, to come to his assistance on the Adige, and at the worst, after thus having gained time, which was every thing, might have retired upon Brixen, and afterwards upon Lienz. In this manner he would have supported one of the extremities of the immense line which Bonaparte's army held; and the safety of the latter, would consequently have been less endangered.

The last question, that of fact, which has been so much discussed, and on which opinions have been so much divided, comes now to be considered. At the moment when Bonaparte signed the armistice, was he, or was he not, in a perilous situation?—Was he entitled to reap the fruits of his invasion, or to have been punished for daring to attempt it? The latter of these alternatives shall be adopted without hesitation, and that for the following reasons.

Bonaparte, when arrived at Judenburg, was more than 150 miles from the point from whence

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he set out, and there remained nearly as many for him to march before he found himself under the walls of Vienna, the object of his expedition*. The troops which had passed the Alps with him amounted to about 60,000 men. They occupied the banks of the Save, the Drave, and the Muehr; the extremity of the right was between Trieste and Fiume; that of the left was at the entrance of the valley of the Drave; the centre was at Judenburg, being thus considerably advanced before the two wings, but less before the right than the left; for this latter was, to speak properly, almost entirely behind him. It was in this whimsical and unexampled formation, required, indeed, by circumstances, that the French General was to continue his march towards Vienna. In casting one's eyes over the map, one sees that at every step that he would have taken, the line which he occupied on his left, would have been prolonged; and that his right could not march at the same rate, and at the same distance from him, without leaving in its rear Croatia, as well as all the countries of the lower

* He had written to the Directory, " If they pass the Rhine, I shall go to Vienna; if they do not, I shall gain three battles, and still go to Vienna."

lower Save, and the lower Drave: he would then have been exposed on his left, or rather behind his left, to the Austrian troops, which were in the country of Saltzburg, and to those which would have come from upper Austria, or even from Bohemia; and behind his right, to all that could have marched from Croatia, and from the adjacent countries, those countries from whence the regiments, called the regiments of the frontiers, are drawn, and the whole population of which is not only subjected to conscription, but is even regimented. To what dangers, to what disasters did not such a situation expose and condemn him? Was it not probable, nay, must it not inevitably have happened, that while he was advancing with his eyes fixed on the capital, the bodies of troops, with which he had flattered himself he should be able to make head on both his flanks, would be attacked, not only by bodies of regulars, but by a numerous people, who had already, on all sides, taken up arms? That these two corps would then be obliged to fall back towards Italy, or to close in upon him? in the former case, diminishing his forces, and delivering him to the mercy of his enemies, and in the latter, depriving him of all communication with Italy, and enabling

enabling the Austrians to surround him, and to form an army in his rear. These suppositions are so far from being fanciful, that they had actually begun to be realised at the moment when the negotiations opened, and when Bonaparte still spoke in the tone of a conqueror. It has, in fact, been seen, that three days before the suspension of arms, General Loudon had expelled the French from Botzen, and that, on the following days, he had pushed them as far as the castle of Verona; while, on his side, General Kerpen drove them as far as Lientz.—Bonaparte has written, and it was repeated, that this last movement was voluntary, and by his orders. This may be allowed to be true, though it is rather singular that the moment chosen to execute it, should have been that on which they were attacked, and when an enemy was upon them. But this hypothesis itself justifies the opinion just given, and proves that the Republican General began to feel the embarrassment of his situation, since he determined to cause himself to be reinforced by General Joubert, though he foresaw, to a certainty, that the Austrians would pursue him, and would place themselves in his rear. While he was already reaping, on his left, the fruits of his temerity,

temerity, he was on the point of being still more severely treated on his right. Colonel Casimer, at the head of a corps of Croatians, had advanced between the sea and the French, and had recovered Trieste. An account has not been sooner given of this affair, partly because, being detached, it would have interrupted the thread of the narration, and partly because it took place posterior to the armistice. Bonaparte, in consequence, exacted that his troops should re-enter Trieste for form's sake, and only for twenty-four hours; but he was more serious in compelling the restoration of many chests of money, which Colonel Casimer had taken at Trieste, and which belonged to the French, who, as may be easily supposed, had not drawn it from the treasury of the Republic. Already, then, while Bonaparte was still near 120 miles from Vienna, and before he had obtained any signal advantage, two hostile corps had taken post in his rear, and were at a little distance from the defiles, by which he had entered Germany, and by which he kept up his communication with Italy.

In this state of affairs, which would have rapidly grown worse and worse, if the suspension of arms had not taken place, what remained for the French

General to do? Some will say, to march straight to Vienna, and with that view to force the Archduke to an engagement, or oblige him to give up as much ground as he might be able to occupy:—some, to chuse a good position, to intrench himself there, and to maintain it till General Moreau might arrive in Bavaria: and others, to retreat with celerity, to repass the Alps, to fall like a thunderbolt on Generals Kerpen and Loudon, and drive them on the Adige. Let us examine these three hypotheses.

No one can admit the first without being entirely unacquainted with the art of war. The General, who well understands it, and knows how to take advantage of localities, can find means to avoid a general action, and at the same time to stop, or, at least retard the march of an enemy, however enterprising he may be, or however superior in strength. The talents which the Archduke had displayed during the preceding campaign, and the perfect knowledge which he could not fail to have of the country, since it was his own, and that of his Generals, authorize one to suppose that this Prince would have known, as he had done till then, how to retreat without committing himself, and, at the same time, without precipitation. Supposing,

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nevertheless, that he had been forced, or had consented to give battle, it must be allowed, in recollecting what was passing behind Bonaparte, that if this General was beaten, he was lost without resource:— if, on the contrary, he triumphed, still he had gained but one of the three battles, which he acknowledged himself, it was necessary that he should fight to force his way to Vienna.

The Archduke would have retired, with the rest of his army, into the mountains which defend the frontiers of Austria, and would have seized the entrenched passes, occupied by some thousands of soldiers, and by a larger number of armed peasants. These different means of resistance would have enabled him to stop Bonaparte for some time, and to make every attack cost him dear. Supposing, however, that by dint of courage, of talents, and of blood, he had forced the passage of the mountains, and the entrenched camp of Neustadt, all the troops which occupied it, would, with the Archduke, have retired under the walls of Vienna, where this Prince would have found more than 50,000 volunteers, drawn either from that capital, or from the two provinces of Austria. Can it be believed, that with an army reduced, by his victories themselves to 40,000

men, and perhaps less, he would have defeated an equal number of soldiers, supported by more than double the number of peasants, not disciplined, it is true, but brave, obedient, and fighting for their country, their king, and their homes? But admitting an event so very improbable, and supposing the French masters of Vienna, what would they then have done?—Would they have remained in this city? Would they have kept the field? Would they have entrenched themselves in a well-chosen camp? Who does not see that in all these cases, having no fortified place, and finding themselves in the midst of a people, beyond every other in Europe, the most anciently attached to their Sovereign, their laws, and their customs, and amongst whom the French Revolution had scarcely a single partisan, the Republicans would have found themselves in a short time surrounded, even besieged, by numbers of enemies four or five times, at least, more considerable than their own; that every morsel of bread they procured, must have been at the point of the bayonet: that their cavalry would not have dared to shew itself before 20,000 horses, which Hungary and the neighbouring provinces could easily have furnished, and which would not have left,

left, for many leagues, around the French army, either cattle, or forage, or provisions of any description?—It seems useless to push any farther the examination of the first supposition; it is evident that it must have drawn with it the entire ruin of Bonaparte's army.

The second is not more favorable for him:—If he had stopped in Styria, and had there taken a more concentrated position; this course would, without doubt, have been more prudent than the former; but, besides that, by this he would have failed in the avowed object of his expedition, which would have been sufficient to justify the judgment given upon it, he would have incurred scarcely less danger than in Austria. His flanks and his rear would have been still open to the attacks of the enemy; the supplies which he could have procured in Styria, would have been soon exhausted; and he would have been too distant from, and have been too little secure of his communications with Italy, to have drawn his subsistence from this latter country. It may, perhaps, be said, that he might have maintained himself between the Muehr, and the Drave, long enough to admit of his being joined by Hoche or Moreau, or, at least, of their co-operating with

him. But, however rapid the progress of either of these Generals might have been, who, as may be remembered, passed the Rhine, the one on the 18th and the other on the 20th of April, and who besides might have been defeated, they could not possibly have arrived in Austria before the middle of the month of June. We find then that Bonaparte must have waited for them more than two months, which was a much longer time than was necessary for the Archduke to collect a force capable of destroying the French army, or of obliging it to lay down its arms.—It is unnecessary to explain to the reader, the means which that prince would have employed to effect this.

It only remains to examine, what would have been the result, if Bonaparte, justly alarmed at his situation, had hastened to retreat, and to fall rapidly on Generals Kerpen and Loudon. It was, beyond contradiction, the best thing that remained for him to do; and there is no doubt but that he would have determined on it, if the conclusion of the armistice had not realized the political motives which encouraged him in his enterprize. But the most fortunate result which his retrograde march could have had, would have been, to bring him
back

back to the point from whence he had set out, after having lost a part of his troops, and after having effaced the sentiment which his last campaign had produced, by that which so disgraceful a retreat could not fail to excite. Probably he would not have escaped with merely this misfortune. The Archduke would instantly have resumed the offensive, and have begun a pursuit. If the retreat had been precipitate, it would have been difficult for Bonaparte to avoid the loss of part of his baggage, his artillery, and probably also of his rear guard. If he had retreated slowly, and with method, Prince Charles would have had time to multiply embarrassments around him, to concert his attacks, and to chuse his moment : the troops stationed in the country of Saltzburg, would have marched to the Drave, have passed that river, and supported by Generals Kerpen and Loudon, might have occupied the defile of the Ponteba, in sufficient force to close it against the French. Reduced to the only route by Goritia, it may be conceived that it would have been difficult for the French to pass their whole army that way, their baggage, and their artillery, without sacrificing a part of it. Bonaparte would then have returned into the Venetian

States with an army exhausted, greatly diminished, and for some time to come, incapable of again entering into the campaign, having lost all that he had before conquered in the Tyrol, in the Venetian Alps, and, what would have been still worse, the effect which his preceding triumphs had produced in the opinion of the people of Italy, and one may say indeed of all Europe. Confidence, the hope of victory, and probably victory itself, would have passed from his banners, to those of the Austrians; his glory would have vanished like a meteor; and if history could not forget his brilliant successes in the former campaign, it would have attributed them to chance on the one part, and to incapacity and treachery on the other: it would have discovered in this man, only a desperate gambler, pushing his good fortune to the utmost, playing at every throw, double or quits, for some time successful, and at last undone.

It is presumed, that it has been sufficiently proved, that the plan of invasion pursued by this General, neither agreed with the principles of ordinary offensive war, nor with those of a war of conquest; that prudence did not direct its execution, and that without the peace of Leoben, its issue far
from

from being such as the French had promised to themselves, would have been more or less fatal. This judgment may rather be considered as well founded, as it is also the opinion of many enlightened military men, who in the examination of this interesting question, have not suffered themselves to be influenced by their particular affections, or by their political sentiments. Some persons have indeed taken the opposite side; but so little susceptible is it of defence, that it has not been attempted by two men who certainly cannot be suspected of partiality towards the Austrians, *Dumouriez and Carnot. With whatever reluctance their evidence is resorted to, the judgment which they have publicly delivered on the subject, under consideration cannot but be mentioned. If their morality is utterly contemptible, the same cannot be said of their talents, and their authority must have weight in military matters: unfortunately they have but too well proved that they know well, the one how to project, the other how to execute. Dumourier has * not hesitated to say, that without the conclusion of the armistice, Bonaparte could not

* In the little work, intituled, " Des nouveaux intérêts de l'Europe," published in 1798.

not have escaped complete destruction; and he has given nearly the same proofs of it that have been just adduced.—In the answer to Citizen Bailleul, a work in which he never suffers truth to escape him, except where it is useful to his useless justification, Carnot says, in speaking of the passage of the Rhine, by Moreau :

“ I did not myself expect such prompt success.
 “ To prevent the army of Italy from acting under a
 “ deception—*To prevent its advancing too far before*
 “ *it could be supported,*—and its placing itself in a
 “ *dangerous position,* I ought to have transmitted to
 “ it literally the intelligence which I received from
 “ the Rhine; I ought, consequently, to have in-
 “ formed it, that all was not yet ready, nor would
 “ be for some time. The passage of the Rhine
 “ was effected sooner than had been promised,
 “ sooner than had ever been hoped, because much
 “ was hazarded to *extricate the army of Italy from*
 “ *its perilous situation.* But assuredly, had it been
 “ made known by the telegraph, that the Rhine
 “ would be passed in two days, it would not have
 “ been the less *necessary* to conclude the treaty of
 “ Leoben. Joubert, notwithstanding a resistance,
 “ more than human, notwithstanding his battles of
 Giants,

“ Giants, would not the less have been forced in
 “ the Tyrol; the enemy had not the less already
 “ re-entered Trieste; the army was not yet the less
 “ menaced on both its flanks, and threatened in its
 “ rear by the insurgents of the Venetian States,
 “ waiting with their poignards for the moment to
 “ exterminate us.”

However superior to all others, on this point, the
 authority of Carnot must be, who had himself the di-
 rection of this enterprize, and who had endeavoured,
 as he tells us in his work, to put Bonaparte in a
 condition to undertake it, we are not in want of his
 declarations to learn, that the French Government,
 and the Generals who were then at the Republican
 armies, considered that of Bonaparte in a critical
 predicament. One word of Moreau's, made it ap-
 pear at the time: in the account which he sent to
 the Directory of the passage of the Rhine, he says,
 “ *The position of the army of Italy,* and the neces-
 “ sity of forcing our enemies to a peace, demanded
 “ the passage of the river, &c. &c.” This phrase
 sufficiently indicated, at once, the idea which this
 General had formed of the dangers to which his
 colleague was exposed, and of the means by which
 he flattered himself they might be avoided.

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We may conclude then, that the armistice agreed on at Judenburg, the 7th of April, did more for the safety of the French, than of the Austrians; that if the latter had shewn as great a degree of firmness as the former did of audacity; if the cabinet of Vienna had known how to bear up against a moment of danger, and had dared to wait the result, it would have had an opportunity of repairing, in a great degree, the disasters of the preceding year; that this campaign of 1797, ought rather to diminish, than increase the military reputation of Bonaparte; and that the expedition, which he undertook, can only be justified in the eyes of scientific people, by the certainty of its speedily terminating in peace, a certainty, which the known dispositions of the cabinet of Vienna, and the intrigues which prevailed there, had pretty well allowed. It must at the same time be admitted, that Bonaparte proved himself an able politician; that he knew how to judge of his situation; that his vanity did not deceive him, at the moment when his advantages arrived at their highest point, could not but diminish; and that he made peace under circumstances, in which it was not only useful but necessary, under circumstances, in which

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it secured to him all the advantages of the past, and precluded all apprehensions for the future.

If the brilliant result which crowned the expedition of the French General was calculated to astonish the vulgar, the wise conduct of his illustrious rival is calculated to excite the admiration of men of the art. If Fabius, arrived at the maturity of age, after a youth spent in camps and a long experience of reverses, which had given him the means of knowing the formidable enemy with whom he had to contend, if Fabius, a dictator, disposing at his pleasure of all the resources and all the forces of Rome against an enemy, enfeebled by bloody campaigns, and having no hope either of succours or reinforcements from his country—if Fabius has acquired an immortal renown and the surname of the Buckler of Rome, for having suspended by a wise temperising system the success of the Carthaginian General—what must be thought of a young prince, scarcely twenty-five years of age, and brought up in all the effeminacy of a court, who after having in the preceding year, repulsed from the heart of Germany, and forced to return upon their own frontiers, two formidable armies, quitted the theatre of his glory, in order to come to arrest the progress

of

of the Conqueror of Italy, who having to oppose to his triumphant army only the feeble relics of an army discouraged by a series of disasters, who ill seconded by ministers and subalterns, jealous or ill intentioned, made on all points of an immense line an obstinate resistance, disputed the ground step by step, insensibly drew his rash enemy into defiles, separated them from their magazines and harrassed them with boldness, and who after having by this conduct augmented his own forces and diminished those of his rival, while he opposed him formidably in front, surrounded and turned his flanks, threatened his rear, and left to the exhausted victor no other reserve but that of a retreat, which was become almost impracticable.—Such was the state into which by the wise conduct of the Archduke, affairs had been brought, when the timidity of the court of Vienna, and the treaty of Leoben which was the result, deprived this prince of the opportunity of raising his own glory upon the ruin of that of Bonaparte, and of becoming a second time the saviour of Germany.

End of the Campaign of 1797.

CHAP.

C H A P. VIII.

Reflections on the Treaty of Leoben—it is equally ill received by the two Powers who had contracted it—Situation of Europe at this epocha—The French retire from the Hereditary States, and subdue the territory of Venice—The revolutionizing of this Republic.

THE Treaty of Leoben was received with transports of joy in France as well as Germany. People flattered themselves that it was at length about to give peace to Europe, worn out by so many convulsions; but it did not excite the same sentiments in the respective cabinets, which had just concluded it. The pressure of circumstances on the one part, and the influence of Bonaparte on the other, had obliged the Belligerent Powers to give a great latitude to the negociators, who had taken advantage of it to come to an understanding and to sign a treaty, before their governments were come to a real agreement. This treaty, which was only preliminary,

liminary, having never been converted into a definitive one, and each of the contracting powers, to whom it was equally unsatisfactory, having probably mutually resolved to change the basis of it, was never made public. It has been seen, that each of them was content to publish the substance of the articles, which appeared the most conformable to its own interests or its honour. The Directory proclaimed the acknowledged result of the decreed limits and the affiliated Republics; while the court of Vienna boasted of having obtained, at the expence of the blood and treasure of its people, the integrity of the German Empire. The general basis, which with a few modifications were to serve for a definitive treaty, have since transpired: it appears that they were laid down by considerations of mutual convenience; but the majority of the Directory, composed of short-sighted men, and of unbounded ambition, did not find that the dismemberment of one part only of Europe was a sufficient field for their plundering disposition, and the court of Vienna recovering from its terror, in proportion to the distance to which the enemy which it had suffered to escape, withdrew from its territory, repented of its error, and aspired to a new partition in Italy or in Germany, as a just indemnity

indemnity for the sacrifices which this war had cost her.

Before negotiations and other events which these reciprocal pretensions occasioned, are related, it will not perhaps be improper to advert for a moment, to the political situation of Europe in the month of May 1797.

After five years of a bloody war, after great reverses, followed by still greater victories, the armies of the Republic had just almost annihilated at the gates of Vienna, the last remains of the continental coalition of 1792. The French Republic, fortified by surrounding affiliated Republics, covered on its weak side by Switzerland, which war had respected for three centuries, seemed to present on all sides, an impenetrable bulwark, and commanded all the west of Europe, from the Adriatic sea to the Ocean. Its armies, at first driven in disorder to the plains of Champagne within 40 leagues of Paris, had ended in carrying terror to the walls of Madrid, of Turin, of Munich, and at last of Vienna, after having taken advantage of the ice of a rigorous winter, for the conquest of Holland, where in the 17th century, the fortune of Louis the

fourteenth, and the ability of his Generals had miscarried. This was what might be called the Empire of the west.

To the east, Russia extending itself from Tartary, and the western coast of America, to the gulph of Finland, and from the Caspian sea, to the Polar circle, without commerce and industry, strong in immense territory, and in its numbers of people half-civilized, seemed formed to be made use of as a counterpoise to the French Republic. Europe thus compressed on its two extremities, by two preponderant powers, contained two others, which seemed placed on purpose to maintain their equilibrium, and to prevent them from being opposed to each other.

Prussia, aggrandized by the dismemberment of Poland, enriched by the acquisition of Dantzick, and by an intelligent and œconomical administration, having scarcely taken a part in the war, with its finances in good condition, a numerous army, and able Generals, untouched in its population and resources, might by the acquisition of Hamburg, and the probable secularisation of some ecclesiastical fiefs in Westphalia, consolidate its influence in the

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north

north of Germany, and as a secondary power might become a respectable ally, or a dangerous enemy.

If Austria was reduced by the exhausted state of its finances, by the loss of 200,000 soldiers, and by the enormous aggrandisement of Russia and of France, to the rank of a secondary power, the extent of her territory,—the resources of a considerable and warlike population, which might in a short time fill up the voids in her armies, occasioned by six bloody campaigns,—the excellence of her soldiers, perhaps the best in Europe,—her influence on the south of Germany—that which she was to preserve in Italy, by the recovery of Mantua, and by the renunciation of Brabant and the Milanese—every thing would conspire to make her still a formidable power, who might, at her pleasure, maintain the balance of Europe, or make it incline in favour of that of the two preponderant powers, to which she would unite her forces.

The French Republic had now no enemies but Portugal and England. The Directory, intoxicated with its successes, had just been guilty of the error of refusing peace to Portugal, in putting too high a price upon it; and by dismissing its plenipotentiary in a manner no less rude than humiliating,

it had forced this power to strengthen its connection with England, and to give up its ports to her, which enabled the latter to block up those of Spain.

Great Britain, no less triumphant at sea, than France was on land, having no Allies, but the waves and the winds, which preserved her from a menacing invasion, flourished in the midst of the war which had been fed by her treasures for five years, saw her commerce renew every year the wealth which she had expended in support of this memorable struggle, of which she had been the soul, and which she now found herself, without alarm, called upon to carry on quite alone.

Meanwhile the hydra of revolt, incessantly stifled, renewed itself as incessantly in Ireland, and threatened a general convulsion. A spirit of languor and of discouragement shewed itself even in England with alarming symptoms. Its public credit decreased; the state could no longer borrow but at a heavy interest, owing to the rapid and unheard of fall of the public funds; the bank, till then most flourishing, suspended its payments, and instead of lending its credit to, required credit of government: Finally an insurrection, regularly organised, broke out at once throughout the whole fleet.

Happily

Happily for England and for the world, she had a King of an energetic character, and a Minister, whose genius seemed to be that of his country, a genius, which roused by obstacles, finished by surmounting them; and which constant in its projects, knew how to draw resources even from difficulties themselves: for whom in short Livy seemed to have written, *Impedimentum pro occasione arripiebat*. He soon found means to dissipate the alarms with which the situation of affairs had inspired the friends of Great Britain and of social order. Raising his own courage in proportion as that of others diminished, and discovering the means of safety, where others saw only causes of destruction, in a few days he contrived to revive the spirit, to awaken the energy, and to re-animate the confidence of the nation; to restore credit to the bank, to raise the public funds, to appease the insurrection of the fleet, and to prepare the immediate suppression of that in Ireland; an event on which, still drawing good from evil, he afterwards founded the happy union of that kingdom with Great Britain.

This transient storm had cleared the horizon of England. Every one saw more distinctly his situa-

tion, his duties, and his interests. The most undoubted patriotism burst forth from every quarter, and the most generous proofs of it were given by every class of the people, who in common with their sovereign, voluntarily made large contributions for the defence of the state. The political body, following the laws of elasticity, had again risen in proportion as it had been depressed. At the moment when it displayed a new vigour, the minister who had been successful in restoring it, unwilling to leave pretexts for any complaint, or subjects for any regret, dispatched that able negociator, Lord Malmesbury to Paris, solemnly to treat for peace. While he in vain endeavoured to bring back the ambitious, the ignorant and senseless Directory to reasonable views, England proved that its moderation was not the result of weakness. Numerous fleets sailed, in all directions, to seek the remains of the French, the Spanish, and the Dutch marine. The sailors which manned them, restored to their character and to their accustomed obedience, burned with a desire to obliterate their past misconduct, and to wash away in their blood and that of their enemies, the injury they had done their country. They proved it gloriously a short time after

afterwards in a great battle against the Dutch, whom Admiral Duncan punished, by a complete defeat, for having associated their fortune with that of the French Republic.

Such was the state of Europe after the conclusion of the preliminary treaty of Leoben, which Bonaparte had not lost an instant to carry into execution with effect. At the moment when he wrote to the Archduke to propose a negociation, he meditated, even then, to sacrifice the Republic of Venice to the existence of those which he had founded in Lombardy, and to offer its territory to the Emperor, in exchange for that which he had torn from him. The impossibility of justifying a political theft, so bare faced, would not have allowed Austria to think of getting possession of the Venetian territory by the Lion's right. But Bonaparte thought, that though it might feel objections to seizing, with its own hand, the spoils of an Ally, it might shew less scruple in receiving them from the hands of an enemy; and doubted not but that if he would consent to take on himself the odium of usurpation, Austria would consent afterwards to accept the profit of it.

It has been seen that a short time after General Loudon had forced the small French corps left on

the Adige, to shut itself up in the castles of Verona, the inhabitants of the Terra Firma, seeing only 2 or 3,000 men of Joubert's division return, and believing that all the rest had been exterminated, followed the example of the Tyrolians, and arming themselves on all sides, massacred or made prisoners all the little French detachments which they could meet with; and forced General Balland, who commanded at Verona, to seek an asylum in the castles, after having seen a part of the troops that he had with him fall under the hands of the people of this city. From the 14th to the 20th of April, there were more than 40,000 peasants in arms; and General Balland blocked up in the citadel of Verona, by the Insurgents, and by General Loudon, was obliged to agree with the latter, for an armistice of six days, in order to capitulate.

In the meantime, General Kilmaine, who commanded in Lombardy, being informed of these movements, had assembled his troops on the 12th of April, and marched towards the Adige. On the 14th, the French troops encamped in the Bergamese, and the Brescian, united with the revolutionary party in these two provinces, had attacked, carried, pillaged, and burned the town of Salò, after

after several obstinate engagements; and had afterwards marched in haste towards the Adige, where they arrived on the 21st, leaving in every part of their route traces of barbarous vengeance. By the 23d, General Kilmaine had reduced the whole country on the right bank of the Adige, and pushed forwards towards Verona.

In consequence of these transactions, General Augereau, who commanded between the Adige and the Piave, alarmed by the rapidity of this formidable insurrection, notwithstanding his natural ferocity, published a moderate proclamation, in which he promised amnesty, and an oblivion of the past; and called upon the inhabitants of the country to return to their homes. This hypocritical measure, drawn from him by the danger to which the French army was exposed, had no other object but to give time to Bonaparte to send back his army, which arrived, by forced marches, through Styria and Carylthia, seizing as it advanced, all the Venetian states, leaving garrisons, commanders, municipalities, in a word, a revolution wherever it passed.

Bonaparte, who had already resolved the destruction of the Venetian Republic, had made a pretext of the slight opposition which the Republican revolt

revolt had experienced, that had broken out in the provinces of the Brescian and the Bergamese, in the month of March, to write a menacing letter to the Doge, on the 10th of April, dated from his headquarters at Judenburg, in which he accused the Senate of perfidy, and of having violated their neutrality. The Senate terrified at the storm which threatened them, had endeavoured to appease him by submission, and had written a letter to the French General, on the 15th of April, in which it disavowed the second insurrection of its subjects, and attributed it to the confusion of the times; spoke of its efforts to suppress it; and gave him to understand, in an obedient and respectful manner, that the insurrection having commenced in the provinces beyond the Mincio, separated by Bonaparte himself from the Venetian States, the Senate could not be responsible for the insurrection hostile to them, and for the excesses committed after it against the French troops. This letter had been confided to two deputies, charged to negotiate with the conqueror, and to soften him, if it was possible.

On the 12th of April the Senate had addressed a proclamation to its subjects, in which it disavowed as false and seditious another, dated the 12th of March,

March, which had been circulated to excite the people to an insurrection against the French. It has since been known, that this supposed publication was a Republican forgery, printed at Milan. Bonaparte, himself, has almost acknowledged that, in a letter written by him to the Senator Battagia, to whom this proclamation had been attributed—a letter which has not been made public, but which some persons have gained a knowledge of.

The Deputies of the Senate found the French General at Gratz, and his army in full retreat; for after the signing of the preliminaries, he had not lost a moment in withdrawing himself from the perilous situation in which he was placed. Although the fate of Venice was probably already determined in his mind, he contented himself with coldly receiving the deputies, and demanded of them, that the troops raised during the last year, should be disarmed, and discharged.

Scarce, however, had he assembled in the Friuly a part of his army, when he took off the mask with as much effrontery, as he had shewn duplicity in his preceding negotiation; and, on the 3d of May, he published at Palmanova a formal declaration of war against the Republic
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of Venice, founded on fifteen complaints, which remind one of those in the fable of the wolf against the lamb. He did not confine himself to menaces: in a few days he took possession of all the States of Terra Firma without any resistance; and suffered his soldiers to live there at discretion, who levied abundant contributions of money, of bread, of wine, of cloathing; who, in short, seized on every thing that they found convenient to them. The nobles saw themselves even obliged to give up their carriages and horses to the French officers.

On the the 11th of May, the Senate extraordinarily convoked, without doubt, believing that Bonaparte meant to effect a revolution, and flattering itself that it might prevent it, or at least avert the violence of it by doing it themselves, declared that the actual government was burthensome to the people, and was not suited to times and circumstances, and by a majority of 740 to 5, determined to deprive themselves of their functions and authority, and to invite the French to Venice, to maintain order there.

The Senate was replaced that day by a democratic municipality, composed of 60 individuals, of all ranks, of all nations, of Greeks, Jews, Ex-Nobles,
 1 Artizans,

Artizans, probably the scum of their country and of their profession.

The new government made haste to announce its institution to the people, whose work it called itself, by proclamations to the French Livery, of *liberty and equality*, and preaching the doctrine of the sacred duty of insurrection and of the sovereignty of the people. But the populace of Venice, which was attached to its ancient government, under which it had lived so happy, and which perhaps was the only one on the Continent, which had the good sense to feel its happiness, and to be grateful for it, was too little familiarized with the philosophical gospel of Sieyes, not to interpret it badly. The first use that it made of the right of sovereignty and of insurrection, was to rise against those who had given it to them.

Scarcely were the proclamations fixed up, on the 12th of May, when the people grew frantic, tore them down with fury, rushed in crowds to the houses of the municipal officers whom they ill treated, raised the Venetian flag in the middle of the great public place, which resounded with the cries of "Viva St. Marco!"—which every person was compelled to repeat. The populace united with a great
number

number of Slavonians, seized on the arsenal, equipped sloops furnished with cannon, and made preparations for defence against the French; and Venice saw itself on the point of being buried by the despair and fury of its inhabitants under the wrecks of its honour, and of its government. The insurgents, however, even in their greatest excesses respected the rights of nations, and the hotel of the French Minister was spared.

The merchants, the artisans, even the members of the former government, alarmed by this tumult and the confusion that reigned in Venice, thought it right to hasten the end of this crisis, by inviting the French to quicken their arrival. The latter disembarked on the 16th, at the place of St. Mark, to the number of 2 or 3,000, took possession of the arsenal, the port, and all the principal posts, which they did without opposition; for dismay soon succeeded to the first emotions of fury in this faithful populace, who saw themselves abandoned by those whose rights they were willing to have defended.

The municipality chosen in the name of the people was established by the French General; it took measures to cause the property which had been

been pillaged in the tumult of the 12th, to be restored as far as was possible: and to calm the public mind, it published a proclamation, in which it spoke of the ancient government with moderation and even in honourable terms; promised to grant pensions to the ex-nobles of small fortunes; extolled the merit of their abdication; engaged itself to maintain the bank, the mint, and the exchequer in its present state; acknowledged the public debt, and undertook to discharge it.

On the 14th of May, the Doge and the nobles had confirmed the abdication of their titles and their dignities; the name of *citizen* had been substituted for that of *excellence*; and the deputies had concluded a treaty with Bonaparte in the name of the new Republic, by which it was stipulated that the Terra Firma and the port of Venice should be occupied by the French, until there was some definitive agreement for the settlement of the State; that the fleet and the arsenal should be at their disposal; that a contribution of eighty millions should be paid them; that the government should be democratised, and that all persons arrested for political opinions should be set at liberty.

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A few days afterwards the new government, notwithstanding its professions, the servile instrument of the vengeance and the cruelty of the French General, caused Count Auguste Verita, Count Mejo, and a citizen of distinction, named Malenza, accused of being the authors of the insurrection, to be shot under the walls of Verona; and shortly after, the bishop and some priests suffered the same fate.

For two or three months the Venetian state and its capital, delivered over to revolutionary torment, to the rapine of the military, to that of a cloud of jobbers, Jews, and harpies of every description, who followed the army, to the more regular plunder of fiscal commissaries, of scavans, and of philosophers of the French Republic, presented a most deplorable spectacle. Anarchy completed the destruction of what fire and sword had spared. Venice, but now so beautiful and so wealthy a city, stripped of its shipping, both mercantile and military, plundered of its treasures accumulated by 300 years of peace, of its rich magazines, of its monuments of the arts, which were also the monuments of its glory, of its literary and scientific curiosities, devoured by misery and famine, was become but a
sad

gad skeleton of its past grandeur. Thus in a few weeks was completed what it pleased the Directory and their General to call the regeneration of Venice:—Thus was annihilated by the philosophical Atila and the Vandals of the 18th century, the splendor of this celebrated city, founded in the fifth, and which offered in the bosom of the waves to the unfortunate inhabitants of Italy an asylum, respected even by the savage king of the Huns—of a city whose empire extended over a part of Italy, along the coasts of the Adriatic sea, of the Morea, and of the islands of the Archipelago—which, in the 13th century, conquered the capital of the Eastern Empire, and which, for many ages, was the centre and the depot of the commerce of the world. Thus finished this government, the most ancient of Europe, which had existed more than thirteen centuries, and which, for more than six, had been unchanged in its institutions—Thus, by the stroke of a pen, was erased from the list of powers, this Republic, illustrious by its government, by the wisdom of its laws, by the happiness and attachment of its people. No doubt, this ancient asylum of the fine arts, of the sciences, and of commerce,

which flourished there so long under the wings of peace and of aristocracy, placed in the midst of the Cispadan and Transpadan Republics, appeared to the corsican conqueror a political scandal which he could not suffer to exist: and to furnish a new chapter to the history of human vicissitudes, one saw fall in the course of a few days, without effort and without convulsion, under the philosophical fanaticism of the 18th century, a state, which in the 15th had served as a rampart to Europe, against the superstitious fanaticism of the Ottomans*.

* The conditions of peace imposed by Bonaparte on the Republic of Venice, such as they have been just related above, were only provisory; and soon afterwards he dictated new ones to the government which was forced: 1st. To pay to the French a million and a half of ducats, in ready money. 2d. To entertain their troops till their retreat. 3d. To furnish the value of 3,000,000 in naval supplies. 4th. Six ships of the line completely equipped. 5th. Forty paintings at the choice of the French commissioners. 6th. The most precious monuments of the library of St. Mark. 7th. The four famous horses, and the two lions of gilt brown, the spoils of Constantinople.—The French General carried his effrontery so far as to declare that as soon as these preliminary articles were signed, he would treat about other

other matters, and would settle the new frontiers of the Republic.

These conditions, hard as they were, could not satisfy the plundering disposition of the French government. Venice, although revolutionized, was not the less given up to Republican pillage. The agents of the Directory took, in the port, the Arsenal, the chests, and the public magazines, every thing that suited their convenience, and violated with the same impudence all the private property which tempted their avarice.

CHAP. IX.

The Directory refuse to execute all the articles of the Treaty of Leoben, and the continuation of peace seems doubtful—Revolutionizing of the Republics of Genoa and of Lucca—Preparations for that of the rest of Italy, but which is obliged to be deferred—War seems to be upon the point of breaking out again between Austria and France—The negotiations are continued at Udine—New difficulties arise—Peace is at last concluded at Campo Formio the 17th of October 1797—Substance of the secret and public articles of the treaty.

WHILE the French Commissioners completed the sack of Venice, a part of their army almost without resistance took possession of Friuli and of Dalmatia; and other troops embarked in Venetian vessels, with the same facility seized the islands in the Adriatic, and among others Corfou, the key of the Gulph, and of which the excellent port contained not only a part of the Venetian fleet, but also the
arsenals

arsenals and maritime magazines of that Republic. Bonaparte abandoned such easy conquests to his Lieutenants :* Interests more dear at that time occupied elsewhere his attention. In proportion as his army had evacuated the Austrian Provinces, they had been again occupied by that of the Emperor which lined the Provinces of Friuli and of Venetian Dalmatia, and had even attempted in this latter country to make itself master of some convenient posts, invited thereto by the good will of the inhabitants who held the French in detestation.

After the cabinet of Vienna had recovered from the alarm into which it had been thrown by the triumphant march of the conqueror of Italy, and saw the Alps betwixt it and those legions lately so formidable, it showed itself less docile to the con-

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ditions

* He only took upon himself the task of making a report of them to the Directory full of mythology and ridiculously scientific in which he observed that Corcyra was the birth place of the Princess Nausicaæ—After this he wrote a letter of fraternisation to the Maniots, a set of robbers who inhabit the rocks of the Gulph of Magne, the ancient country of the Spartans, in which he assured them that if they would come and visit his brave companions in arms, they would find themselves perfectly *at home* among them.

ditions which Buonaparte thought he had only to dictate, and seemed even to hope to recover by negotiations and political manœuvres what it had lost by the fate of war.

The majority of the Directory, on the other hand, yielding to the influence of Bonaparte, supported by the declared wish of Carnot and Barthlemy had, it is true, ratified the treaty of Leoben, but they refused to put it in execution, and particularly to restore Mantua to the Emperor which furnished new matter for negotiation*.

Bonaparte, perfectly informed of the opposite pretensions of the two parties, was sensible that he would perhaps be obliged to leave the decision of the contested points a second time to the fate of arms; and that force alone could extort from the

House

* Carnot affirms that Le Tourneur and he were the only members of the Directory, who had rejoiced at this treaty: "The Triumvirate," says he, "were furious at it." Reveillere was like a tiger: Rewbell heaved heavy sighs. Barras disapproved of the treaty, but said, "that, nevertheless, it must be executed:" but one day afterwards, unable to contain his rage, he rose hastily, and addressing himself to me, said, in a fury, "yes, it is to thee that we owe the infamous treaty of Leoben."

House of Austria the sacrifices demanded by the arrogant ambition of the Directory. Warned by the danger he had run from the insurrection at Venice while he was entangled in the narrow vallies of the Alps, he wished, at least, to make good use of the time taken up by negotiations, to complete the revolution in Italy, and to relieve himself from all inquietude with regard to his rear. Besides, as it had been, in a manner, agreed upon that the north east of Italy should be abandoned to Austria in case of a definitive peace, he felt that it was important to confirm democracy in the west, and to establish it in the south.

Therefore, at the same time that he revolutionized Venice, he prepared a like fate for Genoa, and proposed to give it French liberty in exchange for its gold*.

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Genoa,

* The Genoese possessed annuities to the amount of 14,000,000 of livres in the public funds of France, and like most of the other creditors of that nation, they had had the stupidity to rejoice at the revolution, and to let themselves be so much misled by the phrases of Sieyes and Mirabeau, as to believe that their securities were rendered more solid by a convulsion, which sapped from the foundations all the bases of good faith, of morality, and

Genoa upon which the Kings of Sardinia had long looked with a greedy eye, and which still remembered that the Austrians had been within its walls in 1741, had from the beginning of the war, dreaded the successes of the allies, and had favoured the cause of France both by its wishes and by secret succours. Its harbours had been open to the republican privateers, and its flag not less than the position of its coasts, had protected the supply of provisions for the south of France and for the army of Italy, during several years of distress and scarcity. Since the successes of the French in Italy, Genoa, though it kept up a nominal neutrality, had prostituted itself to the republic. Its territory without complaint, had been occupied by French

and of property. Very far from foreseeing the fate of the assignats, this stockjobbing people had received them with joy, and giving themselves up to all the revolutionary speculations had profited by the distress and neediness of the republic, had forced its leaders to make very losing bargains with them, and had enriched themselves by buying up much under value the spoils of their victims. The avidity of these half revolutionists had not been overlooked by that great revolutionist St. Just, who said with a smile of contempt, "Leave them to enrich themselves, the Republic will easily take back its gold when it has occasion for it."

French troops ; it had on the first requisition shut its port against the English, dismissed the Imperial ambassador, and paid a subsidy of four millions, and requisitions of every kind, as the price of a treaty of friendship ; in a word, it had borne in silence every kind of outrage with every humiliation, and had supported without murmuring all the oppressions of the Convention and of the Directory. Who would not have thought that the senate of Genoa had deserved so well of the republic that it would have been spared ! but it was part of the revolutionary system to let nothing subsist which had existed ; and all the meanness of the senate did not one minute retard its fate. The agents of the Directory had for a long time prepared that revolution, by forming in Genoa jacobin clubs at which the senate had shut its eyes ; and every thing was ready for the explosion on the first signal given from the Luxemburg.* The *Redacteur* its official journal

* Salicetti the deputy, in passing through Genoa in his way to Paris some time before, had said publicly at the club of Morando, that the oligarchy of Venice having been destroyed, the turn of Genoa was come, and that a salutary insurrection would before long municipalize it.

journal announced, that the Genoese had no constitution, and that an oligarchy obstinately persisted in the exercise of arbitrary power. From that moment the death warrant was pronounced.

The minister Faypoult charged to put it in execution, on the 21st and 22d of May excited a tumult of about 7 or 800 French, Genoese, or Lombardy revolutionists, smugglers, malefactors, vagabonds escaped from the prisons and the galleys, who immediately, under the protection of the French republic, declared themselves to be *the people of Genoa in insurrection against Oligarchy*, abolished the imposts, deposed the magistrates, and chose new ones among the jacobin conspirators. They took possession, without resistance, of the port, the arsenal, and the gates. The government intimidated, after having tried in vain to gain the insurgents who received with much contempt all their proposals, invoked the mediation of Faypoult, and prepared to abdicate their powers. Without effect, did the real inhabitants of Genoa, the workmen, the tradesmen, the merchants, the householders provoked at the audaciousness of the banditti, demand from the pusillanimous senate that they would put arms in their hands. Abandoned by their magistrates, this
faithful

faithful people following only the impulse of their fury and despair, hastened to the arsenal, broke open the gates guarded by the Jacobins; and 15,000 of them having armed without delay, marched crying out, *viva Maria ed il principe*, and swore upon their cannons to deliver their country. The revolutionary brigands were attacked, exterminated, and dispersed on every side; all the posts of which the Jacobins had got possession were retaken, and the faithful troop came to present themselves to the Doge asking no other recompence but the honour of kissing his hand. On the day after, the 23d of May, 30,000 armed peasants came in from the country, to support the state and the constitution. They completed the dispersion of the Jacobin conspirators, and broke open the house of an apothecary named Morando, employed by Faypoult, where the club of brothers and friends had been held, and where were found a list of 1,200 associates, another of future proscription, and a third of suspected persons: for, here as elsewhere, the factious were by the same means to have proclaimed in the name of the people, the justice of insurrection, the rights of man, and the reign of liberty, virtue, and humanity.

Morando

Morando who in imitation of Marat had proclaimed himself president of the people, took refuge with his principal accomplices at the palace of France, which was likewise the hiding place of Faypoult, who showed himself as base and cowardly in danger, as he had been insolent the preceding evening, when the affrighted senate had required his protection. He hastened to send couriers to the Directory and to the French Generals who commanded in the neighbourhood. They in concert with him, thinking it needless to use any longer the stratagem of making the wish of a few banditti pass for that of the whole people, resolved to have recourse to open force.

In consequence, General Rusca advanced with a vanguard to the gates of Genoa, and was followed by the division of Sahuguet, who encamped with 12,000 men in the valley of Polcevera. On the 26th of May, an aid-de-camp of Bonaparte's came to announce his orders to the senate, who seeing that their destruction was resolved on, determined to submit with a good grace, and passed a decree by which three of its members were authorized to cooperate with General Bonaparte in making such

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changes

changes in the constitution of the republic as would suit the *political system of Italy*.

Bonaparte dictated his laws like a sovereign, and the republic of Genoa disappeared from the list of European powers. It was replaced by a *Ligurian* republic, consisting of directors, of councils of old and young, &c. for, the general legislator at that time the apostle of that system which he had consolidated by force of arms at Paris in 1795 and established in Lombardy in 1796, had not then discovered as he has done since, that it was absurd and impossible to be put in practice.

The new republic as was to be expected, paid for the blessing of its regeneration by very heavy contributions, by the pillage of both public and private property and by requisitions of every kind. Thus was the revolution of Genoa accomplished with still greater ease than that of Venice, towards which the official journal of the Directory declared, that Bonaparte had contributed in no degree, and that he had only protected it because he found it was the result of the general wish of the people.*

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* Some members of the councils were more sincere than the official journal. Dumolard in the sitting of the

The republic of Lucca had about the same time the same fate, and its obscurity not being able to save it from the *new political system*, it was ransomed and democratized. It was in this manner, from the castle of Montebello in which he had modestly succeeded the Archduke governor of Milan, that Bonaparte negotiated with the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor, while he propagated the principles of the French revolution in Italy, and by his intrigues prepared or accomplished the destruction of all the governments which might give him cause for inquietude, in case of a new rupture with Austria.

Piedmont,

the 23d of June, made a motion of order with regard to the revolutions in Italy, in which he denounced the attacks made upon the independance of Venice and of Genoa without provocation on their part and without authority from the Legislative Body. He compared them to the partition of Poland, and attributed them to a vast system of destruction and disorganisation of which he accused the Directory. "The first attempt, said he, " was on Venice, and finding that it did not meet with " your disapprobation, a similar and equally successful one " was made on Genoa. A revolution has been brought " about there through the means of agents of the French " government. Europe and posterity will reproach " France for such a deviation from the principles which " she herself claimed in her own own favour."

Piedmont, Tuscany, Rome, and Naples, after having escaped the sword of the conqueror, seemed destined to fall soon under revolutionary commotions;—Already a great fermentation had manifested itself in Piedmont, and threatened a speedy explosion. The Nobles were insulted at the Theatre: a formidable insurrection had broken out in the environs of Asti: the walls of Turin were covered with proclamations, inviting the people to liberty, and the usual method of seduction, had been tried among the soldiers.—The same symptoms appeared in Tuscany and in the Roman State, in which the Jacobin Party openly demanded to be united with the Cisalpine Republic.—The distance of Naples had not saved it from the commotions of the revolutionary volcano. The secret partizans of France there took advantage of the embarrassments of government, and laboured with much activity, to give a Republican turn to the discontents of the nobility.—All over Italy the Priests and Monks were, it is true, left in the enjoyment of personal tranquillity, but thousands of pamphlets daily poured sarcasm and calumny upon them, and endeavoured without ceasing to deprive them of all influence on the minds

minds of the people, and to sap the very foundation of religion itself.

Bonaparte seconded these dispositions by frequent journies into the revolutionized countries, where he was received with civic feasts and harrangues; and took the opportunity to give solemn audiences to the Deputies from the surrounding Jacobins, and to receive their demands of union and fraternization.

At last, every thing seemed to announce that the moment was come, when the French General would consummate, what he called, the *political system of Italy*, that is to say, the establishment of a destructive democracy on the ruin of all regular governments; when the fear of an approaching rupture with the Emperor which had at first engaged Bonaparte to adopt and execute this plan, forced him to suspend it, and to defer, for some time, the ruin of the still existing governments.

It has been seen in the former part of this volume, that the critical situation in which that General was, and the danger to which the Emperor thought himself exposed, much more than any real pacific disposition, had occasioned the hasty conclusion of the convention of Leoben, which very soon afterwards,

wards, was equally disagreeable to the cabinets of Vienna and of the Luxemburg. The former was not satisfied with the acquisition of a part of the Venetian Republic, and the other abandoned with regret the project of extending its frontiers to the Rhine, and of increasing its influence in Germany by dismemberments and secularizations. Although the solicitations of the negotiators and the joy of the people, had induced these two cabinets to ratify this convention in the first moment, it is very certain that they considered it but as a simple suspension of arms, of which each intended to take advantage, in order to renew the war with more hopes of success.

While the conference for a general pacification, was held at Montebello, between the Marquis de Gallo and Count Meerfeld as plenipotentiaries for the Emperor, and Bonaparte on the part of the Republic; and while the latter laboured secretly to revolutionize and overturn Italy, the cabinet of Vienna occupied itself in amassing money and in completing and disciplining its army. The warlike disposition of its subjects, and their attachment to their sovereign, having soon repaired the breaches made by the war, the Emperor saw himself at the head of numerous and well trained troops.

troops, and in discovering the extent of his resources, he regretted doubly, having allowed his enemy to escape, or at least not having taken advantage of their situation, to force them to more favourable conditions.—Far from reducing his army to the peace establishment, he had as early as the month of June, ordered a part of the general levy in Hungary, to march towards Venetian Dalmatia and take possession of it, while another part moved towards the frontiers of Moravia. He had established a camp of 24,000 men near Goritia, and many battalions were sent towards the frontiers of Friuli, where an extraordinary quantity of military stores and of magazines of every kind had been collected. General Loudon had advanced from the Tyrol to the frontier of the Veronese, and assumed there a menacing position. Some little hostilities had even taken place between the French and Austrian advanced posts, on the confines of Friuli and of Venetian Istria.

Whether from a natural wish to put the finishing stroke to a pacification which he had begun, or on account of the interior state of France which made him suppose that his army might be necessary there, Bonaparte began, at that time, to wish seriously for peace.

peace. In consequence, notwithstanding the hostile appearance of the Austrians, he contented himself with sending a courier to Vienna, to declare that if the Imperial troops advanced a step farther, he would himself enter upon the Austrian territory : until the answer should arrive, he neglected no military precaution which could put it in his power to renew the war with advantage. He reinforced his army, formed magazines, and fortified Palmanuova and Osopo, two fortresses which covered the country of Friuli, and served as a support to his army.

On the Rhine, the preparations were not less active or less alarming, and the two powers took equally every advantage of this momentary truce.

Since the treaty of Leoben, the armies of Hoche and Moreau continued to occupy the positions which they held at its conclusion on the right bank of the Rhine, and they subsisted and cloathed themselves at the expence of the unfortunate Germans. By his own acknowledgement, Hoche, in less than five months had levied about 3,000,000 of livres from countries, which, as he himself expressed it, were exhausted, and of which the worn out and ruined inhabitants were in great numbers absent, and all this at a time when the harvest was not yet got in.

This General fortified the bridges of Neuwied and Giessen, and other important places. The banks of the Lahn were covered with batteries and entrenchments, and different movements of the armies of the North and of the Sambre and Meuse made it be believed about the end of June, that hostilities were about to recommence; it even appears, that the French Generals had orders to advance, and that the return of the courier whom Bonaparte had sent to Vienna, was to decide the question of peace or war.

The Imperialists were not less active in their preparations in Germany than the French. The garrison of Vienna, the auxiliary battalions, the troops of the general levy of the Hereditary States, marched daily towards the Rhine or the Mein, where considerable magazines were formed, and the equipages of the Archduke had already joined the army.

Nevertheless the court of Vienna, not thinking itself perfectly prepared to renew hostilities, or hoping to obtain the objects it had in view by negotiations, determined not to break them off; and, having satisfied Bonaparte with regard to the movements of troops which had given umbrage, the
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negociations were begun again at Udine, a new place chosen for the conferences, and they were there carried on with more activity than before.

Perhaps no negociations ever offered so wide a field for speculations of a political nature ; for, their object was no less, than to establish a new basis for the balance of power in Europe. After a convulsion of thirty years, the treaty of Westphalia had fixed it in the middle of the 17th century, by properly weighing the interest of the great and small states and of the Protestants and the Catholics, for such was the division of the political interests of Europe at that period : but at the end of the 18th century, new interests and new powers had arisen ; and to give a solid peace to Europe, it was become indispensable to establish a balance between democracy and monarchy, and to satisfy the ambition of the great powers at the expence of the small ones.

From the little that has transpired of the conferences at Udine, it appears, that such was the object, the principle, and the basis of the negociations carried on at that place. Each of the Belligerent Powers proposed different projects of that nature, but they shall be overlooked, as there is not yet any authentic document on that subject. The

memoirs of Carnot, alone, have thrown some light upon these mysterious transactions : there is reason to believe that they soon understood one another, or, at least, had hopes of coming to a good understanding in every thing which regarded Germany ; but the great cause of difference was the restitution of Mantua to the Emperor, which, in spite of the convention of Leoben, the Directory persisted in keeping as a barrier for the Cisalpine Republic,

The party inclined to peace at Vienna and at Paris, proposed constantly new modes of conciliation which were immediately rejected. That party was supported in France by two of the directors, Carnot and Barthelemy ; they both felt the importance of peace for the Republic, thought the preliminaries of Leoben sufficiently advantageous to serve as a basis for a definitive treaty, and wished that the stipulations contained in them should be observed. Carnot has even declared, publicly, that he thought that treaty preferable to that of Campo Formio, and that the Directory might have had peace five months sooner than they had upon the conditions which were afterwards adopted. Being perfectly acquainted with the confusion of the finances and the exhausted state of the resources,

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in a word, knowing all the wounds of France, he was sensible that a renewal of hostilities would, according to his expression, "*make again the existence of the Republic a problem*, and that a peace could not be lasting, unless the conditions were at least tolerable to the conquered." Instead of driving the Emperor to despair, by imposing on him conditions so oppressive that they would have occasioned his ruin, he wished to incite his ambition by giving him a part of the spoils of Europe, in order to interest him in maintaining the partition of it intended by France. Bonaparte was of the same opinion.

These two men, actuated with the desire of conciliating the interests of the Emperor with those of the Republic, wished to convert into a definitive treaty the preliminaries of Leoben, in virtue of which, Mantua was to be restored to the Emperor, and Venice to remain in the possession of the new Republics.

Bonaparte asserted, that instead of Mantua, the security of the Cisalpine Republic might be assured by Pizzigitone, which had even some superior advantages. Carnot wished, besides, that to oppose to the Emperor in Italy a barrier stronger than the Cisalpine Republic alone could present, the lega-

tions of Bologna and Ferrara with the Modenese should be given to the Duke of Parma in exchange for Florida and Lousiana, countries which were burthensome to the King of Spain, and which he would have yielded willingly to procure a more considerable establishment for the infant Duke. By this means, the King of Spain, from being much interested in the affairs of Italy would have weighed in the balance against the Emperor; and his still very precarious alliance with France would have been cemented by the necessity he would have felt himself under of making a common cause with her in Italy. France, on its side, would have acquired and republicanized one of the finest and most important countries of North America, would have got possession of posts in the Gulph of Mexico, would have prepared the way to open one day to itself the commerce of that vast and rich kingdom, would have reunited some native French to whom the Spanish yoke was very odious, and would thus have obtained a great influence in North America.

The obstinacy of the majority of the Directory to keep Mantua, frustrated this specious plan. Carnot and Bonaparte then proposed to cede Venice in exchange for Mantua; but the Directory

likewise rejected this proposal, (which it accepted some months afterwards,) and ordered their General to renew hostilities, if the Emperor refused to give up Mantua.

In these circumstances, Bonaparte considering a rupture as inevitable and very near, was obliged to stop his revolutionary career, and to delay, for some little time the destruction of the powers of Italy which he had secretly resolved; consequently, he proposed to the Directory to confirm the partial treaties concluded with the Kings of Sardinia and Naples, and, joining the cunning of a deep politician to the hypocrisy of a Republican, he embraced every opportunity of assuring the two Kings of the good will of the French Republic.

Piedmont was at this time agitated with insurrections and revolutionary movements which Bonaparte himself had excited and fomented; and which were the gloomy forerunners of the subversion of that country. Yet, notwithstanding the measures taken by the French Emissaries to corrupt the people and the army, the majority of the Piedmontese continued to be obedient and faithful.

Bonaparte soon perceived that the overturning of this throne could only be effected by force, and,
fearing

fearing that at the moment he would not have time to do it with security, he thought it best to suspend for some months the fall of the King of Sardinia, and by a short lived alliance to place his troops and the resources of his country at the disposal of the Republic : but which is hardly credible, unless we had the authority of Carnot himself for it, the Directory had such a thirst for destruction, that the General, though supported by Carnot, had great difficulty in procuring their consent, and that they persisted long in the desire of taking up arms again, all at once, against the Emperor and the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, wishing to overturn three thrones at one blow. The persuasions of Bonaparte at last prevailed. He was allowed to treat, and from that moment the French agents in Piedmont ceased to excite insurrection. The French General disavowed and abandoned publicly those whom he had before set on : he even arrested at Milan one of the principal agents of the premeditated insurrection ; he satisfied the King of Sardinia about some injuries of which he complained ; he allowed him to import grain from the countries occupied by the French troops, and he published in several writings,

writings declarations of the friendly sentiments of the republic towards his Sardinian Majesty.

These conciliatory measures were soon followed by a new treaty of alliance offensive and defensive between the two powers, which put all the arsenals and troops of the weaker into the hands of the stronger. Bonaparte having thus secured his flanks and his rear, prepared to renew hostilities with more confidence.

If the turbulent designs of the Directory were sometimes controled by Bonaparte in Italy, the Generals of the armies on the Rhine showed themselves more compliant—Wishing to exhaust the patience of the Emperor and to force him to renew the war or submit to the conditions they chose to impose, about the end of August they made their agents civil or military depose all the regencies and magistrates of the ecclesiastical electorates. Encouraged by this ostensible act and secretly instigated by the Jacobins of the country, after having planted the tree of liberty at Coblenz and Cologne, proclaimed early in September the *Cisrhenan Republic* ; and established as the foundation of its constitution, *an oath to obey the laws of the French Republic, and to execute faithfully all orders which should be sent them*

in its name, and to give no opposition to the principles of liberty and equality. The Directory protected the birth of this short lived Republic, by a proclamation in which the armies were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march, to *punish* (for such was the expression) the Emperor for having wished to deceive the French government, which had with so much generous confidence acceded to the articles of Leoben.

The Cisalpine Republic had already recommenced hostilities by taking possession by open force, of the Imperial fiefs situated between Tuscany and the Bolognese. The Ligurian Republic had done the same with regard to those which were in its neighbourhood; and Bonaparte having established himself mediator between the Grisons and their subjects in the Valteline to terminate troubles which he himself had excited, by a stroke of his pen had united to the Cisalpine Republic that important valley, the key of the Alps and of Italy; and under that pretext had made it be occupied by French troops.

By the 11th of September, the congress of Udine had separated, and Bonaparte having concentrated his

his forces on the frontiers of the states of Venice, had fixed his head quarters at Passeriano, to wait the return of Count Meerfeld, who had carried his ultimatum to Vienna.

The Emperor, however, confiding in the formidable preparations he had made, did not allow himself to be frightened with the menaces of the Directory. The movement of troops and the orders given to the armies on both sides, seemed to announce that the decision of that bloody quarrel would be left a second time to the fate of arms; but a new revolution had taken place in France, which though it was in favour of those who wished to continue the war, yet rendered the disposal of a number of troops so absolutely necessary to preserve tranquillity at home, that they were obliged to conclude a peace.

At a moment when the signal of a new war was expected with alarm, all Europe was surprized to see the Directory yield and the Emperor accept Venice instead of Mantua, and peace definitively signed by the respective plenipotentiaries on the 17th of October, at the country house of Campo Formio.

The principal articles were,

I. The

I. The cession of the *Low countries* to the French Republic.

II. The consent of the Emperor, that the French should keep the islands of the Archipelago and in the Adriatic formerly belonging to Venice, as also the establishments of that Republic in Albania.

III. Consent on the part of the French Republic, that the Emperor should occupy and possess the absolute sovereignty of the territories of Venice, on to the Adige.

IV. The cession of the Milanese and the Mantuan to the Cisalpine Republic.

V. A formal acknowledgment of the Cisalpine Republic.

VI. An indemnity granted to the Duke of Modena in the Brisgaw.

VII. The establishment of a congress at Rastadt, to settle a pacification betwixt France and the German Empire.

This revolutionary treaty contained likewise several secret articles by which the Emperor consented that France should dismember from the Empire all that part situated on the left bank of the Rhine, and by which it was even stipulated that the Imperial troops should enter Venice on the same day that the

the French should enter Mentz. Besides this present partition, they contained the basis of another eventual partition; and if it is too much to say that they implied the Emperor's consent to the subversion of the Popedom and of the Helvetic League, as also of other Revolutions which have broke out since, at least it may be remarked that this treaty contained no clause which could prevent them, or secure the duration of the existing governments.

These articles remained *really secret* till the renewal of the war, but at that time the Directory hoping to throw an odium upon the house of Austria, to excite Prussia against it, and to prevent the different Princes of Germany from making a common cause with it, made them public; and though their authenticity cannot be vouched for, yet as they have not been *authentically* contradicted, they may be inserted here.

I. His Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia consents that the limits of the French Republic shall extend to the aftermentioned line, and he engages to use his good offices when a peace shall be concluded with the German Empire, that the French Republic shall obtain it as follows, *viz.* The left bank of the Rhine from the frontiers

of Switzerland below Basle to the junction of the Nette above Andernach, comprehending therein the bridge head of Manheim on the left bank of the Rhine, and the town and fortress of Mentz; both sides of the Nette from its mouth to its source near Bruch; beyond, a line passing by Marmagen, Call, Gemund, with the two banks of the Roer, comprehending Heimbach, Nidecken, Duren, and Juliers, with their districts on to Linnich; and beyond, a line passing at Hoffern and Halensdatum, Pape-lermol, Latelfout, Badenber, Haverslow, (if it should happen to be in the direction of the line) Anderschied, Kalderkirchen, Heinbeck, Herringen, and Grasberg, with the town and district of Venloo: and if in spite of the good offices of the Emperor and King, the German Empire should not consent to the acquisition above mentioned, his Majesty the Emperor and King engages formally to furnish no more to the army of the Empire than his contingent, which can only be employed in the fortresses, without by so doing in any way diminishing the peace and friendship now established betwixt his Majesty and the French Republic.

II. His Majesty the Emperor and King shall in like manner employ his good offices when a peace shall be concluded with the Empire.

III. That

III. That the navigation of the Rhine shall be free to the French Republic and the States of the Empire situated on its right bank, from Huningen until its entry into the territory of the Batavian Republic.

IV. That the posessors of that part of Germany opposite to the mouth of the Moselle may never upon any pretext whatever, oppose the free navigation or the going out of boats or vessels from the mouth of that river.

V. That the French Republic shall have the free navigation of the Meuse, and that the toll duties from Venloo to its entry into the Batavian territory shall be suppressed.

VI. His Majesty Imperial and Royal renounces for himself and for his successors, all right to the sovereignty and property of the county of Falkenstein and its dependencies.

VII. The countries which his Majesty the King of Hungary and Bohemia is to possess by virtue of the sixth article of the public definitive treaty signed this day, shall serve as a compensation for the countries which he gives up by the 1st and 7th of the public treaty, and by the preceding article—This renunciation shall not be valid unless the troops of his Im-

perial and Royal Majesty shall obtain possession of the countries mentioned.

VIII. The French Republic shall use its influence that the Emperor may obtain in Germany the Bishopric of Saltzburg and the river of the Inn, with a circuit of six thousand yards.

IX. His Imperial Majesty when a peace is concluded with the Empire, shall cede to the French Republic the sovereignty and property of the Frickthall and of all the possessions of the House of Austria on the left bank of the Rhine besides Zurzach and Bale, on condition that at the peace the Emperor shall obtain an adequate and convenient compensation in Germany. The French Republic shall unite the before countries to the Helvetic Republic in consequence of arrangements to be made between these two powers, without prejudice to the Emperor or to the Empire.

X. It is agreed between the contracting powers that if at the approaching peace with the German Empire, the French Republic should acquire any territory in Germany, his Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, shall obtain an equivalent; and reciprocally if his Imperial and royal Majesty

Majesty makes any acquisition, the French Republic shall receive a similar equivalent.

XI. A territorial indemnity shall be given to the Prince of Nassau Diest, formerly Stadtholder of Holland—This territorial indemnity cannot be taken in the neighbourhood of the Austrian possessions, or of those of the Batavian Republic.

XII. The French Republic making no difficulty to restore to the King of Prussia his possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, there shall be no new acquisition given to the King of Prussia, and this the contracting powers guarantee to one another mutually.

XIII. If the King of Prussia shall consent to yield to the French and Batavian Republics small portions of his territory on the left banks of the Meuse, as also the district of Sevenum and other possessions near Hessel, his Majesty the Emperor and the King shall employ his good offices to render these cessions practicable and to make them be sanctioned by the German Empire. Though this article should not be executed, the preceding one shall have its full effect.

XIV. His Majesty the Emperor makes no opposition to the use which the French Republic has

made of the Imperial Fiefs in favour of the Ligurian Republic. His Majesty the Emperor shall unite his good offices to those of the French Republic to induce the Germanic Empire to renounce all right of sovereignty it may have had in Italy, and especially over the countries which make part of the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics, as also over the Imperial Fiefs situated between Tuscany, the States of Parma, the Ligurian Republic, the Republic of Lucca, and the Modenese, which Fiefs shall make a part of the Cisalpine Republic.

XV. His Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and the French Republic shall unite their good offices when a pacification takes place with the Germanic Empire, that the different Princes and States of the Empire, who may experience any loss of territory or of rights, in consequence of the stipulations of the present treaty of peace, or finally by any treaty to be concluded with the Germanic Empire, and particularly the Electors of Mentz, Treves, and Cologne, the Elector Palatine of Bavaria, the Duke of Wurtemberg, the Margrave of Baden, the Duke of Deux Ponts, the Landgraves of Hesse Cassel and Darmstadt, the Princes of Nassau,

Nassau, Saarbruck, and Salm Kirbourg, Lowenstein, Vertgein, and Weidshonckel, and the Counts of Leyen shall obtain in Germany, adequate indemnities which shall be regulated in concert with the French Republic.

XVI. The troops of His Imperial Majesty twenty days after the ratification of the present treaty shall evacuate the towns and fortresses of Mentz, Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburgh, Mannheim, Koenigstein, Ulm, Ingolstadt, as also all the territories belonging to the Germanic Empire, till the limits of the Hereditary States.

XVII. The present secret articles shall have the same force, as if they had been inserted in the public treaty of peace signed this day. They shall be ratified at the same time by the two contracting parties, and the acts of ratification in due form shall be exchanged at Rastadt.

Done and signed at Campo Formio,

17th of October, 1797.

Such was the basis on which they endeavoured to persuade themselves at Paris and at Vienna, that the peace of Europe might be established. Time shall not be occupied in showing that they

were neither solid nor desirable. Their insufficiency is easily perceptible, and subsequent events have completely proved it. It is thought better to make a few reflections on the new revolution which had just taken place in France, and which had determined the Directory to conclude for the moment, a peace with the Emperor. To throw more light on it, things must be considered from an earlier period.

C H A P. X.

Internal situation of France after the fall of Robespierre—Convulsion of the 13th of Vendemiaire, (4th of October 1795), and revolution of the 18th of Fructidor, (4th of September 1797)—Rupture of the negotiations at Lisle—Overthrow of the pontifical throne, and establishment of the Roman Republic—Congress of Rastadt.

THE 9th of Thermidor, (28th of July 1794), had seen Robespierre fall under the blows of his accomplices; and France, recovered from the stupor into which his bloody tyranny had thrown it, had began to respire. The republic then found itself divided into three parties; that known by the name of the Thermidorian, composed of revolutionists who seeing their own heads threatened by the tyrant had taken off his, and who hoped, without co-adjutors to turn the revolution to their own advantage; the second, consisted of the wrecks of Robespierre's vanquished party, which then took exclusively the

name of Jacobins ; the third was the great mass of the French people, who tired of the revolution, longed for the termination of it, to enjoy in peace what they had acquired or preserved.

These three parties watched each other for some months; and the Thermidorians who held the reins of government, more uneasy at the ferocious activity of a small number of Jacobins burning with the thirst of power and vengeance, than at the idle complaints of the Royalists, of the Moderés, and of other Malcontents who were united by opinions rather than by party, caused the balance of their protecting authority to incline towards the latter, in order to support themselves by their force against the impending hostilities of the Jacobins. These broke out in the month of June 1795, under the name of the crisis of the 30th of Prarial. The Fauxbourgs revolted against the Convention, which having for some time foreseen this explosion, had recalled Pichegru to keep the factious in awe ; it ordered the armed force to march against them, which soon dispersed the organized meetings, but not without a good deal of bloodshed.

The Thermidorians having been obliged in this critical moment to strengthen itself by the moderate party,

party, it participated in their success, and ceased to be passive. Supported by the public opinion and acting also upon it, it openly manifested its political sentiments both in the Legislative body and in the journals, and demanded with eagerness the establishment of a constitution, which should enable France at length to enjoy the liberty for which it had made so many sacrifices, and after which it had for so long a time sighed in vain.

The Convention, despised as the passive, and abhorred as the active instrument of Robespierre's ferocity, saw from the decline of its popularity that it was time to terminate its reign. Different committees laboured with activity at the new constitution, in which the moderate republican party had the principal influence, as it had had for some months in the affairs and the treaties of the Republic.

Towards the beginning of September 1795, the Convention at length decreed the constitution known by the name of that of the third year, which seemed to unite the wishes of a great majority of the French, and which, when examined by an impartial man, appeared less absurd than any of the preceding ones, without excepting those of the philosophers and
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wits of 1791, or Theorists of the Gironde. It was as little defective as could be expected from men agitated by such discordant interests, especially at a moment when all the passions were, as it were, sublimated by the still burning fire of the revolution. But even had it been credible that this constitution, cemented by time and the habits of the people, would in the future have been sufficient to establish a permanent order and a regular government in an empire so extensive as that of France and inhabited by a people so corrupt, reason confirmed, since by experience soon proved, that it was totally insufficient for the moment; and the Royalists and the Jacobins were no less pleased with it than the Republicans, each flattering themselves that its insufficiency would furnish either with an opportunity of recovering their authority.

The Convention, as has been observed, had seen the necessity of terminating its reign; but all the Conventionalists were not on that account resigned to give up their influence. Besides the love of power natural to every man who has tasted it, the party which they had so long kept down, manifested a spirit of re-action which led them to fear terrible reprisals, as soon as they should have lost their authority.

thority. In consequence they decreed before they separated, the famous laws of the 3d of Brumaire, by which the *free* people convoked to elect their representatives, were compelled to choose for the new legislative body two thirds of the old conventionalists, and which deprived of the right of election and eligibility, those who had been pardoned and the relations of Emigrants, that is to say, the chiefs of the Jacobins and of the Royalists.

If this law had only made sport of the *Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, at a moment when they published it as the preface and the basis of the constitution, it would have produced only some songs and some pamphlets; but it destroyed the hopes of two powerful parties, who by it saw themselves condemned still to groan under the yoke of men whom they despised and abhorred, at the moment when they thought they should have been disengaged from it.

Scarce was this law known, when it excited universal indignation and clamour. A great fermentation manifested itself throughout the whole Republic, and particularly in the capital. The Conventionalists, resolved to make head against the storm, decreed, that this law should be presented to the
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primary assemblies as an appendix to the constitution, and appointed themselves scrutineers and judges of the acceptance of the French people. In the mean time the fermentation continued to increase; they soon proceeded from petitions and representations to invectives, and from invectives to *sacred* insurrection. The Sections of Paris took up arms, and proceeded in mass against the Convention, which lost no time in proving to its adversaries, that it knew as well how to prevent, as to make revolutions.

The party of the Sections was ten times more numerous than that of the Convention; but it was composed of discordant elements, without chief, without object, without system; while the Conventional party formed a compact whole, had at its disposal an armed force, and was familiarized to revolutionary executions.

While the orators harangued and the sections deliberated, the Convention, by a decree *Caveant Consules, &c.* invested Barras with power to disperse them by force.—He named Bonaparte his Lieutenant, and charged him to execute the decree, which he instantly did with that impetuosity and that perfidy, to which he has since been indebted

for

for so much of his success. While he amused the Sections with conciliating words, he surrounded and attacked them with such fury, that success was not long doubtful. He made a great carnage of the Sectionaries; and the triumphant Convention promulgated its laws without obstacle, and organized at its pleasure the new constitution. Barras obtained for his recompence a place in the Directory, and for his Lieutenant, the command of the army of Italy. The victorious Conventionals divided among themselves all the places of the government; and it was agreed that those in the Directory, as well as all the other principal ones, should be given to those only who had voted for the death of the King; as well to accustom the people to see in them the founders and the supports of the Republic, as to protect against the public hatred with all the power of government, the authors of that atrocious act, whom the remorse of a penitent people threatened, on every commotion, to sacrifice to the manes of the unfortunate Louis the XVIth.

The government, as may be supposed, took advantage of its victory to influence the elections; but it was so odious, that it in a great measure failed. The most determined Jacobins of the Convention, were

were for the most part excluded, and some good choices in the new third consoled the people for those which the dread of the soldiers and of the Jacobins had forced them to make against their inclinations. The new government was so unpopular, that the crafty Sieyes refused a seat in the Directory, and that Carnot, one of them, confesses, they had a difficulty in *finding servants*.

The first step of the Directory was to prosecute criminally the authors of the last troubles, whom it described as Royalists and conspirators against the safety of the Republic; but the public opinion, spoke so decidedly against this measure, that all the power of the new government, aided by the threats of the Robespierrists with whom it had coalesced, was insufficient to compose a single jury at its devotion. All, admitting that the accused were convicted of the facts with which they were charged, denied that there was any conspiracy and consequently that there was any crime.

The year 1796 passed quietly enough. The great military events alone fixed the attention of the Republic.

The Directory and the Jacobins had coalesced for an instant, in October 1795, to crush the Moderates;

but

but the Thermidorians and the Robespierrists could not be sincerely reconciled. The two parties watched each other with uneasiness and jealousy; and the Directory, equally odious to the Jacobins and the Moderates, could only maintain itself by opposing the one to the other. At first it made the balance incline towards the former; but the conspiracy of Babeuf, called that of the *Camp de Grenelle*, soon obliged it to treat them with rigour, and to relax itself towards the opposite party. The latter, at that time, conducted itself with prudence: the new third in the councils, finding itself in a minority, behaved with a good deal of circumspection, and kept itself constantly out of the way; and the people, imitating their example, adjourned their vengeance and the re-vindication of their rights to the next elections. These took place in the Spring of 1797, and all the power and intrigues of the Directory could not prevent almost the whole of the new deputies from being Anti-Directorial, and a great part from being Anti-Revolutionary, amongst whom were found some Royalists, and even some Emigrants.

The Directory, expecting a re-action from the sectionary party which it had oppressed for fifteen months, and which had just obtained a majority in
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the two councils, made every preparation to oppose the storm. Letourneur being the most weak of the five Directors, the others made an agreement with him, for a sum of money and a commission as Ambassador. It was settled that the lot should fall on him, and that he should make way for another. They made haste to call to the principal places of the administration, the most energetic of the Ex-Conventionalists, and to give the command of the troops of the interior to the most revolutionary officers.

The first act of the new Legislative Body was to call Barthelemy to the Directory, who, till then, had been the principal diplomatic agent of the French government, which had employed him from necessity, but with mistrust, having taken care to give him a Jacobin secretary as a spy. The treaties which he had two years before concluded with Prussia and Spain, had given him a sort of popularity. The love of money, alone, had drawn him into the revolution, which he had served without love for it, and without participating in its horrors. He was, besides, a man of a mild and moderate character, but weak, no ways formidable to those who employed his talents, and not capable of
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serving those who might have taken him as their leader.

It was easy to foresee that the party of the Directory, and that of the majority of the councils would not continue long opposed to each other without being at open war. The one exasperated by the oppression which they had suffered, the other by that which they had exercised; both coveted power, in order to make use of reprisals, or to place themselves in security; to cover their own violences; or to attempt new ones.

The public voice had called early to the presidency General Pichegru, whom the jealousy of the Directory had condemned to obscurity and indigence, and who was odious to them because he had been ill treated by them. The new president soon shewed at the head of the councils as much talent, moderation, and modesty, as he had displayed at the head of his army.

The whole summer was consumed in a war of writing and of words; each party pursued a methodical system of hostilities, and attacked the other successively by messages and harangues. If numbers and the public voice were on the side of the councils, these advantages were balanced on the side of

the directorial party by union, by a knowledge of revolutionary parties, by audacity, an indifference about means, the possession of the Executive power, and by the good will of the army which was dependent on it.

The anti-directorial party was composed of elements incoherent and badly assorted. They reckoned a great number of true Republicans having Carnot at their head, who, sincerely wishing to maintain the constitution, wanted only to restrain the attacks made on it by the Directory, by strokes of authority, which every instant endangering civil and political liberty, rendered the government odious even to the Republicans themselves. Amongst this party were to be found—all those who were discontented from whatever cause—all who were disappointed of places which they had solicited—a small number of honest men without any personal ambition, who only were anxious not to see employments prostituted to the most infamous characters, and who wished to place a limit to the dilapidation of the finances, and to the extortions of the agents of the Directory ;—a multitude of victims of the revolution, who, without exactly desiring monarchy, did

not love the Republic, because they identified it with the miscreants whom it had brought into the government, and whose power deprived them even of the hope of peaceably enjoying what the Revolution had not swallowed up—a certain number of nobles, ecclesiastics, of persons who held places under the monarchy, but who, not having had energy enough to defend it, wanted it still more to re-establish it—and finally, a small number of active but petulant royalists, too much inclined to consider their wishes as means, and to lose those by their impatience, which time was slowly furnishing them with.

Such heterogenous elements, though supported by popular favor, and by oratorical talents, could not oppose a very formidable party to the Directory, backed as it was by the Jacobins and by the army. The hatred and contempt, which it inspired, was the only points of union amongst its enemies: they agreed to attack it, but differed about the end and the means of attack; and, instead of adopting a system vigorous and well followed up, they were content to declaim at the tribune, and to annul some revolutionary laws to which the Republicans attached no great value, and which the Directory well knew

were not necessary to the maintenance of their authority.

If they had followed this plan with constancy, but with moderation; if they had had the prudence to disguise their views, and the patience to wait till the new elections should remove from the councils all the ex-conventionalists, and would have given them a majority in the Directory, it is probable that they would have overturned the constitution rather later, and have made the Republicans themselves assist in the subversion of the Republic; but too elate with their majority and with the slight success which it had then procured them, they so ill concealed their designs, that the Directory, from the first instant, perceived that it was lost if it did not prevent them, and if it did not strike some great blow before the following elections. It hastened to make more and more a common cause with the Jacobins. Far from suffering itself to be intimidated, it answered accusations by recriminations, and attacks by reprisals.

The armies commanded by Generals at their devotion, all whose plunderings it had sanctioned and shared, were not slow in declaring themselves in its favor.

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That same Bonaparte, who, two years afterwards was to deprive them ignominiously of the directorial purple, caused all the divisions of the Italian army to present petitions of a threatening nature against the councils. This example was followed by those of Moreau and of Hoche; and the latter, whose Jacobinical energy had exclusively recommended him to the confidence of the Directory, was charged with the execution of the violences which it meditated. Under different pretexts he caused detachments of his army to march towards Paris; but some imprudencies which he committed and which obliged the Directory to disavow him, and the ill-humour with which he bore this disavowal, joined to some other considerations, induced them to prefer Augereau, whom Bonaparte had sent to act as his second in command, and who was an equally determined revolutionist*.

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* Having returned to his army, with despair and vengeance in his heart, Hoche died soon afterwards of poison: a circumstance on which the procès-verbal of the surgeons who opened his body, left no doubt, and which has even been avowed by an impudent and worthless Jacobin named Rousselin, who has written the life of that General. To divert all suspicion, from persons

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The troops already surrounded the capital, and had trespassed the limits prescribed by the constitution. This was passing the *Rubicon* and precluding all possibility of retreating. The impetuosity of Augereau had induced him to take this decisive step, before the Directory was perfectly prepared to make the explosion which it meditated; and, perhaps, if the councils had at that instant passed a decree of accusation against the Triumvirate, they would have fallen under this stroke of unexpected vigour.

But, far from adopting an energetic course which necessity seemed to dictate for the common defence, the Anti-Directorians, more divided than ever on the approach of danger, neither knew how to form any plan or to agree to any measure. They made a noise; they declaimed; they decreed that the national guard should be armed, that posts should be established at proper distances round the constitutional circle; in short, when it was necessary to act, they did nothing but pass decrees and commit blunders.

Some

to whom it was natural, and, it is thought, just to attach it, he had the atrocious effrontery to attribute the poisoning of this General to Pichegru. This, alone, is sufficient to enable one to form a judgment of the work, and of its author,

Some members of the council seeing the crisis approaching, insisted on bringing forward the decree of accusation: others, thinking that there was now no time for it, proposed to march in a body to the Directorial palace, to arrest the Triumvirate, to send them to the scaffold, and to publish afterwards proofs of their conspiracy. But these bold measures were opposed by timid and indecisive spirits, by Republicans who loved forms and who entertained scruples, and by orators whose harangues were not yet sufficiently prepared, and their periods sufficiently rounded. The only step on which they could agree, was to verify the fact, if the troops had actually violated the constitutional circle. But whilst, in order to ascertain this, Lemerer was travelling about from post to post, the fatal hour arrived. On the 4th of September, the alarm gun announced to the terrified Parisians, a new convulsion. The place where the councils held their sittings, and the houses of the chiefs of the Anti-Directorial party were invested. The greater part of them, and the Director Barthelemy, were arrested without resistance or observation, placed in carts resembling iron cages, and sent to Rochefort, where a frigate waited to transport them to the pestilential deserts of Guyana. The victorious

Directory proclaimed the conspiracy, and their own clemency. The *Rump* of the two councils assembled at the *Odeon*, and conferred on them, legally, the absolute power which they had usurped.

The first consequences of the fatal business of the 4th of September, were such as might have been expected. France, which was beginning itself and allowing Europe to breathe again, was once more given up to the fury of the Jacobin spirit. Emigrants shot, priests transported, domiciliary visits, the inquisition of passports, the administrations and tribunals broke and replaced by military commissions, requisitions, war in short instead of peace for which all France was sighing, these were the results that signalized the new regime.

The Directory being thus become a revolutionary government, it was essential to it to wish for war, since a general peace would have deprived it of the pretext as well as the means of governing revolutionary, no less than the hope of sharing in the pillage of its armies. The voice of the French people and of the majority of the councils, had declared itself so decidedly in favor of peace, that the Directory had till the 4th of September found itself obliged to dissemble its turbulent intentions.

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It has been seen that it had, with regret, ratified the treaty of Leoben. The public opinion had also obliged it to receive the English Ambassador who was come to treat for peace: and although the cabinet of St. James's yielded, perhaps reluctantly to the indiscreet wish of the people at large, the concessions which it shewed itself disposed to make were so great, and all its propositions were so reasonable, that the treaty might have been soon concluded if the Directory which was meditating its blow, had not purposely protracted the conferences by disputes of etiquette and by extravagant propositions: but scarcely had the business of the 4th of September, relieved them from their restraint, than they insolently and roughly dismissed the English Minister, who was accompanied to the shore by the regrets of the French people, as he had been welcomed with their acclamations when he disembarked.

It seems that the Triumvirate, at the same time, hesitated whether they should not renew the war with the Emperor: and there is no doubt but that it would have done so, if the influence of Bonaparte, who kept his object in view and who already was meditating those romantic projects which he afterwards in part executed, if the penury of the finances, the
dread

dread of an insurrection in France, and the desire of taking to itself the merit of making peace, had not forced the Directory hypocritically to yield to the wishes of the people, in signing the treaty or rather the truce of Campo Formio, and in adjourning after getting possession of the key of Germany, the plans which it meditated and which were afterwards developed in 1799.

It may be presumed that it was not without mortification that the Directory saw itself forced by circumstances to suspend its projects against Germany, and to spare Austria for some time longer. It, however, lost no time in making itself amends by not only turning the rest of Europe upside down, but by exciting troubles and revolutions in the four quarters of the world.

The Pope was the first victim that it sacrificed to revolutionary fanaticism. The pontifical throne was filled by an old man, grown grey under the Tiara. Regular in his manners, pious without superstition, eloquent, learned, blessed with a noble and elevated soul, with a moderate and conciliating mind; under his double rank of Pontiff and Sovereign, few other Popes or Princes can be compared to him. His virtues which had conciliated to him the esteem
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and admiration of Europe, no less than the majesty of his person, would have been sufficient to disarm even the savage king of the Huns. The Attila of the eighteenth century could not himself avoid shewing some respect for this august old man, or at least some pity for his great age, his virtues, and his misfortunes; and if the desire to stop the career of the Imperial Eagle which from the summit of the Alps again threatened Italy, was the true motive that had determined Bonaparte to conclude the treaty of Tolentino; perhaps he would have felt a repugnance to disgrace his victorious arms by tearing the tiara from the respected forehead of the venerable Pius the Sixth.

Whatever may have been the motives that induced the Corsican General to delay the fall of the head of the church, the treaty of Tolentino had been totally disapproved by the majority of the Directory, and particularly by La Reveillere Lepaux, who thought that his prey had escaped from him. This Director was a man of a narrow understanding, and obstinate as all little minds are. The reading of pretended philosophical books had so completely turned his head, that the christian religion and its ministers were really odious to him. He had declared himself the patriarch

patriarch of an irreligious and revolutionary sect, called Theophilanthropists, and had adopted its dogma with so much enthusiasm, that he was become by fanaticism a violent persecutor of christianity. He only saw in the Pope the chief of a sect which rivalled Theophilanthropism, and could not console himself that Bonaparte had not brought to his feet the chief of the church, that he might triumph publicly over him in the temple of reason. The business of the 18th of Fructidor permitted him to give the rein to his puerile hatred; he easily obtained the consent of his coadjutors for the destruction of the Pontifical Throne, who required only revolutions and pillage.

Nothing remained but to find a pretext; they could not affect to consider the Pope as a dangerous or ill-intentioned neighbour; he had scrupulously executed all the conditions of the treaty of Tolentino, which had deprived him of his finest provinces, and which had reduced his power to nothing. His subjects, contrary to the expectation of the Directory, had submitted quietly enough to all the privations which he had been obliged to impose upon them, to pay the ransom that Bonaparte had exacted. He had given up to the Republicans his pecuniary treasures,

tures, and those of his museum, which he prized much more.

What did La Reveillere think of to lay the foundation of a quarrel with him? He intimated, that he must retract all the censures that he had pronounced on the attacks which had been made against the Catholic Religion by the National Assembly, under pain of seeing war declared a second time. The Pope answered to these shameful propositions—that his decisions were conformable to the constant discipline of the church, to the Canons of the Councils, to the opinions of the Holy Fathers, and that the sight of the scaffold itself could not induce him to retract them. The Theophilanthropist Patriarch was surprised at the firmness of the Holy Pontiff; and his co-adjutors, affecting more philosophy than he did, made him perceive that it would be ridiculous in them to attach the smallest importance to the decisions of a Priest.—Unwilling however to be stopped in their career, they resolved to cause an attack to be made on the Pope by their auxiliaries the Cisalpines. These in order to ground the quarrel which they were charged with exciting, went as far back as the time of King Pepin, and reclaimed some parts of the marquisate of Ancona, which

which that Prince had dismembered from the exarchate of Ravenna, and had given to Stephen the Third. Preceded by a fine manifesto, their troops entered the territory of the church, and took possession of the fort of St. Leon after a bloody engagement maintained by the people of the country, whom the first invasion of the French had already disgusted with philosophic liberty. The Directory had hoped that the Pope would defend himself, and that they should have an opportunity of interfering, as allies of the Cisalpine Republic : But the Holy Father contented himself with sending an ambassador to Milan, to make representations.

The Directors, deceived in their hopes, had then recourse to their accustomed means. They excited troubles and insurrections in almost every part of the States of the Pope, ready to take part of the rebels, if he had attempted to repress them. But his moderation and his impotence having prevented them from taking any strong measures to re-establish order, they were at length obliged to take off the mask, and to make use of their great and last resources.

Joseph Bonaparte, the elder brother of the General, had orders to go to Rome, in the capacity of ambassador, and with instructions to drive from the
chair

chair of St. Peter, in some way or other, the august and unfortunate old man that filled it. On his arrival he assumed the mask of a perfidious kindness; but privately laboured to excite the lower orders of people to insurrection. Soon after he came to Rome, tumults succeeded one another rapidly in the capital, and every day incendiary placards called the people to a general insurrection. At last on the 26th of December, 1797, the factious made it known that every thing was ready for the projected revolution. Joseph Bonaparte, the worthy agent of the French Government and of his brother, pretended to disavow and to reprimand them. On the following day however the insurrection broke out. The garrison being ordered to suppress it, the furious Jacobins repaired to the palace of France as to their citadel, and from thence fired on the troops. These answered by several discharges, in one of which the French General Duphot was killed, who was among the insurgents, more probably to excite and direct them, than to cause the palace of France to be respected, as the Republicans have pretended.

Without admitting of any excuse or any reparation, without even entering into any explanation, the French ambassador quitted Rome the day following,

lowing and went to Florence, from whence he instantly dispatched a courier to the Directory, who in answer, sent an order to General Berthier, who at that time commanded in Italy, to go and revolutionize the capital of the christian world, and to give up the ancient country of the fine arts to pillage.

The Pope on his part, neglected nothing that might avert his ruin and appease the wrath of the Republic. He offered by his ambassador at Paris, to give whatever satisfaction might be required, and to submit to whatever might be prescribed. But all was in vain—His destruction was sworn in the cave of Theophilanthropism. Berthier arrived at the gates of Rome on the 14th of February, and on the following day, the Jacobins assembled in the Campo Vaccino, (the ancient forum), taking advantage of the stupor of the government, of the alarm of the higher orders, and of the support of the French army, proclaimed the insurrection of the Roman Republic. It was acknowledged the same day by General Berthier, who hastened to enjoy his triumph at the Capitol, from whence he addressed a high-flown discourse, to the manes of the

the Cato's, the Pompey's, the Brutus's, and the Cicero's.

The restoration of the Roman Republic, like all other revolutions effected by French principles or arms, was soon followed by proscriptions, by requisitions, and by the pillage of religious houses, of the depositaries of the arts and sciences, in short, of all property public and private. Misery and famine, the usual companions of French liberty, completed the destruction of all that these new liberators had spared. The ancient capital of the world, and which was still that of the fine arts and of catholicism, soon only presented a deplorable spectacle of desolation ; and while the ruins of the *Coliseum* attested the ravages of time and of the Vandals, the modern Brennus's proved that the *væ victis* was still with them the fundamental axiom of the rights of nations.]

All the Cardinals who had not escaped by flight, were imprisoned, and their goods confiscated. A number of them died in irons of misery and bad treatment. The nephews of the Pope, and all who were attached to the ancient government, were treated in the same manner. Even the person of Pius the VI. was not more respected : neither his

dignity, nor his infirmities, nor his resignation, could extort the smallest pity from these barbarians. Detained from that time a prisoner, treated with extreme rigour, and exposed to all the indignities which philosophical fanaticism could invent, this unfortunate old man was torn from his bed, dragged from city to city, and at length in 1799 confined in a fortress on the top of the Alps, where under the old regime, it was customary sometimes to send regiments by way of punishment. The successes of the Austro Russians having excited some uneasiness in the Directory, they tore him from his prison; and the unhappy pontiff went to close his miseries at Valence, where Bonaparte, when chief consul, caused a monument to be erected to the memory of him, who died a victim to the perfidy of his brother.

While his Lieutenant Berthier completed the overthrow of the pontifical throne, the commander in chief, become a negociator, proceeded to Rastadt, to assist at the congress to which the treaty of Campo Formio had adjourned the peace of the Empire, and where the difficulties were to be adjusted which might occur about the execution of it. All Europe had its eyes fixed on this assembly which

which was to decide its fate, to lay the foundation of a new system of political equilibrium, and to furnish to history an epocha still more important than that of the treaty of Westphalia.

The congress opened towards the end of November 1797; but far from answering the public expectation, it was evident from the first month to every observer, that it was only an empty form, to throw a veil over the projects of the two principal powers, who had previously disposed of the fate of others, and who only wished to understand one another on some points which were not yet perfectly fixed.

The execution which then took place of some of the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio, unveiled the spirit in which it had been made; and the entry of the French into Mentz, on the same day that the Austrians entered Venice, clearly proved, that if the integrity of the Empire had been the basis of the preliminaries of Leoben, it was not that of the treaty of Campo Formio; that Germany was no more than a field of plunder, and that the only business was to regulate the division of it. While the French troops took possession of Mentz, and blocked up Ehrenbreistein, and

while the agents of the Directory, and those of the Emperor proposed in the secret conferences new plans of dismemberment and secularization, the respective plenipotentiaries filled the scene ostensibly with miserable debates on trifling difficulties, and made continual exchanges of notes and counter-notes in the revolutionary or Teutonic stile, which made the congress of Rastadt the jest of Europe, and exhibited in it only a contemptible farce, which was likely to be a prelude to a bloody tragedy.

CHAP. XI.

Retrospect of the conduct held by the Swiss Cantons, during the French Revolution—Designs of the Directory upon that country—Troubles, war and revolution in which it involved it—Fructidorisation of the Batavian and Cisalpine Republics—Despotic, rapacious, perfidious, and vile conduct of the Directory towards Portugal, the Hans Towns, and the United States of America—Strokes of authority made by it against the Jacobins and the elections—Reception it gives to Bonaparte at Paris—Expedition to Egypt—Naval battle of Aboukir.

WHILE the Emperor and the Empire were bewildered by the French negotiators in the diplomatic labyrinth, of the Congress, at Rastadt; the Directory, under this political curtain which concealed their designs, carried one of them into effect, which from the foundation of the French Republic had been the order of the day, but which the war that broke out in 1792 had obliged to defer them

to a more favourable juncture. Reubell executed what Brissot had projected, and the downfall of the Federative Republic of Switzerland, presented the memorable lesson, " that peace is not to be pursued by servility, and that audacious criminals are not restrained by becoming, from weakness, their accomplice."

The Swiss, active, laborious and independent, had contemplated, for three hundred years, from the bosom of the Alps the political quarrels of Europe, without taking any part in them. Peace, happiness, and industry, appeared to have fixed their abode in Helvetia. The wealth, however which was the consequence of it, was not under all circumstances advantageous to the inhabitants of this country. Born to be poor and virtuous, they had become corrupt, by becoming rich: accustomed to sell their blood for gold, and to fight for every one except for their country, they had been habituated to consider this metal as the spring of their actions; and their love of money had, as is known, become proverbial. Nevertheless, the interior of the country still presented numerous pictures of the ancient simplicity, peaceful liberty, and patriarchal manners of its first inhabitants. The cantons, in
which

which the people were subject to a limited aristocracy, prospered under the shelter of a wise, mild, and paternal government, which did not require any taxes of them, and which defended their persons and their property, by a strict execution of the laws, and an impartial administration of justice. In short, the inhabitants of these cantons enjoyed, perhaps, more happiness, and more true civil liberty than any other people on the continent of Europe.

Notwithstanding, the contagion of French principles, after having gained the Pays de Vaud and the parts of Switzerland nearest to France, had by degrees spread into the interior of the country. A part even of the members of the aristocratic governments were affected, and the French philosophers had succeeded in persuading the shepherds and manufacturers of Helvetia, that they were oppressed, because they had neither clubs nor councils, nor municipalities, where orators might declaim.

If the small proprietors, the labourers, and the artists, had given ear to the seductions of the French revolutionists, the rich and the capitalists had been all entirely devoted to them from the beginning. Allured by the high interest with which the financier Necker had tempted their avarice, they had placed

their capitals in his loans, and France paid thirty millions of livres of annual interest, in the countries between Berne and Geneva. Almost all the inhabitants were creditors of France, and the greater number deceived by the golden promises of the financiers of the Constituent Assembly, were simple enough to believe that the faith of revolutionary France was a better security for their debts, than the gabelle and the other taxes of monarchichal France.—They only saw in the revolution honourable means conceived by able men, to repay the usurious debts of the Swiss and Genevese; in consequence they applauded plunder, confiscation, and profanations, not doubting that the profits of these robberies would in the end come into their pockets, and so deluded as to believe, that for the first time debts would be cancelled by robbery.

The government had followed the steps of the people, and the Helvetic Diet was one of the first powers that prostituted itself before the bloody Republic of Robespierre. It acknowledged and received with distinction, the ambassador of the celebrated committee of public safety. At the time of the massacre of the Swiss guards on the 10th of August,

August, 1792, not a complaint, not a murmur had escaped them against this dreadful act.

In the following years, when the Republic was in the greatest distress, the Diet obstinately refused the urgent solicitations of her enemies; and attached by the gold and the assignats, the governors and people of Switzerland lavished on St. Just and Robespierre, all the resources of the country in cattle, corn, arms, &c. When the inhabitants of Lyons, where the Swiss enjoyed the right of co-citizenship and even some privileges, were obliged to fly before a ferocious persecution, they found in the cantons of Friburg and Soleure and in the Valais, hospitality, compassion, the most friendly attentions, and the most generous assistance; every where else they were repelled, or oppressed by mortifications, which were made a merit of to the monsters who reigned in France. This was called *prudence* by the governments; but this ignominious prudence found itself in an error. The prediction of St. Just was fulfilled; the revolution went in search of the gold of Switzerland, which the cupidity of its inhabitants had attracted thither, and there as elsewhere, under the pretext that the people were not sufficiently

free

free or happy, the revolution came to drown happiness and liberty in streams of blood.

Besides the general plans of disorganization and plunder which instigated the Directory to attack and revolutionize Switzerland, it was also induced to it by political and military considerations. By being possessed of this country, it was to obtain the advantage of forming a junction between the armies of Italy and Germany, the efforts of which might henceforth be united, and of seizing the summits of the Alps, from whence the rivers flow and where the vallies rise which run into the Hereditary States; in short it considered Switzerland as an advanced post from which its armies could with ease penetrate into the heart of Germany and of the states of the house of Austria. A little more prudence and reflection would have enabled it to perceive that these advantages would be more than counterballanced by evident inconveniencies; it would have seen that the neutrality of Switzerland had constantly served as an impenetrable rampart to the most defenceless part of France; that this country was too barren to maintain great armies for a considerable time, and that it would not be possible to establish magazines there, except at a great expence; in short that after having
subjugated

subjugated this warlike nation, it would require an army to keep it in subjection, and in case of a reverse it was exposing France to be attacked on the side on which she was most open, and the retreat of her armies to be cut off by the insurrection of a brave and oppressed people.

All these considerations could not arrest the disorganizing fury of the Directors. War, conquests and the pillage of the defenceless, were become as necessary to their hearts, as they were to the finances of the Republic : they wanted them morally as well as physically. Accustomed to prepare for violence by dissimulation, they provoked by outrages and undermined by intrigues the different Helvetic governments. Amongst numberless affronts offered and submitted to every day, one of the most marked was a demand of the dismissal of the British minister. It was made by an agent named Mengaud taken from the dregs of the Jacobins, who without any credentials imperiously signified to the senate of Bern the resolution of the Directory which required this dismissal; and the English Minister was obliged to depart to save the Helvetic body the humiliation of giving the order for it. The senate of Bern had however the meanness to cause excuses to be made
for

for its delay in executing this order: to this effect it sent two deputies, who were ignominiously driven out of France.

The Directory, emboldened by so many base submissions to its will, signified by its agents, that it required the restoration and release of all the criminals who had been imprisoned or banished on account of sedition or conspiracy, the expulsion of the emigrants, and the renunciation of all military orders with which the Swiss officers had been decorated in France. "These cross-bearers," said they, "are connected with the Condeans, and those who will allow this cross to be worn, will be considered as favouring the conspirators." The Helvetic body was not ashamed to stoop to the meanness of acceding to all these demands.

These first interferences were soon followed by the seizure of the Bishopric of Basle, under the most frivolous pretexts, and in spite of the treaty concluded with the Swiss, in 1792, in which the independence and neutrality of that Canton were expressly stipulated for*. The Helvetic body remained

* The first treaty of alliance between France and Switzerland, took place under Charles the VIIth, after the

remained quiet spectators of this violence, a prelude to those with which it was threatened: and justified its *prudence* by observing that it was only a *German Bishop*, as the French proprietors said in 1790, when they plundered the bishops and the monks—
 “ *It is only the clergy.*”

Soon afterwards an insurrection founded on the rights of man, broke out on a sudden in the Pays de Vaud, and the authors of it instantly addressed a petition to the Directory, in which, by virtue of ancient treaties, they reclaimed the guaranty of France for the re-establishment of their rights. The government of the Luxemburg declared itself, without hesitation, the protector of the insurgents, and followed up its declaration, by ordering 1,500 men to
 enter

the terrible battle which was fought in 1444, between Louis XI, then Dauphin, and the Swiss. Another treaty was concluded during the reign of Charles VIII. in 1512. But it was Henry the IVth, who in 1602, most intimately connected the two nations. — Louis XIV. swore, in 1660 to continue this alliance. The revocation of the edict of Nantes, threw a damp on the intimacy between France and the Protestant cantons, and it was at that period that they began to furnish soldiers to other powers. Louis XVI. renewed the alliance in 1779, and that more closely.

enter the Pays de Vaud, under the orders of General Menard.

The Senate of Bern, always uncertain and temporising, thought of nothing better in this pressing crisis than to have the oath of fidelity renewed by the inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud. It invited them to it by a proclamation of the 5th of January, 1798, and named commissioners to receive it. The insurgents answered this invitation by flying to arms: they took possession of the strong fort of Chillon, and seized the persons of the bailiffs and other officers of the government.

At length the Senate of Bern, roused from its lethargy, thought fit to arm, and directed a body of 20,000 men, to march under the orders of Colonel de Weiss, known by his attachment not only to the Revolution in general, but to all its changes from the Constituent Assembly to the days of Robespierre, Barras, and Bonaparte. General Menard having advanced, Colonel Weiss retreated without striking a blow, and all the Pays de Vaud was in the hands of the French by the beginning of February. The tri-couloured cockade was mounted, the tree of liberty planted, the public treasury seized and plundered, and an

2

assembly

assembly of Jacobins erected into a provisional government. Whilst this Revolution was effecting, the Helvetic Diet convoked extraordinarily at Araru, there solemnly renewed the alliance and the federative oath of its different members. Mengaud had the impudence to go there, escorted by six hussars, to set up the French colours, to excite an insurrection, and to plant the tree of liberty.

The Senate of Bern thought at last that it was time to shew vigour; it assembled a considerable body of Militia, and summoned the city of Araru; but instead of persisting in this conduct, it listened to the councils of perfidy and fear, entered into a conference with the French, and imagined that it could prevent the revolution with which it was threatened, by making it itself: in consequence of which, a decree of the Senate of Berne changed the constitution of the state into a species of Democracy; and this absurd example was immediately imitated by the cantons of Zurich, Lucerne, Soleure, and Schauffhausen. In these three last the inhabitants rose against this innovation, and demanded the maintenance of the ancient government and the punishment of the innovators. There, as at Ve-

nice,

nice, the people were seen endeavouring to stop the Suicidal arm of government.

During these transactions, Brune had succeeded to Menard, in the command of the French troops which increased every day; but as he was not yet absolutely ready to act, he entered into perfidious negotiations with the regency of Berne, which had the weakness to listen to them, and which ended in humbling itself so far as to offer to complete the Revolution by abdicating its power, and resigning it to the people.

At length, on the 4th of March, all measures being taken, Brune attacked and carried the Castle of Dornach, at the northern extremity of the canton of Soleure, while a column of 1,300 men marched against that city, which capitulated at the first summons. Brune went in person against Friburg, and took possession of it after a slight resistance.

The Bernese army, 25,000 strong, commanded by General d'Erlach, which occupied a line of near thirty-five leagues, seeing its wings surprised and broke, could take no other step but that of retreating to cover the capital. From this moment discouragement and disorder succeeded to the enthusiasm and obedient courage which had till then animated the soldiers;

soldiers; the French agents who had introduced themselves into the Bernese camp during the negotiations, insinuated that the troops were betrayed by their officers; several battalions mutinied, others disbanded themselves; there was no longer confidence, authority, or discipline.

During this time, Berne presented as great a scene of confusion as the camp. The Senate, agitated by different factions, adopted in the same instant the most opposite resolutions, and completed the disorder by its contradictory decrees. On the 3d it decreed the levy of the Landsturm, that is to say, of the generality of the inhabitants at the sound of the Tocsin, and the next day it completed the dissolution of the government, and placed the broken sceptre of sovereignty in the hands of a popular and provisional regency.

From this moment all was anarchy and confusion in the town and in the army; battalions massacred their officers; others disbanded themselves, others flew with fury on the enemy, who attacked and repulsed at Fraubrunnen, the wreck of that disorganised army—The brave General d'Erlach rallied them with no better success, first at Ulteren, and afterwards at Granholz, where after a bloody battle,

in which old men, women, and children, took a part, the unfortunate Bernese were driven under the walls of their capital, which on the 6th surrendered by capitulation. One division of the army given up to a blind despair and led astray by the machiavelian suggestions of the French party, massacred the unfortunate d'Erlach, and several of his principal officers. Berne, Soleure, Friburg, and the cantons of these names, were given up to the methodical plunder of the commissioners of the Directory, and to the licentious pillage of a revolutionary soldiery : public banks, hospitals, arsenals, &c. were all devastated ; villages, houses, castles, farms, cottages, household goods, cattle, provisions, all was burnt, destroyed, or carried off, and excesses of every description, surpassed perhaps all those with which the French Revolution had already afflicted humanity.

The other cantons had seen the invasion and the fall of Berne, Friburg, and Soleure, without coming to their assistance ; very soon victims to their pusillanimity and to their want of faith, Zurich, Lucerne, Schaffhausen, and Basle, passed under the French yoke, and experienced the same misfortunes, without doing honour to their last moments,

moments by a generous defence; and Helvetia, covered with blood and ruins, received from the Directory of France, a constitution and a patent which created it into an Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible. Geneva was incorporated with that of France. The democratic cantons preserved however their independence some months longer; they even at first repulsed with considerable loss the vile disturbers of their repose; but in the end, crushed by numbers, the worthy descendants of the founders of Helvetic liberty, were buried under its ruins. The smoking wrecks of Underwalden attested at once the courage of its inhabitants, and the ferocity of their enemies.

While the Directory excited by this political crime a cry of universal indignation, it made farther steps in the career of oppression, of pillage, and of infamy, which it had marked out for itself; not content with overturning the hostile or neutral countries, in the same manner that it had violated in France the constitution which it was charged to execute, it determined to effect a similar revolution in the affiliated Republics, satellites destined to undergo all the phases of the planet which made them move in its orbit. Lacroix was sent in January

1798 into Holland, and Trouvé to Milan, in quality of proconsuls, to *fructidorize* the Batavian and Cisalpine Republics. The military force was employed, as at Paris, to overturn the laws and the recent constitutions of these two states; a part of the Directory and of the Councils, was in the same manner arrested, imprisoned, and banished without form or process; and worthy sycophants of the French Directory were installed in their room.

In the course of the summer 1797, an ambassador from Portugal had been sent to Paris to negotiate a peace there, and had concluded a treaty on very severe terms. The Directory broke it, though it had touched a part of the sums which had been the price of it. The ambassador, instead of quitting Paris in 24 hours as he had been ordered, having endeavoured to renew the negotiations; the Directory as little scrupulous about the *rights of nations* as about the *rights of men*, had him arrested and committed to the Temple. It followed up this act by the threat of invading Portugal; and sent Augereau to take the command of the army which it seemed disposed to collect for this expedition. This General, a fit instrument of directorial

pro-

proscriptions, had hoped, (as had been promised him,) that the business of the 18th of Fructidor, would raise him to the Directory, as that of the 13th of Vendemiaire 1795, had before raised Barras. Deceived in this hope, he shewed so strongly his discontent, that the Directors took from him the command of the army of the Rhine, which had been given him instead of the Directorial purple, and sent him into the Pyrenees, to command that of Portugal, which scarcely existed but in name.

The Directory did not treat with more kindness the party which had served it so well in the last revolution. Notwithstanding the seductions, the terror, and the violence that government had employed to influence the elections in the month of April 1798, the Jacobins, who had rallied to it the preceding year, to crush the Moderates, had taken advantage of the temporary favour which had been shewn them to command at the elections; and the Anarchists, finding themselves a strong party in the councils, and having the majority in the new third, already talked of taking their revenge for the affair of the Camp de Grenelle.

The Directory, mindful of the danger which it had run the preceding year, but finding itself stronger

than it then was, inasmuch as the Anarchists were not supported as the Moderates had been by the good-will of the people, determined to strike a great blow. A decree issued from the Luxemburg on the 7th of April, broke the greater part of the elections of the *free* people, and substituted representatives, judges and administrators, the choice of the Triumvirate.

Become all powerful within, they found nothing but submission or stupor without, and pursued indefatigably their course of crimes and of plunder.

The distance of the Hans Towns, their political insignificance, their neutrality so favourable to France, and even the protection of Prussia, were insufficient to secure them from the rapacity of the Directory ; their ships were seized, and their commerce intercepted on imaginary causes of complaint ; they were obliged to appease with some millions, the affected displeasure of the despots of France. The ocean itself was not a barrier against their insatiable avarice ; and they thought they could extort money from the Americans. A treaty of alliance and neutrality which the United States had concluded with England, was the pretext chosen
by

by the Directory. After having complained bitterly of it, it gave orders to its privateers to attack the Americans. A great number of vessels belonging to this nation, were in consequence taken in both quarters of the world. The Congress, instead of making reprisals, sent three plenipotentiaries to Paris, to enter into negotiations, and to adjust amicably all differences with the Republic : as soon as they arrived, they announced their conciliatory intentions, but they could not even obtain an audience of the Directory, who thinking they had struck terror into the Congress, reckoned on having found an opportunity to extort money from them. In consequence its inferior agents insinuated to the American plenipotentiaries, that the only means of obtaining the audience they desired, and of being favourably heard, was to give about £60,000 sterling to Talleyrand the minister for foreign affairs, to divide between him and four of the Directors; they were given to understand at the same time, that Merlin was paid by the privateers for having granted them the permission to take the American ships, and that in virtue of the engagements he had made with them, that permission could not be repealed for

some time; but they added, that if the Congress would lend 80,000,000, (a little more than 3,000,000 sterling) to the Republic, they might obtain its friendship. The plenipotentiaries refused with dignity to accede to this scandalous negociation, and to purchase the dishonour of their country; they left Paris, being enabled to say as *Jugurtha* did when he quitted Rome by order of the Senate, *O urbem venalem, et mature perituram, si emptorem inænerit!* Returned to America, they published this shameful transaction, which was not known in Europe till some months after it had taken place, and which made the Directory as vile as its other acts had rendered it odious.

Thus these five men, intoxicated with the double power which had been given them with respect to France, by the act of the 18th of Fructidor, and with respect to the Continental Powers by the treaty of Campo Formio, and endeavouring to make the world feel their despotism, their outrages, and their contempt, deprived the French revolution of the small number of its partisans which remained, made all enlightened governments feel the necessity of a new league against her, and happily suffered the most favourable opportunity to escape of consolidating

solidating the Republic and their own authority. If after having conquered or disarmed at the end of 1797 their external and internal enemies, they had shewn as much prudence as they displayed boldness, if they had known how to enjoy politically the power which they had usurped criminally, it is probable that France wearied with so many convulsions, as Europe was with so many efforts, would have left them quietly seated on the directorial throne. But unworthy of their good fortune, and driven on, as it were, by the spirit of perdition, they abandoned themselves to all the extravagancies and violences of which a sketch has just been given, and drew on their own heads the storm which soon burst forth.—An account of the fortunate event which hastened its explosion shall now be given.

Bonaparte had disdained to remain at Rastadt longer than was sufficient for the exchange of the respective powers and ratifications, and proceeded to Paris to enjoy his triumph, and the popular acclamations which he supposed would be lavished on the conqueror of Italy, and the pacificator of Campo Formio, and to receive from the Directory the rewards to which he was no less entitled for the deliberations of his army in the late crisis, than for
his

his victories. He was deceived in his expectations. The people, fallen into a state of apathy, and become strangers to the Republic since the last revolution, saw only in him an Aga of the Janissaries of the Triumvirate; and these, jealous of his glory and of the influence to which he might aspire, received him at the Luxemburg, as *Germanicus* was at the court of *Tiberius* after his triumphs, *brevi acceptus osculo*. After some hypocritical demonstrations, which imposed on no one, they gave him the command of the army of the west, which they had just decorated with the pompous title of the army of England; and the direction of citadel rafts, of insubmersible vessels, of balloons, and other magic machines, with which the journalists of the Directory menaced the coasts of proud Albion.

Bonaparte seized the pretext to go and review his army, to withdraw from the equivocal and painful situation in which he found himself at Paris; but his restless and fiery spirit greedy of renown, could not accommodate itself to the retreat to which he saw himself condemned. His glory was insensibly eclipsed in the idle obscurity which the jealousy of the Directory made it necessary for them to place him: He thought himself too great to remain with safety

in France, at least unless he consented to be too little for the high destinies which he thought himself called to fulfil.

This was probably what first gave rise to the famous expedition to Egypt. The Directory, very glad to get rid of him, and of his faithful legions in Italy, thought itself too happy to find a pretext for sending him to a distance in the reduction of a new country, and in the hope of striking a sensible blow against Great-Britain.

All the spring and part of the summer of 1798 were employed in the preparations for this expedition, which were made with no less activity than secrecy.

Fifteen ships of the line and eighteen frigates, the remains of the French and Venetian marine, were fitted out at Toulon, and more than 200 transports were collected in the ports of France and of Italy, before it was known with certainty what was the object of the expedition*. 30,000 veterans
from

* The whole armament consisted of one ship of 120 guns, three of 80, nine of 74, seven frigates of 40 guns, three cutters, five brigs, four bomb vessels, six gun-boats, four tartans and two frigates armed en-flûte: the whole forty-four ships of war. Two vessels, one serving

from Italy, a croud of young men and of adventurers, attracted by the reputation of the General or the romantic spirit of the enterprize, a chosen staff, a numerous battering and field artillery, immense stores and baggage, and a number of scavants, of artists and artificers of all descriptions, were embarked on board this fleet. The Admiral who commanded it took on board pilots for the coast of Spain and for the Straits, to make it supposed that the invasion of Ireland was the object of the expedition. The fleet sailed from Toulon on the 20th of May, and proceeding, contrary to the usual practice, between Italy and the eastern coasts of Corsica and Sardinia, it collected the transports which waited for it on the different parts of the coast, eluded the vigilance of the English cruizers, and appeared before Malta on the 9th of June. On the 11th, a preconcerted treachery delivered up to the French this celebrated fortress which had been deemed impregnable, long since the bulwark of christi-

ing as an hospital ship, and seven frigates, the whole, nine armed en-flute: forty-three transports laden with military stores, thirty-five carrying 520 horses.—Seventy-seven were fitted out at Toulon, sixty-four at Marseilles, Nice, and Antibes. Total 131, without reckoning the transports fitted out in Italy.

christianity, and which had seen fail under its growing walls the great and fortunate Soliman in the zenith of his power.

In the mean time Lord St. Vincent, who commanded on the Mediterranean station, detached Admiral Nelson with three ships to observe the French squadron; and as soon as he saw more clearly into the preparations of the French, he re-inforced him with ten ships more, under the command of Commodore Trowbridge. The astonishing news of the capture of Malta, which spread with rapidity, directed the course of the English Admiral towards that island, in sight of which he appeared on the 22d of June; but on the 18th Bonaparte with his accustomed celerity, having left 4,000 men to garrison Malta, under the command of General Vaubois, had sailed towards Alexandria, where he arrived on the 1st of July with the whole of his convoy, after having escaped the pursuit of the light vessels of the English Admiral, a signal instance of that good fortune which till then had never abandoned him.

On the 5th the city of Alexandria was carried by assault, and the convoy placed in safety in the famous port of Eunoste. Without losing an instant,

Bonaparte

Bonaparte began his march across the desert, where his army suffered incredibly from thirst; at length on the 21st, he appeared in the plains of Egypt, opposite to Cairo, from which he was separated by the Nile. In the whole of his march across the Desert he had been continually harrassed by the Arabs and the Mamelukes. The constancy and bravery of his troops seem almost approaching to the romantic when it is considered, that during near three weeks they advanced by forced marches across sandy deserts, almost without water and without provisions, under a burning sky and on a burning soil, having every day a formidable cavalry to fight, to which they had hardly any to oppose. They were not long in receiving the reward of their constancy.

On the 26th of July twenty-three of the Beys having assembled their force attacked the French drawn up in a line, in the plains of Giré. Bonaparte by a skilful disposition to which he owed the success of this day, formed his infantry into five columns *en echelon*, which by extending his front gave him the means of supporting one of his flanks on the Pyramids, and the other on the Nile, in the face of a village where the Beys had entrenched their best infantry, with a considerable number

number of cannon. Those of the French were placed between their columns, and made terrible execution amongst the Mamelukes, who attacked Buonaparte's right with an impetuosity, and a bravery worthy of a better fate. This intrepid cavalry penetrated several times into the ranks of the French grenadiers, without making them lose an inch of ground. When Bonaparte perceived that his columns remained unshaken, he saw that the victory was his, and thought only of rendering it complete and decisive. Without losing an instant he ordered his left to attack the entrenched village; it moved forward with rapidity under a terrible fire of grape shot: nothing could resist it; the entrenchments were carried by the bayonet; those who defended them were put to the sword; a great number of Mamelukes who fled towards this post to cross the Nile there, were killed or drowned. 2,000 enemies dead in the field, 400 camels, 50 pieces of cannon, a vast quantity of baggage, the peaceable possession of Grand Cairo, and of Lower Egypt, were according to the accounts of the French, the consequences of this victory.*

Fortune,

* It is thought unnecessary to follow up the details of this expedition, which is not at this present moment terminated

Fortune, constantly faithful to Bonaparte till this moment, prepared to abandon him at the very instant when she was lavishing her favors on him.

This General has declared in his official dispatches that it was against his express orders that Admiral Brueys had remained on the coast of Egypt after the disembarkation of the troops and military stores, and that he had enjoined him to proceed with all expedition to Corfu, if he could not find an entrance for his fleet into the port of Alexandria. Admiral Gantheaume on the contrary has asserted in his dispatches to the minister of marine, that Bonaparte had directed Brueys to remain on the coast until he should be firmly established in Egypt; and that the latter, after having in vain attempted to enter the port of Alexandria, had just discovered a pass which had sufficient depth of water, and was preparing to place his fleet in security, when he was prevented by the incredible celerity of Admiral Nelson.

This commander having reached Malta four days after the departure of the French fleet, had sailed without

terminated, and the preceding narration of which has only been introduced because it could not be separated from the events which followed.

without stopping to the bottom of the Mediterranean; but being ignorant what point was menaced, and apprehending that the armament might be destined for the Adriatic Sea, he steered his course opposite the entrance of the Gulph, and from thence directed himself straight towards Egypt, without reconnoitring Candia, while the French fleet passed between that island and the coast of Africa. His squadron having got the start of that of the French, which was retarded by its convoy, he appeared on the 29th of June before the Pharos of Alexandria, without having gained any intelligence of the proceedings of the enemy. He scarcely stopped there: on the 4th of July he was in sight of the coast of Caramania, and then returned along the southern coast of Candia in the hope of finding the French there, if the conquest of that island was the object of their expedition. Still deceived in his expectations, he flew back to Sicily there to obtain a supply of water and provisions, and anchored on the 18th of July at Syracuse. On the 25th he quitted it again without having obtained any precise information of the enemy, visited the coasts of the Morea, and there learned that the French fleet had been seen a month before steering to the S. E. of Candia.

Nelson immediately crouded sail towards Alexandria, and regained sight of the Pharos on the 1st of August at noon; his perplexity and his anguish when he saw the tri-coloured flag flying in the port of Alexandria, may be conceived: for a moment he thought that his prey had escaped him; but soon afterwards the Zealous, which had been detached, made a signal that the French fleet was at anchor in the road of Aboukir. The Admiral instantly made that of preparing for battle; and the whole fleet answered it by shouts of exultation.

During his long and fruitless course through the Mediterranean, this Admiral had taken care whenever the weather permitted, to assemble on board his own ship the captains of his squadron, and foreseeing that he might fall in with the French unexpectedly, either at anchor or at sea, he had explained to them the plans of attack which he had formed, so that when he made the signal that his intention was to attack the van and centre of the French fleet, every captain knew what he had to do to second the manœuvre.

The French who by no means expected such a visit, were drawn up in the road of Aboukir, in a line of battle, describing an obtuse angle, supported

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ed by four frigates, gun-boats, and a battery of cannon and mortars placed on an island at the head of its van. This order of battle was bad; and to engage on equal terms, Brueys ought to have made sail as soon as he had intelligence of the English squadron; but instead of adopting such a plan, he seemed confident that the British squadron inferior to him in force would not venture to attack him.

Nelson formed his judgment of the enemy's position with the eye of an eagle; he saw the errors committed by the enemy, took advantage of them, and committed none himself. Without deliberating he made the signal to double the French fleet which was readily obeyed, all his officers being resolved like himself to conquer or to perish. The *Goliath* took the lead and doubled the French squadron, followed by the *Zealous*, the *Lion*, the *Audacious*, and the *Theseus*. The flag-ship, the *Vanguard*, anchored the first on the outside of the enemy, and the rest following, formed within half pistol shot of the French van. The latter, though placed between two fires, shewed a good countenance and returned a vigorous fire, which raked the English ships, as they came to their anchorage. The English ships anchored by the stern as they came up, so that the

order of battle was quite inverted, and each on coming up found itself protected by that which immediately preceded it. The *Leander* of 50 guns too weak to present its broadside, had the courage to cut the line, and to place itself across the head of the *Franklin*, which it raked. The *Culloden*, which with the *Alexander* and *Leander* had been looking out in the S. W. quarter, were called in by signal upon the first discovery of the French fleet, and the former in doubling the point of *Aboukir* grounded on the sandbank which stretches a considerable way into the sea, and was thus disabled from having any share in the action.

The battle began at half past six in the evening, and scarcely had the English opened their fire when the victory may be said to have been decided. The van and centre of the French, attacked on both sides, without the possibility of support from the rear which being to leeward could not bear up to their assistance, were soon overpowered. *Le Guerrier*, the leading ship was dismasted in twelve minutes. The darkness of the night at first abated by the fire of the combatants, was soon entirely dissipated by the conflagration from the French Admiral's ship *l'Orient* which blew up with a terrible explosion.

A me-

A melancholy stillness and silence for a few minutes succeeded this horrible crash. Shortly afterwards the fire re-commenced with increased fury, and lasted till break of day. Already a part of the French van had been captured. The English ships which were still engaged suffered themselves to drive towards the French rear, where they attacked and took the ships one by one. Mr. du Petit Thonars, an officer of the ancient royal marine, honorably sustained the credit of the corps to which he had belonged. *Le Tonnant* which he commanded made a distinguished defence, was the last to strike its flag, and did not surrender till after the death of its brave captain. *Le Genereux* and *Le Guillaume Tell*, the two last ships in the rear, and two frigates, taking advantage of the disabled state of the English squadron, got under weigh and were the only ones which escaped to carry the news of this fatal day, the immediate fruits of which to the conquerors were seven ships of the line and two frigates taken, sunk, or destroyed.

An excuse will be probably given for having enlarged on this battle, perhaps the most glorious in the annals of the British Navy. This memorable victory, which must render the name of Admiral

Nelson immortal, struck a blow no less fatal to the French marine than that which it had received at the battle of La Hogue: But it much more influenced the destinies of the Continent of Europe, which it awakened from its stupor, and to which it restored the hope of being at length enabled to deliver itself from the yoke or from the threats of the French Republic.

C H A P. XII.

The King of Naples arms, and advances at the head of his army, to expel the French from the Roman territory—March of the Neapolitan army—The Directory declares war against the King of the Two Sicilies, as well as against the King of Sardinia, whom it dethrones at the same time—Ill fortune of the Neapolitans—They evacuate Rome—The King withdraws to Palermo—Championet invades the kingdom of Naples—Shameful capitulation of the Vice Regent of that kingdom—Loyal insurrection of the Lazzaroni—The French enter Naples after a battle of 60 hours—Congress of Radstadt—Dilemma to which the French reduce the Emperor.

OF all the powers which were in such a state of weakness, as to admit of being revolutionized by intrigues, proclamations, and a few battalions, there remained only the Kings of Naples, of Sardinia, and Spain, tottering upon their thrones shaken

as much and even more by the peace which they had concluded with the Republic of France, than by the war which they had carried on against her. The ferocious and covetous eyes of the Directory wandered from the west to the south of the European continent in search of new victims, while its king's appeared, like the companions of Ulysses, to expect with resignation the arrival of their turn to serve as food for the Revolutionary Cyclop ; when one, the most impotent and dangerously situated of all of them, daring to brave the fate which threatened him, attempted by his example to awaken the other Sovereigns from the stupor in which they seemed plunged ; and aspired to the glory of giving the signal for vengeance against directorial tyranny.

The King of Naples could not behold, without considerable uneasiness, the formation of the Roman Republic. This was evidently a focus of intrigues and jacobinism, an advanced post of revolution, in which were silently preparing the subversion of his throne and the overthrow of his States. Too feeble to prevent the destruction of the Papal see, or even to restrain the Jacobinical Republic which had risen upon its ruins, he had been compelled
to

to remain the idle spectator of an event to him of so very threatening an aspect ; and seeing the sword of Damocles suspended over his head, he was expecting every instant to partake the fate of the unhappy pontiff, when the victorious cannon of Aboukir echoing from one end of Europe to the other, restored to the people their hopes, energy to governments, and to the political body its elasticity. The King could not dissemble his joy at this event so disastrous to the French ; he went to meet their conqueror, received him with triumph into his capital, and opened to him his ports and arsenals. Being pretty certain of the resentment with which this proceeding would inspire the French despots, he immediately took measures for sheltering himself from it, and prepared openly for war with a boldness which might be deemed temerity, if it had not been evident his destruction was already determined upon : there remained to him no other choice than that of anticipating the stroke with which he was threatened, and at least to render his fall an honourable one, at the hazard of hastening it a few moments. His situation and conduct strikingly recall those lines of the poet Corncille,

“ *Nim-*

*" N'importe ! a tout oser le peril doit contraindre :
 " Il ne faut craindre rien, quand on a tout à craindre.*

The King took considerable pains to augment his army, and he procured from Germany in order to command it the Austrian General Mack, who has been already mentioned in this volume.—As early as the end of October 1798, his preparations had been sufficiently formidable to alarm the Roman Republic which denounced them to the mother Republic, in a violent manifesto. Ferdinand, less alarmed than incensed by these menaces, marched his troops in a large body towards his frontiers, and set out to take the command of them in person—Knowing that his condemnation was already determined upon in the Cabinet of the Luxemburg, and that it was useless to reason with lawyers who had 300,000 men at their command, he resolved to anticipate them, and to conquer with glory, or to fall without disgrace.

In consequence of this, General Mack, after having publicly summoned the French Generals to evacuate the state of Rome, as having been usurped and revolutionized since the treaty of Campo Formio ; *a usurpation which had been recognised, neither by the King of the Two Sicilies, nor by*
 his

*his august ally the Emperor,** made all preparations in his power to expel them, and with a spirit which was better suited to the number than the real bravery of his troops, or at least to the use which he could make of it, he added, that he should consider the entry of the French into Tuscany, or any resistance on their part, as an act of hostility for which he should consider them responsible.

Championet, who commanded the French in the Roman Republic, answered the proclamation of Mack in a more moderate tone than could have been expected from him, and rendered him on his part responsible for the consequences of this aggression.

The Neapolitan army put itself in motion on the 21st of November, and entered on the 23d the Roman territory in five columns, commanded by the Generals de Michereux, Marquis San Filippo, Mecher, Chevalier de Saxe, and the Captain
Genera

* The sending of General Mack to Naples, the confidence with which he spoke and appeared to act, not less than this phrase of his proclamation, made it believed at that time, that the King of the Two Sicilies was confident of the support of the Emperor. The issue did not fail to remove this conjecture.

General Mack. These five divisions which amounted in all to about 40,000 men, advanced from the two sides of the Apenines, which divide in the middle this part of Italy from the north to the south. A considerable corps of reserve remained on the frontiers of the kingdom of Naples, while a detachment under the orders of Count Roger de Damas, being disembarked at the Presidii* on the coast of Tuscany, was to harrass the French upon their flanks, and another body commanded by General Naselli, conveyed by the British fleet to Leghorn, was intended to cut off their retreat to Tuscany.

This skilful disposition, which was however considering the circumstances rather brilliant than effective, met at once all the success which could have been desired from it. Leghorn opened its gates without resistance, and the Grand Duke, from whom the French General had just been demanding quarters for a division of 4,000 men, which was in other words, to expel him from his dominions, was happy to see himself freed from these dangerous guests. Championet, who had with him only five
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* This little state is situated on the coast of the Mediterranean, enclosed between the Papal dominions and Tuscany. Orbitello is the chief town.

demi brigades, one regiment of Chasseurs, one of
 dragoons, two companies of artillery, in all scarce
 10,000 French, supported it is true, by some thou-
 sand Italians, quitted Rome after having left a gar-
 rison in the castle of St. Angelo, and fell back upon
 the upper Tyber. The King entered Rome in
 triumph on the 29th of November, preceded by a
 proclamation in form of a manifesto, in which he
 professed having taken up arms only for the protec-
 tion of his states, the re-establishment of the sove-
 reign Pontiff, and catholic religion. This decla-
 ration much better drawn up than those which pro-
 ceeded from the pen of General Mack, was pru-
 dent and temperate. It promised an amnesty, and
 a perfect oblivion to all those who had been in-
 duced to take part in the revolution of Rome, and
 also promised supplies of provisions to the inhabi-
 tants of this city, who suffered much from scarcity.
 The King was received with the acclamations of
 the people, who were with difficulty restrained from
 proceeding to the greatest excesses against all those
 who had taken a part in the revolution; the tree of
 liberty was cut down, as well as the monument
 erected in the capitol to the memory of General
 Duphot.

While

While Italy was rejoicing at these premature successes, the Directory hurled from his throne the King of Sardinia, as a preliminary to the destruction of that of Naples. The fall of this unfortunate monarch operated as the catastrophe in a play which has been long foreseen and expected. The pretext for this new usurpation, was as may be imagined, the compliance of this prince with the enemies of the Republic.—The King of Sardinia a memorable instance of the misfortunes which result from the weakness of Princes, and of the abject state to which it may reduce them, had reluctantly ascended a tottering throne from which he descended without regret. His father had died of grief soon after his signing in conformity to pusillanimous counsels the fatal peace which put his person and his states at the mercy of the French. When Victor Emanuel succeeded him, he found a dismembered kingdom, an empty treasury, dismantled fortresses, a disorganized army, a people surrounded by countries already revolutionized and whom the government had been obliged to tax heavily in order to supply the exactions of the French armies. The first step of the new king had been to give up the too heavy burthen of such a government, into

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the hands of a regency whom he invested with the whole of his powers. This Regency having soon become sensible of its own inability to govern in such very critical circumstances, he saw itself in some measure obliged to place his states under the protection of the French, concluded with them an offensive and defensive alliance, and gave up to them the possession of the capital, as a pledge of its fidelity. Such was the melancholy condition to which he was reduced, when the turn of affairs in Germany, and in the south of Italy, induced the Directory, in order to spare themselves all uneasiness, to strike him with the blow which they had long prepared for him.

The invasion of the Roman territory had no sooner reached the ears of General Joubert who was Commander in Chief of the army of Italy, than by virtue of the secret instructions which he had beforehand received from the Directory, he effected the invasion of Piedmont. On the 3d of December General Victor who occupied the territory of Modena with his division, began his march towards Piedmont. On the 6th he entered by surprise into Novarra, where they thought themselves in perfect security; and proceeded towards Turin, whither some other columns marched in different directions, disarming

arming in their passage the Piedmontese troops, and placing garrisons in the fortresses. The Sardinian troops wished at first to make some resistance, but they were prevented from doing it by the orders of the King, who determined immediately to descend from his throne; he sent the act of his abdication, on the 9th of December to Chiavasso where the General in Chief Joubert was, who the same day entered Turin, and obliged the unhappy monarch to quit his capital the same night, notwithstanding the rigour of the season. This prince without uttering a sigh of regret after the crown of thorns which he had just left, followed by his family, by the sister of Louis the XVIth, a small number of faithful domestics and friends, as well as by the blessings and tears of his people, set forward on his journey by the dismal light of torches, in the middle of a dark night, through weather the most terrible, to seek an asylum in Sardinia, where the Directory had thought proper to transport him.

The Directory published only on the 14th of December, that is to say, after all was done, their declaration of war, in a manifesto in form of a message to the councils, in which they had the absurdity to accuse the dethroned monarch, of
having

having caused a man to be buried alive, and of having poisoned the wells in order to destroy the French army; they had also the ironical impudence to reproach him with preparations for defence, which had unfortunately never taken place. They supported this manifesto by the publication of some pretended intercepted pieces, of which the fabrication, was too gross to impose on the meanest understanding.

Joubert hastened to revolutionize Piedmont, and to establish there a provisional government; and the Piedmontese army was incorporated with that which he commanded, after having given its oath of fidelity to the French Republic.*

VOL. II.

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During

* It is not indeed the first time that France had plundered the House of Savoy of Piedmont. Francis the First conquered and kept it. His successor Henry the Second restored it by the treaty of *Cateau-Cambresis*. In the next century Cardinal Richelieu obtained for France Pignerol and the adjacent vallies: the House of Savoy recovered them in 1796; and by the treaty of Utrecht the other vallies and passes which the French still possessed beyond the Alps were given up.—Under a succession of brave and able princes, such as no other Royal House affords an example of, that of Savoy from the

During this time, Championet withdrawn into the Ombria, occupied on the heights from Viterbo to Terni, a central and concentrated position, which enabled him at the same time to watch the movements of the enemy's columns, which were advancing on the two sides of the Apenines. These different columns had scarce any means of mutual com-

the middle of the sixteenth century continually aggrandized her possessions, notwithstanding the difficult and dangerous situation in which she was constantly placed by the disputes between France and Austria. Though weaker than either of them, she augmented her power at the expence of both, particularly of the latter: she succeeded in driving the former beyond the Alps, and obtained from the other a part of the Milanese. By the treaty of 1703 she acquired the Alexandrino and the Vigevanasc; by that of 1738 the country of Tortona and Novarra; and by that of 1743 all that remained of the Milanese on this side of the Ticcino and the Po, also a small part of the Plaisantin as far as the Mera. Every body knows that Victor Amedeus said to his son, "the Milanese is an artichoke which must be eaten leaf by leaf." Charles Emmanuel knew how to follow this advice.—The House of Savoy, whose origin is lost in obscurity, has reigned above 700 years over the country of which it bears the name, but it was only in the fourteenth century when it established itself in Italy, that it became of importance to Europe.

communications, being a great way removed the one from the other, and separated by chains of mountains.

The desire of invading at once the whole of the Roman territory, and the hope of striking a panic into the French by such display of superior troops, could alone have determined General Mack to divide his own in that manner. There is reason to believe, that owing to the little confidence he placed in the Neapolitan troops, he had attempted to gain ground rather by *manceuvres* than by battles, in which troops accustomed to war were likely although inferior in numbers to get the better of those who were quite inexperienced.

However this might be, this plan of the campaign had an issue very different from what was hoped for. Championet, having received reinforcements which increased his army to about 15,000 men, resolved attempting to destroy singly the divisions of the Neapolitan army, which could not support each other. On the 6th of December, he attacked and beat the enemy's advanced guard at Otricoli; on the 9th, he made a brisk attempt upon Calvi which he carried, taking a great number of prisoners, pieces

of cannon, and baggage waggons. Actions more or less bloody, took place nearly at the same time, at Terni, at Torre di Palma, and at Monterosi: every where, the French though very inferior in numbers overthrew the Neapolitans; this last engagement was a very warm one, and it was not without difficulty and considerable loss that Macdonald repulsed the column under the command of the Chevalier de Saxe*. On the 7th Championet attacked and routed near Cantaluppo the great division commanded by General Mack in person; from this period, the Neapolitan army was disabled from making head against the French. As badly organized as it was little enured to war, and as discontented with its commander as he had reason to be with it, besides this, misled by the councils of

treason

* This officer, a very distinguished young man, served in France before the Revolution. The same was the case with Count Roger de Damas, a French emigrant, who commanded the column which had come through the Neapolitan Presidü. He had taken a part in nearly the whole of the war with the Russians against the Turks, had acquired considerable fame at the taking of Oczakow, and had been loaded with merited favours by the Empress Catherine.

treason and cowardice, it was incapable of being rallied after this defeat, and withdrew in disorder towards the frontiers of its country. General Mack proceeded with all the troops he could retain, in order to post himself behind Capua.—Count Roger de Damas was the only one who fulfilled his duty; having maintained the spirit of obedience and courage in his division, and having had also the address to incite the inhabitants of the country on both his flanks to an insurrection, he was enabled to stop General Kellerman (son of the General of the same name) who had closely followed him, fought a bloody and obstinate battle with him, and though being dangerously wounded, accomplished his retreat slowly and in good order, to the point from whence he had set out.—On the 13th of December, the King quitted Rome, which fifteen days before he had entered in triumph, and Championet returned there the 16th with the acclamations of the Jacobins. If any credit can be given to the accounts of the Directory, 12,000 prisoners, 100 pieces of cannon, 21 standards, 3,000 horses or mules, the baggage and chests of the army were the fruits of this campaign.

paign of twenty days. All this was much exaggerated, but the victory was nevertheless neither doubtful, nor of little advantage to the French.

Championet did not lose an instant in taking advantage of the disorder and panic of the Neapolitans. After having obliged them to quit the Roman territory, he hastened to pursue them into their own. Sensible that he had no resistance to fear from troops so little military and so unorganized, he thought it advisable to divide his little army, in order to pursue his enemies in all directions and prevent them from rallying.—The division of Macdonald advanced by Piperno, Ferentino, Fromosina, and then split into two columns. The first, under the orders of General Mathicu, proceeded to seize the bridge of Caprano upon the Garigliano, while that on the left after having crossed Allatri, Veroli, and Casamara, carried the intrenchments of Castelleno, and took its position in front of the rivers of Liri, and Garigliano. This division possessed itself of a great quantity of artillery, which the Neapolitans abandoned in their hasty retreat.—General Rey at the head of the Polish legions, and two regiments of chasseurs, advanced

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at the same time by Terracina. At Fondi he was joined by General Kellerman whose march had been retarded by the handsome retreat of General Damas, and the brave resistance of the town of Viterbo which had taken part with the Neapolitans: Kellerman brought to General Rey some artillery and a demi-brigade of light infantry, while his cavalry proceeded to reunite itself to the division of Macdonald, which was marching through a more open country. Rey assisted by this little reinforcement attacked and carried the defiles of Fondi, and Itri, which the Neapolitans had strongly intrenched; and presented himself with 2 or 3000 men before Gaeta, a fortified town situated on a little peninsula: the sea bathes its walls, except on the side of the narrow neck of land which unites it to the continent, and which leaves but one road between steep mountains, and the sea. 4,000 Neapolitans entrusted to defend this fortress, having provision and ammunition for a whole year, and an open sea enabling them to have fresh supplies or to escape, surrendered at discretion at the first cannon shot, and delivered up to the French 92 pices of artillery, 7 armed feluccas, a great number of transport ships, a bridge equipage,

20,000 musquets, 100,000 pounds of powder, and a number of boats loaded with grain. Rey, after having placed a garrison in Gaeta and thrown a bridge over the Garigliano, went in order to rejoin under the walls of Capua Championet and Macdonald, who had advanced without meeting any obstacle as far as this place, and had even already summoned General Mack to surrender. The latter having returned a negative answer, Championet made presumptuous by victory, without waiting for the divisions of the army, attacked the outposts and advanced works of the place. He at first carried two redoubts, but he was very soon attacked and beat in his turn and obliged to retreat, leaving one General, and a considerable number of men dead on the field of battle.

The left wing of the French army, after surmounting the obstacles of the season, and of a country covered with mountains, defended by fortresses, by regular troops, and the levy in mass of the inhabitants, rejoined the right wing upon the banks of the Volturno.—General le Moine's division having proceeded 36 miles across the defiles of the mountains of Abruzzza arrived before Aquilla,
the

the capital of this province on the 18th of December, and got possession of it without resistance; the French found there considerable magazines, as well as ammunition. This division marched without loss of time to Sulmona, the central point of all the routs of Abruzzza, in order to harrass the left flank of the Neapolitans opposed to the division of General Duhem, which was quite on the left upon the Adriatic; and to cut off their retreat if they made a stand. Another column had marched at the same time by Tivoli, Viccovaro, and Securcola, with a view to support Le Moine's flank, and keep up his communication with Macdonald.

Duhem with his division, after toilsome marches, was arrived before Pescara defended by the fortress of Civitella, which commands the plain country as well as the defiles, and which fortified by nature and art, passed for impregnable; it contained 3,000 men who surrendered after a feeble resistance, abandoning to the French an immense quantity of magazines. At length, after incredible fatigues and hardships, the whole of the French army found itself re-united before Capua, between the 1st and 4th of January 1799.

General Serrurier, during this, had set off from Mo-

dena

dena on the 29th of December, with some thousands of men; the 2d of January he entered into Lucca, and imposed on it, on his way through, a contribution of 2,000,000. He proceeded from hence towards Pistoia, but having learnt that the Neapolitans had at his approach quitted Leghorn, he suspended his march; and the Directory not being yet prepared to break with the Emperor whose interests could not be separated from those of the Grand Duke, this General received orders from Joubert to march back. Meanwhile the latter was despoiling Piedmont, putting in requisition the horses, suppressing the ecclesiastical bodies and selling their effects, opening the tombs of the Kings at Superga, dishonouring and dispersing their ashes, and at last, imposing a contribution of 2,000,000 on the city of Turin and proportionable ones on the rest of the country.

While the King of Sardinia was proceeding on his melancholy journey to the place of his exile, the King of Naples alarmed, not without good reason, at the base behaviour of his troops, and the success of the enemy, had withdrawn into his capital, and not considering himself safe even there, he on the 16th of December, the day on which
 Cham-

Championet entered Rome, embarked on board the English Admiral's ship with his ministers, the foreign ambassadors, and about 400 persons in his suite, after having caused his maritime arsenals and those of his ships of war which he could not bring away, to be set fire to. He did not land till the 23d at Palermo, having experienced a frightful storm which was very near wrecking the vessel in which he was, and during which Prince Albert one of his sons six years and a half old, died of fatigue. The motives which occasioned this hasty retreat of the King of Naples have never been thoroughly known; it would not be just to accuse of pusillanimity a Prince who had so lately been giving a great example of courage in putting himself with the heir apparent to the throne at the head of his army, and who was the first who had dared to raise the standard against the Directorial tyranny. It is more than probable that the discovery of some jacobinical conspiracy, which the King had no means of preventing, obliged him precipitately to place his person in safety. This opinion gains still more weight, when it is considered that he did not think it prudent to return into his capital for many months after it was delivered from the French.

During

During this, General Mack having rallied the shattered remains of his army which still was more numerous than that of the French, occupied an entrenched camp in the plain of Caserta, having the Vulturno in front, and protected by Capua, a strong place which defends the passage of this river. By this strong and well chosen position, he held Championet in check for many days, and would have been able to maintain it longer, had not the same causes which prevented his success in the invasion of the state of the Church, still more powerfully operated against his being more fortunate in the defence of the Kingdom of Naples.—The camp of the Neapolitan army was a scene of disorder, divisions, licentiousness, and want of discipline: every day some conspiracy broke out in the middle of it: few of the officers knew how to command; and few of the soldiers were willing to obey. In these circumstances General Mack, unable notwithstanding the number of his troops to resume offensive measures, and apprehensive that he should not be able to resist the attack of the French when all their divisions should be reunited, on the 31st of December proposed a suspension of arms to Championet, who rejected it with disdain.

Since .

Since the departure of the King for Sicily, consternation prevailed in Naples, where Prince Pignatelli commanded in quality of Captain General of the Kingdom. It is not known whether the King had, before he set off, empowered him to treat with the French, or whether it was of himself that he sent to Championet an agent invested with full powers to negotiate a suspension of arms as a prelude to a definitive treaty of peace. This plenipotentiary met the French General at St. Germano the 2d of January, and proposed the surrender of Capua as a condition of the truce. It is even affirmed, but credit can hardly be given to it, that he offered in order to procure peace, to deliver to the French the remainder of the Royal navy, and to conclude with them an offensive and defensive alliance.

Championet persisted at first in his refusal to enter into any negotiations; however, having experienced on the 8th of January a considerable check in an attack upon Capua, having no heavy artillery to besiege this place in form, the armed insurrection of the peasants from the Abruzzza as far as Naples, incessantly harrassing him and cutting off his communications and

provisions, General Rusca having been made prisoner by them, and General Rey assassinated at Gaeta by a woman, the French army which had been for eight days past without tents and sustenance, perishing with hunger and cold before Capua, Championet, whose situation would have been a very critical one, if he had had to do with any other enemy, determined at length to profit by the pusillanimity of the Viceroy, of whom he obtained without striking a blow, advantages which the fortune of war might have denied him, or at least would not have bestowed at so low a price. On the 10th of January he concluded an armistice with Pignatelli, by which it was agreed that as the price of a suspension of arms, the latter should deliver up Capua, that is to say, the key of Naples, with its magazines and artillery, and even the artillery which had been taken from thence for the entrenched camp; that the French should have possession of all the country from the Mediterranean as far as the mouth of the Ofanto, by a line passing through Acerra, Acienzo, Benevent, &c. that the ports of the Kingdom of Naples should be shut to the enemies of the Republic, and that the King should pay 10,000,000 of livres, and send an am-

bassador to Paris, to treat concerning a definitive peace.

The next day the gates of Capua were opened to the French, who had not one piece of cannon to besiege it; and the other conditions of the armistice were beginning to be put in execution. But scarcely was this base capitulation known at Naples on the 12th, when a great fermentation manifested itself there. The indignation of the people broke out two days after with violence. The inhabitants of the country, and the populace of the capital, known by the name of Lazzaroni, more alive to the national honor than those who charged with the office of defending it had just prostrated it, ran to arms, crying from all parts "*Viva el Rey—Viva St. Janaro,*" and possessed themselves of many posts. Foreigners, and all the known partisans of the French run the greatest danger, and some were even massacred. General Mack, pursued by a blind rage guided by treason, was not able to escape but by taking refuge with all his staff, in the French camp*.

On

* He first took the precaution to request of General Championet a safe passage across Italy, in order to return

On the 15th the insurgents disarmed the troops which had lately come from Leghorn, armed themselves,

turn into Germany. Upon this promise this General commenced his journey, but being obliged to travel slowly in consequence of poison which had been administered to him a few days before by a Neapolitan traitor, he was arrested on his road by an order of the Directory, with all the German officers who accompanied him. It was in vain that he protested against his arrest, and that he represented that his safety had been guaranteed; and that having given in his resignation of Captain General of the Neapolitan troops, he could now only be considered as the subject of the Emperor, with whom the Republic was not at this time at war. He was conducted to Milan, and from thence to Briancon, and afterwards to Dijon, where he remained many months in close confinement. The bad state of his health, but much more the shew of justice which Bonaparte was desirous of making, when he first got into power at the close of 1799, and the hope that General Mack might be subservient to his views of a partial pacification with Austria, induced the grand Consul to permit him to repair to Paris, and live there upon his parole. He had many interviews there with him or with his agents; but the cabinet of Vienna, having at the commencement of the year 1800 rejected the pacific propositions of the grand Consul, General Mack, finding himself not so well treated as before, and fearing he could not thenceforth be able to obtain an exchange which he had been soliciting in vain during

selves, and got possession of Castel-nuovo, and Castel di Carmina. They proceeded to the greatest excesses, against all those who had been suspected of being the parizans of the French, and the same scenes of horror were to be witnessed in the streets of Naples, which polluted those of Paris, in the first days which succeeded the too famous 14th of July, 1789.

This unruly populace, after having massacred in its blind fury many worthy persons who had been marked out to them as Jacobins by their personal enemies, chose on the 16th of January for their General the young Prince Moliterno, who kept up an understanding with the French, and one of the secret chiefs of the revolutionary party. This Jacobin hypocrite had no sooner taken posses-

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sion

during fifteen months, escaped from Paris the 16th of April, and was fortunate enough to elude the vigilance of the Republicans till he arrived at Franckfort. He had previously informed Carnot the minister at war, that if he did not receive before the 15th of April, the passports which had been promised to him, he would consider himself as disengaged from his parole. Had he waited a few days longer, he might have saved himself the fatigues and trouble attending his escape; for his exchange was at the same time effected for that of the Generals Perignon and Gronchi.

sion of his new dignity, than he profited by his
 ascendancy and his popularity, by arming all the
 revolutionists who mixed with the loyal multitude :
 and he thus found means to introduce into the
 castle of St. Elmo, which commands the entry of
 Naples, some hundreds of his partizans. By a per-
 fidy without example, he repaired himself into the
 French camp, to concert there with Championet
 the means of delivering up to him the city of
 Naples, and exterminating the insurgent Loyalists.
 After having concerted the scheme between
 them, Moliterno suggested to the Lazzaroni to
 march to Capua, and to drive the French from
 thence. On the 21st of January they proceeded from
 Naples, to the number of about 30,000 men, better
 or worse armed, attacked with impetuosity the above-
 mentioned fortress, and tried several times to storm
 it, which proved unsuccessful, and as may be sup-
 posed very destructive to themselves. Their rage
 however only encreased, and they were threatening
 to scale the town upon the heaps of the carcases of
 their companions, when they were attacked in flank
 by a French column and by the patriots of Naples,
 while another Republican column advanced upon
 this town, deprived of its brave defenders, through
 Capo-

Capochino and Poggio Reale. The Lazzaroni, who had remained in Naples, astonished to see the French arrive, whom they supposed engaged with their comrades, ran to arms, and while some set the houses on fire and slaughtered those whom they supposed to have betrayed them, others attacked the French with a fury unexampled in history. The noise of the combat having apprised those who were engaged at Capua of the treason of which they were the victims, they turned back, were followed by the French, and the whole of the plain between this town and Naples, was for the space of sixty hours the scene of a most confused and bloody contest. Victory remained long uncertain; on the 21st and 22d of January the French were broken in upon several times, and experienced a considerable loss; their artillery in vain overthrew whole ranks of these brave Lazzaroni, others took their places, and renewed the battle, with still more courage and obstinacy.

At length valour assisted by order and discipline proved superior to numbers and savage intrepidity; the French entered on the 23d the principal streets of Naples, with sword and fire. The Lazzaroni disputed their ground with

them foot by foot, and harrassed them from the tops of the houses with a shower of stones and musquetry. The flaming streets were filled with mutilated carcasses, bloody and half burnt, and the city offered a spectacle of horror impossible to be described. The French, assisted by the Jacobins, and by them put in possession of the forts of St. Elm and Castelnovo which kept firing on the Royalists, succeeded in cutting off or dispersing this brave populace. The Castles of Ovo and Carmina opened their gates, and the Republicans saw themselves possessors of this capital, deluged with blood and a prey to flames.—On the morning of the following day, Championet turned his attention to the establishing good order and disarming the people. The tree of liberty was planted in the middle of the Royal Square; a provisional government was organized, as well as a national guard composed of revolutionists, among whom were to be seen with astonishment many individuals of the first families among the nobility, dignitaries of the church, and the archbishop himself. The latter invited the people to assemble at the Cathedral, where General Championet with his staff was to meet them, in order to sing a solemn Te Deum, in returning thanks for the
glorious

glorious entry of the French into this city, who, protected in a peculiar manner by Divine Providence, had regenerated the people, and had come thither to establish and consolidate their happiness. He added, St. Januarius, our protector, has given his sanction to it: the very evening of the entry of the Republicans, his blood was miraculously liquified. In fact the Saint lent a favourable ear to the fervent prayers of the devout Championet, and worked his usual miracle. The latter, in gratitude for this, hastened to fulfil the Saint's predilection for French liberty, by proclaiming the abolition of Royalty and the establishment of the Pathenopian Republic, to which he gave the present of a constitution founded on the rights of man, and which was supported by requisitions, contributions, exactions, and the usual pillage.

The limits of the new Republic scarcely extended further than the territory occupied by the French. The people of the country, sharing the courageous fidelity of the Lazzaroni, rose in a mass to oppose the invasion of the French; Cardinal Ruffo, and a priest, surnamed Grandiavolo, put themselves at the head of this loyal militia, who occupied the defiles and the mountains of Calabria, and prevented the French from penetrating there. The latter, ex-

tremely weakened by their losses, were scarcely sufficiently numerous to retain in subjection the ground of which they were in possession; and the events which took place soon after, obliged them to keep on the defensive, till the period when the successes of the Austro Russians in Italy a few months after, compelled them to evacuate the kingdom of Naples and the Roman state, and delivered those fine countries from their oppressors.

While the war was desolating the south of Italy, the Emperor, a quiet spectator of the dethronement of two Kings, one of whom was his near relation, seemed only anxious to negotiate with the enemies of all thrones, but he was meditating in silence the means of avenging the injuries of his House, and those of Europe.

The congress of Rastadt had not ceased consuming their time in forms and puerile discussions, and had presented to the eyes of the world nothing but a veil contrived to cover the projects of the two principal powers, who sought in vain to reconcile their ambition and their interests. During the whole of the time that they were negotiating, and endeavouring to impose upon one another with captious propositions, each on his own side made formidable

formidable preparations, which in other times would probably have procured peace ; but the revolution which has overturned every thing, both in a moral and physical respect, seem to have changed even maxims and adages. The old axiom, *Si vis pacem para bellum*, since the reign of hypocritical philanthropy, was become *si vis bellum, para pacem*. Every note of the Directory, was a philosophical homily upon its pacific dispositions, and each of its acts was a provocation to war.

General Bernadotte, whom the Directory had after the conclusion of the treaty of Campo Formio, sent to Vienna in quality of ambassador, and who was commissioned to accustom if possible the House of Austria to the same humiliations with which its agents loaded other crowned heads, had faithfully executed his mission ; but after having provoked that court by all sorts of insults, having gone so far as to celebrate in his house the Republican orgies and in hoisting upon it the three coloured flag, the indignant populace riotously assembled together, and he only escaped their fury by withdrawing from Vienna with precipitation. It had been universally expected, that this event would be the signal for a rupture between two jarring and

discordant powers, but it had produced nothing but the conferences of Selz, where the difference which occasioned it was scarcely mentioned, and where both parties were only occupied in modifying and changing the secret and public articles of the treaty of Campo Formio.—It has been seen by the tenor of both, that the Emperor had not only consented to the dismemberment of the Empire, but had himself forwarded it, by delivering up Mentz to the French in exchange for Venice; and that new arrangements of the same kind, had been, if not definitively settled, at least agreed upon in principle. These plans of partition, in which the Directory was desirous of having the lion's share, having caused difficulties by no means easy to remove, the Emperor who still wished if possible, to avoid war, prorogued the conferences of Selz, where his agents were less occupied in objecting to the possession of Switzerland and the Roman state by the French, than in demanding equally for their Sovereign an increase of correspondent power.

The Imperial commissioners made to those of the Directory various propositions, which all tended to accommodate themselves at the expence of
others,

others, and to procure aggrandisement without a compensation to Prussia: They were all rejected by the Directory, who wished to keep on good terms with the latter power, who feared to aggrandize Austria, and was besides pretty near decided upon re-commencing the war. It became from that time inevitable, and each of the two powers only awaited the moment, and the means of making it with advantage. Preparations were made for it on both sides with activity, although with mystery. The Emperor had suffered Switzerland to be revolutionized without opposition, but perceiving all the advantages which the French would be enabled to derive from the possession of this country in an offensive war against Germany, on the easily obtained invitation of a part of the inhabitants of the Grison country, he had caused that country to be occupied by his troops, which is the key of the Tyrol and of Austria, and where the vallies which form the Hereditary dominions, and the rivers which water them, begin. His troops had even dislodged some French posts, which had advanced upon the Grison territory. It had been imagined that the haughty Republic would resent this affront, and would avenge it sword in hand, but the moment

of

of its taking revenge was not arrived : all its measures were not entirely concerted. The levy of 200,000 conscripts, (decreed in the month of October 1798), had not yet reinforced the armies ; Ehrenbreitstein which in contempt of all agreements and all principles of the law of nations its troops had invested, was not at that time fallen into their hands ; the Kings of Sardinia and Naples, were not yet precipitated from their thrones : The Directory in consequence blamed and disavowed the conduct of its Generals ; this, added to the silence which the court of Vienna had preserved on the subject of the revolution of Switzerland, made it even believed at the time that these respective transactions had been mutually agreed and determined upon.

It may be easily supposed, that in such circumstances the negotiations of Rastadt were scarcely at all forwarded, and almost all the year 1798 was consumed in vain altercations.—The Directory submitted patiently to all the forms of the Germanic chancery, because the prolongation of the conferences afforded it the means of consolidating its past usurpations, and of ripening those which it was planning

ning. Its troops, in spite of the armistice concluded between France and the Empire, had carried by assault the fort of Manheim, and had dared to stigmatize as assassins the brave soldiers who were its defenders: Ehrenbreitstein straitly blockaded, was daily becoming short of provisions; such was the advantage which the Directory procured to itself in Germany by the prolongation of the negotiations. At length, however, on the peremptory demand of the French plenipotentiaries, the Congress consented to accept for the ground of the treaty, the cession of the left bank of the Rhine. The commissioners from the Emperor sanctioned this clause, a necessary basis to the accomplishment of the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio. In concert with them those of the Republic, proposed afterwards to take into consideration the secularizations to be made in order to indemnify the Princes, who should be dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the river. It was to this point the Directory had wished to bring matters. This proposition was a brand of discord by which it hoped to inflame the covetousness of the one party, and excite the fear of the other, to divide the interests and views of the Princes of the Empire, to disorganize the Germanic

manic body, and perhaps even to embroil Prussia with Austria.—The latter still flattering herself with the accomplishment of her objects, continued for some time to negotiate upon this second basis, but very soon perceiving that the Directory, after having laid down the first for its own advantage, concerned itself very little about the establishment of the second, and that if it wished to dismember Germany, it was less to augment than to diminish the Austrian power there, judged from this moment, that she had nothing advantageous to expect from the continuance of the negotiations, and prepared herself for war in earnest, reinforced the division which occupied the Grison country, increased the number of the troops which she had upon the Lech and the Adige, and directed her attention to strengthening her continental connections, as well as those beyond the sea, which had been broken or weakened by the treaty of Campo Formio.

The Throne of Russia was filled by the son of Catherine II. She had rendered her name celebrated by ruling with splendour the Empire which she had usurped, and in extending its limits already too remote at the expence of the feeble successors of Soliman and Sobiesky. The patroness of arts
and

and sciences, which she had naturalised in her states hitherto half Barbarian, she had received in return for the favours which she had lavished on the literati and the philosophers, pompous eulogiums, which had not a little contributed to fill Europe with the sound of her praise. When their doctrines had sapped the foundation of all social institutions, Catherine, thinking herself sheltered from the contagion and the influence of them, by the remote situation of her kingdom and the very barbarism of her subjects, contented herself with withdrawing her protection from her old favourites, and with opposing to their principles declarations and manifestos, without opposing armies to their armies. She seemed to wait for the moment when the disorganization of Europe would permit her to strike a sure and fatal blow to the Ottoman Empire. Her gigantic ambition knew no limits except those which nature assigns to all human enterprises. She died, and Paul I. was her successor. He shewed himself animated with no less ambition than his mother; but it was that of being protector of the weak, the avenger of the oppressed, and the prop of Europe. He hastened to form a more close connection with England, who having anticipated him in this honourable career continued

to

to profess the same principles ; concluded with her treaties, by which the one engaged to furnish, and the other pay more than 60,000 men generously destined for the defence of continental powers ; declared himself the friend of all governments, except that of the Jacobins to whom he vowed endless war, and offered to all whom the latter menaced, his navy and his soldiers. Far from thinking of invading the Bosphorus, his fleets crossed it in order to unite themselves to those of the Sultan. Wishing to prevent the Germanic body from concluding an ignominious peace with the enemies to all real peace, he offered it an extensive and disinterested protection, and before even the Emperor of Germany was himself firmly bent upon taking up arms, he sent him 20,000 of his choicest soldiery, whom 40,000 others were ready to follow, and did follow ; and he put at their head a General, who of all the various chances of war, had never known any other than victory.

The Russian troops arrived about the end of December 1798 in the Hereditary dominions, and waited on the banks of the Danube for the unfolding of the shameful and ridiculous scene which was acted at Rastadt. The Directory a little time after,
reaped

reaped the last fruit, which it had promised itself from the delay of the negociations. Colonel Faber who commanded in the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein was obliged to surrender it the 17th of January, 1799, after twenty-two months of a blockade more or less close. This brave man did not yield till near the last extremity, and after experiencing all the horrors of famine. The Directory waited only for this event in order to change its tone and language; it was not ignorant of the treaties by which England, meditating the deliverance of Europe, had brought the Emperor Paul to take an active part in the affairs of Germany, and the arrival of the first auxiliary Russian corps in the Hereditary dominions, no longer permitted it to doubt of the grand coalition which was forming against itself. Having reason nevertheless to believe that though receiving the eventual succours of the Emperor of Russia, the Emperor of Germany was not yet perfectly resolved upon making use of them, still preserving the hopes of terrifying or seducing him, and being desirous above every thing else, of gaining time to prepare itself for war and procure the fall of Ehrenbreitstein, it had observed silence respecting the march of the Russians;

but as soon as it was confident of the fall of this fortress, it caused to be remitted on the 2d of January by its ministers, a note to the deputation of the Empire, by which it was signified, *that if the Diet of Ratisbon consented, or even if it did not oppose the entry of the Russians upon the German territory, the Republic should consider this act as a rupture of the armistice and the negotiation.* The French ministers remitted at the same time to that of the Emperor, a note very much resembling the former, but somewhat less menacing ; in which they declared to him, *that the further march of the Russians, would be looked upon as a rupture of the ties of friendship, which united the two States.* The Congress of Rastadt, the Diet of Ratisbon, and the minister of the Emperor, referred themselves for an answer to the cabinet of Vienna, which returned none; or at least not a categorical one.

While these things were taking place at Rastadt, the Directory was engaged, but with little success, in collecting the pecuniary and military means, of which it stood in need to recommence war. The hatred in which it was held, prevented the greatest number of the conscripts from resorting to its standard, and the want of money prevented those who had done it from
being

being accoutred and armed. The Directory weaned counsels with messages upon the bad state of the finances, and with proposals for establishing new imposts. Compelled to resort to the monarchical system of revenue, it had intended to re-establish with some modifications the tax upon salt, known formerly by the name of the Gabelle, and not doubting the obedience of the counsels in decreeing this, it had mortgaged beforehand the product of it to a company of stockjobbers, who had promised some millions upon this security, having immediate want of the money to give the armies, clothing, bread, and part of the arrears of their pay. The contrary turned out to be the case, the tax upon salt was refused, the company were not willing any longer to give the money they had promised; the soldiers naked and half-starved demanded loudly that they should receive what they stood in need of, or that they should send them to seize it on the other side of the Rhine. Scarcely then had Ehrenbreitstein fallen into the hands of their troops, when the Directory sent orders to their plenipotentiaries, to mark the circle of Popilius around the Emperor, and these by a note dated the 1st of February, demanded a positive

assurance, that the Russian troops should evacuate the territory of His Imperial Majesty, that his orders should be given in consequence of this, and that a catagorical answer should be given in 15 days, without which his silence, or the further march of the Russians, would be considered by the Republic as an act of hostility.

In the mean time the Elector Palatine having died on the 16th of February, it was thought for a moment, that this event would detain the sword in its scabbard, and that the Emperor and France would make a mutual arrangement at the expence of his successor; but the cabinet of Vienna was too much engaged with that of Petersburg, and already also on too bad terms with that of Luxemburgh, to be able to recede. It thought then of nothing else than repelling with vigour the aggression which the Directory was already openly preparing, and suffered the term which the latter had dared to fix, to elapse without returning any answer. Matters were in this state at the close of February 1799.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.



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